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Abstract
This thesis examines Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontology and argues that his conception of
consciousness as individuated nothingness is responsible for the discontented human condition
he describes. It further argues that this ontology is at variance with our experience, and as such
the human condition is not inevitably unhappy. Instead, a phenomenological description of
consciousness as transpersonal and full is advanced. A transpersonal ontology of consciousness
asserts that consciousnesses are not entirely individuated from one another, but constitutively
constructed by “other” consciousnesses, which renders them full. Consciousness as
transpersonal leads to a reconceptualization of the subject-other relationship as an I-as-otherother-as-me relationship. Transpersonal consciousness is then employed to re-interpret Sartre’s
discontents, and largely resolves the unhappy features of the human condition by leading to the
possibility of peaceful relationships with ourselves and harmonious relationships with others.

Table of Contents

I.

Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1

II.

Chapter 2: Sartre’s Discontent and Redemption .................................................................. 5
A. The Problem........................................................................................................................ 5
B. Phenomenology and the Investigation ................................................................................ 8
C. The Language and Success Criterion of the Investigation................................................ 15

III.

Chapter 3: Sartre’s Ontology: Summary and Critique ....................................................... 22

Part I. Exposition of Sartre’s Ontology ..................................................................................... 22
A. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-In-Itself .................................................................................... 23
B. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-For-Itself .................................................................................. 24
C. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-For-Itself Continued and Internal Nihilations ......................... 29
D. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-for-others ................................................................................. 33
Part II: Evaluating Sartre’s Ontology ........................................................................................ 34
A. Is Sartre’s Consciousness a Nothingness? ........................................................................ 35
B. Values, Choices, Projects, Situations and the Ego............................................................ 43
C. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 53
Part III. Language and the Ontology of Consciousness ............................................................ 54
A. Sartre’s General Ontology Re-Considered ....................................................................... 54
B. General Ontological and Methodological Conclusions .................................................... 67
IV.

Chapter 4: Transpersonal Consciousness........................................................................... 70
A. Examining Sartre’s Phenomenological Reduction ........................................................... 70
B. Epistemic Limitations of the Reduction and a Revised Structure of Consciousness ....... 80
C. Overview of Transpersonal Consciousness ...................................................................... 83
D. Sartre’s Being-for-others Re-examined ............................................................................ 90
E. The Origin of Individuation and the Peculiar Ontology of Consciousness ...................... 97
F. Transpersonal Phenomenology of Grief.......................................................................... 103

V.

Chapter 5: Resolving Sartre’s Discontents ...................................................................... 109

Part I: Discontents of Sartre’s Ontology ................................................................................. 109
A. Discontents within Ourselves: Meaninglessness, Nausea, Anguish, Anxiety and Isolation
............................................................................................................................................. 109

B. Discontents within Ourselves: Bad Faith, Lack and Death Distress .............................. 112
C. Discontents with Others: Shame, Alienation, Exploitation and Guilt ............................ 118
D. Conclusions Regarding Sartre’s Ontology and Its Discontents ...................................... 123
Part II: The Resolution of Sartre’s Discontents ...................................................................... 125
A. Freedom in Transpersonal Ontology .............................................................................. 125
B. The Ego in Transpersonal Ontology ............................................................................... 128
C. The Other and Freedom in Transpersonal Ontology ...................................................... 136
D. Sartre’s Lack Re-interpreted ........................................................................................... 140
E. Sartre’s Shame, Alienation, Exploitation, and Guilt Reinterpreted ................................ 145
F. Simone de Beauvoir and Transpersonal Ontology .......................................................... 148
G. Sartre’s Bad Faith and Authenticity Reinterpreted ......................................................... 152
H. Sartre’s Anguish, Anxiety, and Isolation Reinterpreted ................................................. 155
I. Sartre’s Meaninglessness and Nausea Reinterpreted ....................................................... 157
J. Sartre’s Love Reinterpreted ............................................................................................. 160
K. Sartre’s Death Distress Reinterpreted ............................................................................. 164
VI.

Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Afterthoughts ............................................... 170
A. Summary of Discontents and Ontology .......................................................................... 170
B. Other Philosophical Implications of Transpersonal Ontology........................................ 174

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 179

1

I.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Sartre explicitly asserts his philosophy to be a phenomenological description and analysis of the
human condition absent God. He advances an ontology that intrinsically entails an “unhappy
consciousness”1 characterized by anxiety, anguish, nausea, shame, conflict, exploitation, and
dehumanization. The existence of these unhappy features of the human condition hardly needs
defense given their ubiquity, but did Sartre successfully identify their origins in ontology? This
thesis evaluates Sartre’s phenomenological ontology by describing and analyzing mundane
experience to elucidate how it creates and might remedy our discontent. I ultimately reject
Sartre’s ontology of consciousness as an individuated nothingness that creates discontent, and
replace it with a transpersonal ontology of consciousness that largely rejects subject-other
dualism and provides the ontological basis for human happiness.
Chapter 2 sets the stage for the investigation by explaining the phenomenological method
that is employed and clarifying the language often used to communicate experiences with
unverifiable intersubjective meanings that vary among persons and groups. Because figurative
language is employed to express our phenomenology, caution is advised when making fine
grained distinctions among subjective experiences and abstract concepts without concrete
denotations. Given a phenomenological method and these limitations of language the success
criterion for the investigation is identified as “phenomenological verisimilitude,” defined as
accurate articulation of what it is like to be human.

1

Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes, (U.S.A: Simon &Shuster, 1956),
140.
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Part I of Chapter 3 reviews Sartre’s ontology to provide the context within which the
investigation proceeds. He conceives a tripartite structure of being composed of being-in-itself,
being-for-itself, and being-for-others, which all exist in a “synthetic totality.”2 He designates the
non-conscious stuff of the universe as being-in-itself contrasted with human existence
characterized by consciousness that is being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is infinitely dense and
self-identical, whereas being-for-itself is a nothingness. Sartre’s third ontological structure is
being-for-others in which we become aware that others are also consciousnesses, and as such
foci of worlds they create in which we are objects incorporated into their worlds and goals.
Part II of Chapter 3 evaluates Sartre’s ontology of consciousness and challenges his claim
that consciousness is a nothingness by distinguishing between his most basic phenomenology
and his cognized phenomenology, and concludes that he mistakenly privileges his cognized
phenomenology. By contrast his basic phenomenology leads to a consciousness that is not a
nothingness, but content-ed by telos that creates values, projects and their situations, and the ego.
Part III of Chapter 3 evaluates Sartre’s overall ontology and concludes that his ontology of
consciousness is based on language created to communicate about substances. Using this
language from a different regional ontology to describe consciousness leads to a mistaken
ontology of consciousness as a nothingness that contributes to the discontents Sartre identifies.
Chapter 4 begins by reconsidering Sartre’s phenomenological reduction and finds that his
conclusion that consciousness is a nothingness is based on his consciousness that is content-ed
by others, rendering his conclusion self-negating. Sartre’s inability to realize this feature of his

2

Sartre, Being, 3.
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consciousness is then identified as a general epistemic limitation in consciousness’ ability to look
at itself. Consciousness is then reconceived as transpersonal and thickly content-ed by others
rather than individuated nothingness as Sartre describes. Transpersonal theory maintains that
consciousness is not primordially individuated; instead, “each” consciousness is constitutively
constructed by other consciousnesses, such that the boundary between consciousnesses is
ontologically permeable and diffuse. We are not primordially anything but “others,” who
constitutively construct each of us. In this manner, there is a transpersonal constitutive process
that challenges the idea of others as Other. Sartre’s being-for-others is then reconsidered and
found to advance a primordial consciousness that is also transpersonal. Next the origin of
individuation within a transpersonal ontology of consciousness is explicated, and the peculiar
ontology of consciousness is advanced. The chapter then closes by examining the
phenomenology of grief to illustrate transpersonal consciousness.
Part I of Chapter 5 describes Sartre’s discontents and connects them to his ontology of
consciousness as an individuated nothingness. Part II begins by using transpersonal ontology to
reconceive freedom as more than the capacity to make unimpeded choices, but to actually create
previously unforeseen possibilities. The ego as an actual structure of consciousness is then
rehabilitated given consciousness is no longer a nothingness, but a thickly content-ed peculiar
being. Blending freedom as identification of novel possibilities and an actual ego, others then
become critical to confer insight into the content-ed consciousness of individuals so that novel
possibilities can be created that individuals could not see on their own. This conception of
freedom and the role of others is then briefly distinguished from Simone de Beauvoir’s view of
freedom. Sartre’s specific discontents are then re-interpreted using a transpersonally content-ed
consciousness inhabited by an ego and the freedom expansion others promise to confer.

4

Chapter 6 concludes by providing a summary of the human condition within a
transpersonally content-ed ontology of consciousness and considers some further philosophical
implications of such an ontology.
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II.

Chapter 2: Sartre’s Discontent and Redemption

A. The Problem

God had been moribund for centuries when Friedrich Nietzsche finally declared Him dead in
1882.3 In the wake of God’s final demise and during the upheaval of the first half of the
twentieth century Jean-Paul Sartre began articulating a philosophy of existence absent God.4 His
phenomenological ontology leads to a grim depiction of the human condition succinctly
expressed by the titles of his fictional works Nausea and No Exit, and the conclusion of Being
and Nothingness that “Man is a useless passion.”5 In Existentialism is a Humanism Sartre
defends his philosophy against charges that it is grim, denying it is “...a pessimistic description
of man, for no doctrine is more optimistic, the destiny of man is placed within himself.’’6 While
his existentialism places human destiny within our own power, the claim that it is optimistic
cannot be taken seriously given the description of the human condition in Being and
Nothingness.
In particular, Sartre’s ontology entails two distinct but related spheres of unhappiness:
intra-personal unhappiness filled with anxiety, anguish, nausea, and similar experiences of and
within ourselves, and inter-personal unhappiness characterized by shame, conflict, exploitation,

3

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,
1974).
4
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2007)
5
Sartre, Being, 784.
6
Sartre, Existentialism, 40.
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dehumanization, and other relational discontents.7 These unhappy features of the human
condition are indisputable, but does Sartre accurately identify their origin in ontology? Does he
courageously “draw all the conclusions inferred from a consistently atheistic point of view” as he
claims or is his ontology misconceived, which then leads to a dark depiction of the human
condition?8
The current investigation seeks to answer this question by examining what Joseph S.
Catalano describes as the “concrete situation of man’s existence”9 and Martin Heidegger
describes as “‘Being-in-the-world.’”10 The investigation seeks to describe human existence as a
lived situation, so-called human-being-in-the-world, by examining and then reconceiving
Sartre’s ontology of consciousness and the human condition it creates.
Like Sartre’s project, this investigation does not seek to understand a particular person or
group of persons. It is an ontological, not an empirical investigation, which seeks to understand
our ontology as beings, the type of being that is human being. It follows Sartre’s conception of
ontology, “In this sense ontology appears to us capable of being defined as the specification of
the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality.”11 Also like Sartre, it seeks to
understand the structure of consciousness by examining human subjectivity, our first-person
experience of ourselves and the world using a phenomenological method. An ontology of

Sartre’s ontology evaluated by this investigation is drawn from The Transcendence of the Ego
and Being and Nothingness. For expository purposes intrapersonal and interpersonal are divided,
and the somewhat artificial and misleading nature of this distinction becomes clear in Chapter 4.
8
Sartre, Existentialism, 53.
9
Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, (The
University of Chicago Press: USA, 1974), xi.
10
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (USA: Harper
and Rowe). 79.
11
Sartre, Being, 395.
7
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human being and the human condition it creates is guided by asking Thomas Nagel’s Question
“What is it like to be a bat ?” applied to human subjectivity.12 Thus, our experience of “What is it
like to be a human?” provides the phenomenology from which to understand our ontology, the
most basic “structures of being” human and the basic structures of consciousness.13
The thesis argues that Sartre’s ontology errs along two critical dimensions that lead
inexorably to discontent: consciousness is a nothingness and consciousness is individuated. By
contrast, a different ontology is proposed in which consciousness is thickly content-ed and
constitutively identified with the Other. This conception of consciousness as full rather than a
nothingness, and transpersonal rather than individuated, challenges the traditional subject-other
dualism that Sartre employs, and leads the way out of his discontent to a very different
description of what it is like to be a human. The following sections of this chapter lay the
foundation on which the investigation will unfold by identifying its method as
phenomenological, its language as largely figurative, and its success criterion as
“phenomenological verisimilitude” and “articulation.” Explicating this foundation for the
investigation occupies the remainder of the chapter.

This is a reference to Thomas Nagel’s famous illustration of the subjectivity of consciousness
by asking what it is like to be a bat. Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”
Philosophical Review, October, 1974.
13
Sartre, Being, 395.
12
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B. Phenomenology and the Investigation

By subtitling Being and Nothingness “A phenomenological essay on ontology” Sartre signals his
intention to use a phenomenological method. The phenomenological method advanced by
Edmund Husserl seeks a return “back to the ‘things’ themselves” in their most primordial
presentation in (or to) consciousness.14 M. A. Natanson describes the method as “the attempt to
construct a ‘presuppositionless’ method and a philosophy which will begin with that ‘root’
experience or givenness which neither reflection nor dialectic nor scientific disciplines of any
order can meaningfully deny.”15
Despite Sartre’s intention to follow this method, there is debate about how faithfully he
deploys it. For example, Natanson asserts that in the Introduction of Being and Nothingness
Sartre intends a phenomenological method using Husserl’s reduction only to abandon it as the
book unfolds in favor of one that is “...a quasi-phenomenological sort of method.”16 This
argument rests at least partially upon the observation that in Being and Nothingness Sartre
affirms the existence of being as a consequence of the for-itself rather than via phenomenological
reduction, Sartre’s so-called “ontological proof.”17 Sartre states, “Consciousness is
consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of
consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself. This is

14

Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2nd edition, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge,
2001 [1900/1901]), 168.
15
M. A. Natanson, A Critique of Jean Paul Sartre’s Ontology (University of Nebraska: Lincoln,
1951), 67.
16
Natanson, Critique 71. Sartre’s fidelity to a phenomenological method as relevant to the
current investigation is considered in Chapters 3 and 4.
17
Sartre, Being, 23.

9

what we call the ontological proof.”18 Thomas W. Busch, on the other hand, argues that Sartre
does employ a phenomenological method in Being and Nothingness, which yields insight into
the nothingness of consciousness.19 Sartre’s fidelity to the phenomenological method is relevant
to the current investigation and is examined in subsequent chapters.
The key feature of phenomenological investigation is its primarily descriptive character.
Sebastian Gardner observes, “Phenomenology is a descriptive science, and what it describes is
whatever is given to (pure) consciousness, qua given.”20 Thus, rather than being critical or
deductive, phenomenology proceeds by intuition and introspection. For phenomenology
intuition is consciousness’ primordial encounter or confrontation with an object or itself. Forrest
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, editors of The Transcendence of the Ego describe intuition
“...for the phenomenologist the primary mode of evidence is intuitive. An intuition is…an act of
consciousness by which the object under investigation is confronted, rather than merely indicated
in absentia.”21 Introspection for phenomenology is observing our stream of consciousness while
suspending (bracketing) our naive, common-sense, “natural attitude” and its metaphysical and
epistemological assumptions.22 Dan Zahavi asserts we should “...let the originary giving

18

Sartre, Being, 23.
Thomas W. Busch, “Sartre’s Use of the Reduction: Being and Nothingness Reconsidered,” in
Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy, ed. Hugh J. Silverman and
Frederick A. Elliston (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981), 17-29.
20
Sebastian Gardner, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Continuum International Publishing
Group: New York, 2009), 11.
21
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. “notes,” In The Transcendence of the Ego, eds.
Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. (Hill and Wang: New York) 110.
22
John Cogan, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Phenomenological Reduction,”
(USA).
19
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intuition be the source of all knowledge, a source that no authority (not even modern science)
should be allowed to question...”23
Consequently, Natanson notes the naive so-called natural attitude is replaced by a
“phenomenological attitude,” which is a “radical departure,”24 and amplifies Husserl’s statement,
“Instead of now remaining at this standpoint [the natural attitude], we propose to alter it
radically.”25 The method involves a “transcendental reduction” (epoche) that suspends
philosophical assumptions and “‘leads one back to the ‘pure’ consciousness of an individual
knower as the starting point for philosophy’” and an “eidetic reduction” that seeks to discern
ontological essences rather than empirical facts.26 According to Husserl, the “‘pure’
consciousness” revealed by the epoche is a transcendental consciousness that discerns essences.27
Though Sartre rejects the ideas of transcendental consciousness and essences, he follows
Husserl’s attempt to discern an uncorrupted presuppositionless apprehension of the world by
what he calls “pure reflection.”28 By contrast impure reflection is consciousness reflecting upon
itself with the agenda of conceiving itself as a thing, which violates the phenomenological
method’s goal of being suppositionless. In Being and Nothingness he describes his
phenomenological method:

Dan Zahavi, “Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity,” Journal
of Consciousness Studies, no. 5-7 (2001), 45.
23

24

Natanson, Critique, 67.
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: an introduction to pure phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson
(Eastford Connecticut: Martino Fine Books, 2017), 107
26
Marvin Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, (Oxfordshire, England: Routledge, 2006)
353, quoted in Natanson, Critique, 68.
27
Farber Foundations, quoted in Natanson, Critique, 68.
28
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest Williams and William
Kirkpatrick, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1960), 13.
25
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The phenomenon is what manifests itself, and being manifests itself to all in some
way, since we can speak of it and since we have a certain comprehension of it.
Thus, there must be for it a phenomenon of being, an appearance of being, capable
of description as such. Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate
access-boredom nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the
phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is without intermediary.29

In The Transcendence of the Ego he states “Phenomenology is a scientific, not a Critical, study
of consciousness. Its essential way of proceeding is by intuition,”30 and affirms the definition of
intuition noted above, “Intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing.”31
The current investigation follows Sartre’s method of “reflective description”32 by looking
deeply and carefully upon human experience while bracketing presuppositions, and thereby

29

Sartre, Being, 7.
Sartre, Transcendence, 35. Note that Sartre’ capitalizes “Critical” as a proper noun to denote
the approach by Kant whose “Critical philosophy” examined the epistemic foundations required
for knowledge.
Desan describes Sartre’s method in Being and Nothingness, “Phenomenology is a method which
wants to describe all that manifests itself as it manifests itself.” p. 5
31
Sartre, Being, 240. Sartre observes that Husserl’s conception of intuition is a bit different and
might be formulated as “presence of the thing (Sache) ‘in person’ to consciousness” (Being,
240), whereas Sartre focuses on the presence of consciousness to the thing. However, their
different formulations of intuition are based on their differing ontologies, and need not concern
us here.
32
Sartre, Being, 301. While this conception of Sartre’s method is different than he might
advance, the features delineated are implicit despite their lack of explicit articulation. Detailed
arguments supporting this revised description are left for another occasion.
30
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gaining insight beyond the natural attitude. This is Sartre’s “pure reflection”33 or “preontological, phenomenological description,”34 and what I call “basic phenomenology.”35 Basic
phenomenology is our most primordial confrontation with the object as it appears in (or to)
consciousness. Eugen Fink, an exponent of Husserl’s phenomenology explains,

…Husserl arrives at the “hypothesis” of phenomenology in the determination of
orginarity as intuition. For him seeing is original evidence. It is the mode of
consciousness in which the existent shows itself in its “flesh and blood” existence,
the mode in which the existent presents itself...Instead of speculating
argumentatively about the justification for seeing and setting forth empty,
contrary possibilities constructed by thought, seeing is to be exercised, original
evidence is to be produced. It is precisely in this way that seeing is to be
determined to be the ultimate “criterion” for all mere possibilities constructed by
thought. Seeing is legitimized only by its accomplishment: the showing of the
existent itself.36

33
34

Sartre, Transcendence, 13.
Sartre, Being, 159.

The term “basic” suggests an “unmediated” confrontation similar to Sartre’s in that the
confrontation is not mediated by mental representations; the object is directly confronted rather
than representations of the object.
36
Eugen Fink, “The Problem of the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl,” in Apriori and World,
W. eds. McKenna et. al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 41.
35
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Also like Sartre this investigation takes consciousness itself as the starting point, and in assessing
the primordial confrontation with objects follows his use of mundane consciousness, the
consciousness of daily experience, rather than mystical or other non-ordinary states of
consciousness such as those articulated by Fink, who states,

Again and again the motion of the spirit, unfolding itself in that motion, is
snatched away into some kind of worldly position of its self-understanding. Only
the phenomenological radicalism which wants resolutely to ground philosophy
upon the idea of pure self-meditation, without bringing meditation which has been
set into motion under control by arguments and considerations which have sprung
forth from the naive, pre-given understanding of ‘self-meditation’ - only this
radicalism opens a fundamentally non-worldly position of the spirit from out of
which the world can be grasped and spiritually over-powered.37

The basic phenomenology of mundane experience then leads to two possible
apprehensions. First it could produce insight that adds to our understanding of ontology and the
human condition. Insight discerns some feature of human subjectivity or the human condition
that is contrary, different, missed, or obscured by the natural attitude. Second, basic
phenomenology could disclose or reveal something beyond or other than what is apprehend in

37

Eugen Fink. "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Accomplish? (The
Phenomenological Idea of Laying-a-Ground),” trans. Arthur Grugan, Research in
Phenomenology 2, no. 1 (1972): 21-22.
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our most immediate confrontation (insight), but which is hidden or unappreciated by the natural
attitude; it could disclose or reveal our ontology in a manner similar to that employed by
Heidegger in Being and Time.
Finally, basic phenomenology (insight and disclosure) can be the basis of what I call
cognized phenomenology, which is basic phenomenology conceptualized and used for reasoning
to derive additional conclusions beyond those of insight or disclosure; basic phenomenology can
be exploited to go further than our direct experience alone permits. Wilifred Desan observes
Sartre (and Heidegger) “...attempt to ‘systematize’ their experience and to build out of their
subjective view some kind of objective and universal ontology.”38
Following Husserl’s goal of returning back to the things themselves and the foregoing
discussion, several conclusions about the phenomenological method used in this investigation
can be advanced. While each type of phenomenological apprehension (basic and cognized) is
valuable, basic phenomenology is considered the most persuasive because of its more immediate
apprehension. When basic phenomenology conflicts with cognized phenomenology, basic is
usually to be preferred given it does not require inferred or rationally derived conclusions.
Insight is the core phenomenological apprehension, the closest to the thing itself, and as one
moves away from it, first in disclosure, and further in cognized phenomenology, one becomes
removed from the “thing in itself” and the persuasiveness of the conclusions becomes less
compelling.

38

Wilifred Desan, The Tragic Finale, (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1954), 7.
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C. The Language and Success Criterion of the Investigation

Communicating an ontology based on a phenomenological description of consciousness raises
problems of language. Consider that generally language denoting objects, actions, or processes
with concrete external referents readily permits communication. Nouns, verbs, and adjectives
attach to observable entities, actions, or their qualities, and while their exact boundaries may be
fuzzy, communication is relatively unproblematic, and boundary disputes usually adjudicable.
By contrast, communicating the ontology of consciousness, which is neither concrete nor
external, does not permit direct referents.39 Instead, experiences of consciousness must be
communicated using figurative language that expresses them as if they were concrete external
entities, events, processes, qualities, and so on. Thus, language describing consciousness must
necessarily be figurative rather than literal. The language of one domain is used to explain a
different domain for which no such readily understandable language exists.
Zoltan Kovecses calls the domain from which we draw the language and to which it
applies by way of literal denotation, the “source domain,” and the domain to which we apply the
language, the domain about which we seek to communicate, and which uses the source domain
language figuratively, the “target domain.”40 He observes that the most common target domains
for which language with concrete verifiable denotations is used are abstract concepts and mental
states. Following Kovecses formulation, in the current investigation the source domain is the

The word “external” is being used in a purely conventional sense as that which is “outside”
(also being used in a conventional sense) consciousness, and can be apprehended via sensory
perception and empirically verified among people.
40
Zoltan Kovecses, Metaphor: A Practical Introduction, (Second Edition. Oxford University
Press: New York, 2010).
39
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extended, concrete physical world and its actions, processes, or qualities, and the target domain
is consciousness, that is subjectivity.41
By way of example, consider the commonly described state of consciousness
communicated by the word “depression.” While our culture readily understands “depression” as
a state of consciousness (target domain), we easily forget that “depression” is a noun denoting an
area of lower elevation resulting from compression or some other force pushing down on the
area that depresses it relative to those surrounding it (source domain). An easy method for
creating and observing a depression is to slam a hammer into a wooden table, which creates a
dent or depression in the wood. The figurative use of depression to denote an experience of
consciousness that feels as if one is a “depression” or “depressed” is so common that we often
overlook that it is figurative.
But does figurative language have a role in philosophy? Does its use not begin to move
us into literature or perhaps even poetry? Recall that this investigation seeks to investigate the
ontology of consciousness from a first-person perspective to discern if Sartre’s grim conclusions
about the human condition are inevitable. Therefore, the only avenue through which to verbally
communicate is figurative language that expresses subjective experiences (target domain) with
language that in its literal meaning applies only to objects, and their qualities and processes, with
verifiable external referents (source domain). Not only does figurative language have a role to
play in phenomenological philosophy describing consciousness, as noted above it is
indispensable. Using a figurative statement such as “I feel like a depression” shortened to “I feel

Using the word “concrete” to denote physical reality is itself a figure of speech, but one that
deploys the same domain for its source and target.
41
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depressed” is the only type of verbal language that communicates the state of consciousness,
though of course alternative figures of speech could be employed.
As noted, while literal language using words with direct denotations communicates about
objects by referring directly to them, figurative language communicates by referring to
something other than that to which it refers. Thus, in contrast to language with direct
denotations, to literalize a metaphor or other figurative language, “to take it literally,” is to fail to
understand it. Said differently, metaphors say one thing so as to mean another. But this raises
the question of how one understands metaphorical language that does not mean what it means.
How do we come to such an understanding? This question is central to the current investigation:
the entire enterprise of constructing a phenomenological ontology can only be communicated via
language, and if that language fails to be understood any insights from the investigation will
remain private.
If the subjectivity that comprises a phenomenology of consciousness must be
communicated figuratively, then these communications can be understood only if the peculiar
meanings of their metaphors are known as learned knowledge or intuitively grasped by virtue of
a background of intersubjective meanings or innate mental mechanisms. Lin Ma and Aihua Liu
observe that common cross-cultural figures of speech for mental states are employed, which
suggests they express a universal conceptual apparatus.42 Despite their observation, figures of
speech still require interpretation and admit of greater idiosyncrasy than literal communication.

Lin Ma & Liu, Aihua, “A Universal Approach to Metaphors,” Intercultural Communication
Studies XVII: 1 (2008).
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For example, to say that someone is a “pig” presupposes familiarity with domesticated
pigs and their socio-cultural role among a specific human group, which is then particularized by
each individual’s own exposure to, and understanding of this information and its meanings; a pig
likely means something different for an American pig farmer than an American suburbanite.
Further, even assuming similar background knowledge, characterizing a person as a “pig” could
assume a variety of meanings: poor hygiene, living in a slovenly physical environment, eating
too much, or behaving boorishly, and discerning the use intended requires further social and
intersubjective context without which the multiple meanings can be easily confused.
Alternatively, consider the differing meanings of “pissed” for American and British English
speakers; the former usually uses the expression to mean “anger,” and the latter “intoxication.”
Nevertheless, despite the variability of meanings associated with figurative language describing
subjectivity, there apparently exists a degree of precision adequate for communication, as
exhibited in the broad consensus of the meaning of depression and other mental health
descriptions that circulate through our society.
Based on the remarks above, five points about language important for this investigation
can be advanced. First, all language communicating subjective experience is figurative. Second,
figurative language uses locutions from one domain (source) that is literally understood with
relative ease to communicate about another domain (target) that is more abstract or subjective,
and therefore more difficult to understand. Third, because figurative language uses words whose
meaning is different from that which would be indicated if understood literally, to understand
such statements literally is to fail to understand them at all. Fourth, the translation of language
from the source domain to the target domain relies, at least in part, on intersubjective sociocultural knowledge and meanings, combined with individual experience, for its correct
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interpretation. Fifth, despite the obstacles to communicating mental states using figurative
language, there is some adequate basis for doing so that permits a fruitful investigation of
subjectivity; we can talk about it meaningfully.
Therefore, given subjectivity constitutes the methodology and domain of this
investigation, figurative language is required. However, such language cannot correspond tightly
to objectively verifiable referents for several reasons: first, that which it describes, subjectivity, is
neither extended in space nor consensually observable; second, the source language describing
subjectivity originates from a different ontological domain; and third, the meaning of figurative
language varies among peoples in different times and places, and even among peoples within
similar times and places. Finally, novel ideas derived from a phenomenology of consciousness
challenging subject-other dualism require unusual figurative language to communicate, and the
extent to which these communications succeed necessarily relies on a common background of
personal experiences and intersubjective meanings of the reader.
Thus, fine-grained distinctions of basic phenomenology or conceptual constructions
based on them in cognized phenomenology are advanced cautiously, keeping in mind Aristotle’s
admonition, “...for it belongs to an educated person to look for just so much precision in each
kind of discourse as the nature of the thing one is concerned with permits…”43 Ultimately the
conclusions of this investigation will succeed or fail based on their concordance with the reader’s
own experience; the criterion for the success of the investigation is that of “phenomenological
verisimilitude” understood as articulation of the human condition. To illustrate this success
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criterion, consider a psychoanalytic interaction reported by John Bowlby in which a suicidally
depressed patient’s analyst “ventured a reconstruction” that the patient had witnessed his mother
attempt suicide as a young child.44 Upon advancing the reconstruction

...the patient became wracked with convulsive sobbing…Subsequently the patient
described how it had seemed to him that, when the analyst made his suggestion, it
was not so much that he was restoring a memory as giving him (the patient)
permission to talk about something he had always in some way known about.45

Similarly, phenomenological verisimilitude is not the revealing of the human condition,
but the articulating of it in a manner that impresses as already known, but neither
explicitly named nor described.
With these considerations of methodology, language, and a criterion for success, the
investigation’s course can be charted. Chapter 3 contains an expository overview of Sartre’s
general ontology, and then critiques this ontology, with a focus on his conception of
consciousness as an individuated nothingness. Chapter 4 presents an alternative ontology of
consciousness as transpersonal and thickly content-ed rather than an individuated nothingness.
Chapter 5 then employs this transpersonal ontology of consciousness to re-interpret and resolve
key manifestations of Sartre’s discontent, thereby demonstrating that ontology does not doom
44
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humans to unhappiness, but permits space for a more optimistic human condition. Chapter 6
summarizes the main conclusions of the investigation and raises further philosophical
implications of a transpersonal ontology of consciousness.
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III.

Chapter 3: Sartre’s Ontology: Summary and Critique

The current investigation seeks to understand what it is like to be human in the context of
Sartre’s ontology in Being and Nothingness.46 As such, Part I of this chapter summarizes those
features of his ontology most relevant for this purpose. Part II critically evaluates his ontology
and argues that he errs by privileging cognized over basic phenomenology. Part III examines the
language by which consciousness is articulated and concludes Sartre is misled by figurative
language that corrupts his ontology. To these tasks I now turn.

Part I. Exposition of Sartre’s Ontology

Approaching Sartre’s ontology requires appreciating its components comprise a synthetic unity,
and that considering each apart from the others is only an expository strategy. Sartre states this
position in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness and it remains integral to his philosophy.

The concrete can be only the synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the
phenomenon, constitutes only moments. The concrete is man within the world in that
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specific union of man with the world which Heidegger, for example, calls “being-in-theworld.”47

Later in Being and Nothingness he similarly states “We know that there is not a for-itself on the
one hand and a world on the other as two closed entities for which we must subsequently seek
some explanation as to how they communicate. The for-itself is a relation to the world.”48
Within this “synthetic totality” Sartre proposes a tripartite regional ontology composed of beingin-itself, being-for-itself, and being-for-others, which are briefly reviewed below.49

A. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-In-Itself

Sartre’s being-in-itself corresponds roughly to inanimate matter, the non-conscious stuff of the
universe. Natanson observes that being-in-itself most closely resembles a realist conception of
substance, “...for the en-soi corresponds to the realistic element whereas the pour-soi
corresponds to the idealistic aspect.”50 Being-in-itself originates and exists independently of
consciousness, and thus assumes ontological priority over it; it is most basic or fundamental.
Being-in-itself is not subject to time and is infinitely dense and entirely self-identical. There is
no nothingness as part of its being; it is completely and thoroughly what it is, neither more nor
less. Indeed, Sartre observes that were being-in-itself not completely self-identical then it could
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have some kind of relation with itself, which would entail some nothingness within being-initself that he rejects. Moreover, though coextensive with its phenomenal appearance, being-initself is not exhausted by its phenomenal appearance, and accordingly can never be completely
known or understood, which Sartre calls the “transphenomenality of being.”51 Finally, though
without rational structure or organization, being-in-itself cannot support all arrangements; it is
not infinitely malleable and therefore has limits to how it can exist.

B. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-For-Itself

Being-for-itself roughly corresponds to human consciousness, which is founded on or from
being-in-itself, yet simultaneously comprises a different region of being.52 Strictly speaking
being-for-itself refers to human reality that also includes the body and temporality, and some
features of human reality, such as the facticity of our past, that include being-in-itself.
Nevertheless, Sartre notes “In the light of these remarks we can now approach the ontological
study of consciousness, not as the totality of the human being, but as the instantaneous nucleus of
this being…”53 For the current investigation being-for-itself is largely synonymous with
consciousness.
Sartre contrasts being-for-itself that is a nothingness with being-in-itself, which is entirely
self-identical and infinitely dense. Though the in-itself can exist independent of the for-itself, the
for-itself requires the in-itself to exist as its foundation; the for-itself cannot be its own
51
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foundation of being. He states, “The for-itself has no reality save that of being the nihilation of
being”54 and describes it as an “upsurge into being.”55 He further explains “...being [the in-itself]
is indeed the foundation of nothingness [for-itself] as the nihilation of its own being…”56
Thus, the for-itself is dependent upon the in-itself from which it upsurges, while
remaining entirely devoid of the in-itself; the for-itself is the region of being antipodal to the initself by virtue of its complete nothingness contrasted with the in-itself’s self-identity and infinite
density. Though the for-itself has an entirely different ontology than the in-itself, given it
emanates from the in-itself by nihilating it, “...the For-itself feels a profound solidarity of being
with it [being-in-itself]…”57 Further, the upsurge of the for-itself, or we might say the
appearance of human consciousness in the world, is entirely contingent or gratuitous, which is to
say without intrinsic purpose or meaning.
Unlike the in-itself that is self-identical, the for-itself is never self-identical given its
complete nothingness. Nevertheless, recall from Sartre’s “ontological proof”58 that the two
realms of being remain synthetically united by the intentionality of consciousness, which is
always consciousness of something; consciousness never exists absent awareness of some object,
which unites it to the in-itself, while retaining its separate being as a nothingness.59 On this
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rendering, the for-itself is always acting via its intentionality, always reaching out beyond itself,
that is transcending itself into the world, apprehending objects. Further, because consciousness
is a nothingness founded by nihilating the in-itself, consciousness introduces nothingness into
being via its nihilations that then founds a world,60 which Sartre describes “The For-itself is like
a tiny nihilation which has its origin at the heart of Being; and this nihilation is sufficient to
cause a total upheaval to happen to the In-itself. This upheaval is the world.”61
Additionally, the “for-itself is not nothingness in general, but the privation of this
being.”62 By virtue of its nothingness, the for-itself is empty in its relation with the objects that it
intends, which allows their apprehension unmediated by its own contents. Thus, apprehension
occurs devoid of contents interposing themselves between consciousness’ intentionality and that
which it intends. In The Transcendence of the Ego he states, “Consciousness, Husserl stressed,
is consciousness of an object, and composes no part of the object.”63 Williams and Kirkpatrick
describe Sartre’s consciousness, “Its whole reality is exhausted in intending what is other.”64
Therefore, objects appear before consciousness purely as they are. Sartre states, “The For-itself

60

The French words coined by Sartre are the verb neantir and the noun neantisation, which have
been translated as nihilating/nihilation or negating/negation. Neantir might be most usefully
understood as a French equivalent of the English verb “to nothing,” that is to make nothing or
introduce nothingness. The noun neantisation refers to an entity or state of affairs that is
nothingness or that has occurred by the “nothingness activity” (neantir) of consciousness.
During this investigation the words nihilate/nihilation and negate/negation are used
interchangeably.
61
Sartre, Being, 786.
62
Sartre, Being, 786.
63
Sartre, Transcendence, 13. While Sartre agrees with this assertion his main purpose in
Transcendence is to assert that Husserl failed to realize these two activities of consciousness in
his own phenomenology.
64
Williams and Kirkpatrick, Transcendence, 22.

27

is defined as presence to being”65 which he characterizes as “...the revealed revelation of
existents…” and “...a revealing intuition of something…”66
The nothingness of the for-itself also entails that it is always other than itself. Sartre
states “We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not
what it is.”67 Hazel Barnes further clarifies Sartre’s idea, “Thus he is not what at any instant we
might want to say that he is, and he is that toward which he projects himself but which he is not
yet.”68 Hence, consciousness is not what it is because it “continually experiences itself as the
nihilation of its past being”69 in the sense that its being is a current nothingness projecting
towards a future that is not yet rather than self-identical. Conversely, given its continual
projection toward the future that does not yet exist, it is (currently we might say) what it is not
(the future, the “not yet” future existence). This nothingness of consciousness gives rise to its
complete freedom. Desan observes, “This freedom is not some accident of the For-itself or
human consciousness, but is human reality itself.”70 Given consciousness’ nothingness, it is
entirely free of material or psychic determinants. Associated with the being of consciousness as
a nothingness, indeed almost as a necessary corollary, is its spontaneity, which is another way to
characterize its total lack of determinability. Sartre states,
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We may formulate our thesis: transcendental consciousness is an impersonal
spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to
conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us
a creation ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence.71

Among the many roles consciousness as a nothingness plays in Sartre’s ontology, two are
central. The first is epistemic, whereby he seeks to escape Kantian epistemology in which
consciousness’ structuring activity precludes direct confrontation with objects, and thereby
places strict limits upon knowledge.72 By contrast Sartre’s consciousness is a nothingness, which
permits unmediated apprehension of objects required for knowledge. The second role is
ontological; Sartre conceives freedom as “total and infinite.”73 He states, “Man cannot be
sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all.”74 This
totalist freedom becomes possible because the nothingness of consciousness permits choice
unimpeded by intrinsic content to guide or inhibit it. Each choice is made in the context of that
which is apprehended alone, rather than encroached upon by that which is constitutive of
consciousness.
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C. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-For-Itself Continued and Internal Nihilations

As nothingness consciousness introduces or injects nothingness into being via nihilation, defined
as “to encase with a shell of non-being.”75 This non-being that the nothingness of consciousness
is and introduces into being is the basis for several internal nihilations, that is the distinguishing
by encasing with nothingness something about or interior to consciousness itself.76
Consciousness’ most fundamental nihilation is distinguishing itself from the in-itself, as aware of
itself as not the in-itself, as other than the in-itself that it confronts.
The second internal nihilation is consciousness nihilating itself, by which it assumes
distance from itself via nothingness within itself, in self-reflection, or one might say reflexiveawareness.77 Here Sartre distinguishes pre-reflective consciousness from reflective
consciousness.78 Pre-reflective consciousness is our awareness of objects in the world; while we
are also aware of consciousness when aware of objects, we are not aware of consciousness itself
as an object; one might say that we are aware that we are aware, without reflecting on awareness
itself. On the other hand, consciousness that reflects upon its own operations or contents as
objects for it, Sartre calls reflective consciousness.

Hazel Barnes, “Glossary” in Being and Nothingness (U.S.A: Simon & Shuster, 1956), 804.
Recall that nihilation can also be considered synonymous with negation.
76
Internal nihilations are distinguished from external nihilations in that the latter is the
distinction via injection of nothingness into objects entirely external to consciousness, such that
consciousness is not changed by the nihilation; by contrast internal nihilations in some manner
modify the consciousness “performing” the nihilation.
77
There are other internal nihilations, one of which occurs with reference to others, which is
covered in the subsequent section.
78
He also considers these perspectives of consciousness with respect to itself “pre-positional”
and “positional” to denote the perspective, or lack thereof upon itself. These terms are used
interchangeably during this investigation.
75

30

Thus, consciousness can be said to have two possible perspectives or positions with
respect to itself: pre-reflective when aware of itself by virtue of being aware of objects without
taking itself as an object, and reflective when deliberately taking itself as an object of
awareness. Given reflective consciousness is dependent upon pre-reflective consciousness, the
latter is ontologically most fundamental. Further, consciousness’ being and its knowing or
awareness of itself as it is aware are identical. There is not a consciousness that knows; the prereflective “knowing” (really awareness) of itself (its self-consciousness absent positional
consciousness) is the being of consciousness.
A key feature of Sartre’s ontology is that pre-reflective consciousness as primordial
awareness does not emanate from or have a subject, ego or soul that somehow possesses or
deploys it. Instead, consciousness is conceived as individualized subject-less awareness,79 aware
of itself as it perceives the world, but not originating from or possessed by a separate subject,
ego or soul that has it (awareness) as a property or activity. Thus, pre-reflective consciousness is
empty and impersonal absent an “I” or ego; strictly speaking, all that can be said of
consciousness is that there is awareness of some particular being, rather than an ego or subject
that is aware of some particular being; in the strictest sense consciousness is exclusively empty
pre-personal awareness as a consequence of its nothingness. Therefore, conceiving the ego as a
locus of awareness separate from consciousness is a reification, a fiction created by reflective
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consciousness. Sartre states, “The ego is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of
consciousness.”80
Hence, the self we experience, to include its contents, processes, and psychic structures
(cognition, affect, volition, personal history, psychodynamics, etc.) is merely consciousness
regarding its current and past activities as objects that it organizes into a coherent whole or
subdivides as if they were objects or structures, which it then perceives as a subject (ego) that
has experiences. By positing an ego, consciousness moves from pre-reflective to reflective
awareness (non-positional to positional perspectives). In this manner the ego is wholly other
than, that is separable from, pre-reflective consciousness rather than its progenitor; the ego is not
synonymous with consciousness, but is another feature of the “world,” an object for
consciousness.
Finally, consciousness’ awareness of itself (reflexive-awareness) can never be complete.
When nihilating itself to look at itself, there is a reflecting position of consciousness (that which
is “looking”) and a reflected position of consciousness (that which is “looked at”); the former
regards the latter. However, the consciousness that is doing the reflecting, that is doing the
“looking,” cannot also look at itself while looking; it cannot regard itself as a looking activity
while engaged in the looking activity. It is aware that it is looking, but cannot look at itself as it
looks. Therefore, consciousness’ awareness of itself can never be complete because it's looking
is always outside it’s looked at; its ontology as a “looking” limits knowledge of its being.
80
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A second reason consciousness can never completely know itself arises from its
spontaneous nothingness that always exceeds or “overflows”81 any constructed conceptualization
of it, a conceptualization that always conceives it as a limited thing (an object) rather than a
nothingness. Sartre states, “But the reflection which delivers the reflected-on to us, not as a
given but as the being which we have to be, in indistinction without a point of view, is a
knowledge overflowing itself and without explanation.”82
Other features of the for-itself central to this investigation are its individuation and
isolation, which render its relations with others an “inter-monad relation.”83 Sartre conceives
each consciousness as entirely individuated, and as such a locus of awareness known to itself
alone. In The Transcendence of the Ego he states,

Furthermore, the individuality of consciousness evidently stems from the nature of
consciousness. Consciousness…can be limited only by itself. Thus, it constitutes a
synthetic and individual totality entirely isolated from other totalities of the same type,
and the I can evidently be only an expression (rather than a condition) of this
incommunicability and inwardness of consciousness.84
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D. Sartre’s Ontology: Being-for-others

Awareness of others constitutes consciousness’ third basic internal nihilation. Like the internal
nihilation of the in-itself, consciousness is aware of others as subjects, but as subjects that are not
itself. Sartre states, “In fact it is possible to deny that the Other is me only in so far as the Other
is himself a subject.”85 Consequently, the Other is not encountered via knowledge, but by
consciousness’ internal nihilation of its own subject-ness as distinct from the subject-ness of the
Other.
This Other is then revealed pre-reflectively via a dynamic Sartre calls the look.86
Specifically, when another looks at me, I become aware of an additional aspect of my being, my
exterior, my being-for-others. Sartre states, “Thus the Other has not only revealed to me what I
was; he has established me in a new type of being which can support new qualifications.”87 The
Other births a new structure of my being, what I am for the Other, that is as known by the Other,
which cannot be known by me, but nevertheless remains mine.
For the Other (my being-for-others) I am made an object, and when looked at by the
Other my consciousness is altered such that I am moved, by the Other’s look, from pre-reflective
awareness of myself to a positional, reflective awareness of myself as an object, as looked at by
the Other, as an object for him. This alteration of my consciousness from pre-reflective to
positional, effected by the look of the Other, reveals to me my being-for-others in the experience
of shame. “But this new being which appears for the other does not reside in the Other…Thus
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shame is shame of oneself before the Other…”88 Shame is the revealing intuition of our beingfor-others. With this basic ontology in mind, the investigation can now turn to evaluating it.

Part II: Evaluating Sartre’s Ontology

Recall from Chapter 2 that basic phenomenology consists of two different apprehensions. First it
refers to direct apprehension of objects or consciousness in their non-mediated confrontation as
they are in our barest encounter (insight). The second refers to objects or consciousness
disclosed (revealed) by our confrontation without comprising it. For example, Sartre’s
description of anguish is a bare confrontation with his experience (insight), which is a revealing
consciousness, a disclosing of something other than our experience of anguish, in his case
freedom. Similarly, his experience of nausea is a bare confrontation, which reveals the
contingency of our existence, to include the body.
By contrast, cognized phenomenology extends basic phenomenology as the basis for
rational inferences. For example, Sartre’s “ontological proof” rationally derives the existence of
objects from his basic phenomenology of consciousness as an intentional nothingness. If a
nothingness consciousness is aware of objects in basic phenomenology, there must be some thing
that is not consciousness itself, some thing of which it is aware. Therefore, there must be
independently existing entities; this conclusion derives from cognized, rather than basic
phenomenology.
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Employing these distinctions permits evaluation of Sartre’s ontology in terms of his
fidelity to his most basic phenomenology; does his ontology reflect his basic phenomenology or
does he instead privilege cognized phenomenology, which leads him astray? To answering this
question I now turn.

A. Is Sartre’s Consciousness a Nothingness?

Busch observes that Sartre closely examines consciousness and finds that its being is a
nothingness.89 The most important insight Sartre obtains from the phenomenological reduction is
that there is no ego, no owner or inhabiter of consciousness. Whereas Husserl performed the
reduction and arrived at a transcendental ego, Sartre found only a nothingness that constructs an
ego as an object to hide its spontaneity and reduce anxiety; by identifying a transcendental ego,
Husserl’s reduction did not go far enough to realize that the ego is produced by consciousness
rather its organizer.
Recall that the complete nothingness of consciousness serves two critical goals. First, it
is required, as Sartre sees it, for our freedom, which is either total and complete or not at all.
Second, the nothingness of consciousness ensures that our phenomenological confrontation with
objects remains uncorrupted by structures or processes of consciousness that impede their direct,
unmediated apprehension. However, examining the consciousness that Sartre encounters in his
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basic phenomenology, rather than the consciousness he cognizes to retain our freedom and
unmediated confrontation with objects, indicates that it is not the nothingness he claims for it.
As a nothingness Sartre conceives consciousness as a lack, specifically a lack of identity
with itself that characterizes the in-itself from which consciousness is nihilated. According to
Sartre, consciousness attempts to remedy its lack by becoming a thing or appropriating others as
things with which it can identify itself as a thing; consciousness seeks to become an in-itself
entirely coincident with itself. He observes, “Human reality is its own surpassing toward what it
lacks; it surpasses itself toward the particular being which it would be if it were what it is.”90
Indeed, Sartre indicates “...the cogito is haunted by this being…”91 But this activity of the foritself directly apprehended by basic phenomenology is also deducible from Sartre’s ontology as
cognized phenomenology. He states,

Fundamentally man is the desire to be, and the existence of this desire is not to be
established by an empirical induction; it is the result of an a priori description of
the being of the for-itself, since desire is a lack and since the for-itself is a being
which is to itself its own lack of being.92

Sartre asserts that given consciousness is a lack, and desire is a lack, then consciousness
is desire, the desire to be that which it is not, that which it lacks, a self-coincident being-in-itself.
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But this “a priori description” is simply the intentionality of a nothingness consciousness bound
to the in-itself in synthetic unity.93 Given consciousness is always of something and
consciousness is a nothingness, there is no option but a lacking consciousness filled with objects
it intends that are other than itself. Thus, by virtue of being an intentional nothingness bound in
a relation with the in-itself, consciousness moves into the world remedying the lack that it is;
consciousness’ intentionality is active.94 Desan makes a similar point “Sartre’s statement on the
contrary, is not so much empirical as a priori. Indeed it is founded on his basic notion of the
For-itself.”95
But Sartre asserts something more than simply the mechanics of an intentional
nothingness consciousness bound in synthetic relation with the in-itself, something more than an
a priori description of consciousness rationally derived from its lack. His descriptions of
consciousness’ intentional movements into the world as a lack go further than his ontological
deduction alone entails; he does not just describe a nothingness consciousness intending objects.
He describes the movement of consciousness into and through the world seeking to be an initself using words such as “haunts,”96 “desire,”97 “pursuit,”98 “flight,”99 “profound solidarity,”100
“failure,”101 and the like. Is he simply describing the mechanics of an intending nothingness
consciousness using anthropomorphic figures of speech? It would be hard to argue that his
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language imputing human motives to consciousness is simply an anthropomorphic metaphor
given the phenomenon being described is human; just about any description of human reality
would struggle to be conceived as an anthropomorphism.
Further, consider what Sartre means by the words noted above in the context of the foritself and the in-itself. Despite his claims, they are not just an “a priori description” of a
synthetic relation of an intending nothingness consciousness and being-in-itself deducible from
the nothingness of consciousness102; they are descriptions of consciousness’ purposes, which we
confront in our most intimate subjective experience; said differently we confront these purposes
in our most basic phenomenology. Indeed, Sartre persistently describes consciousness
throughout Being and Nothingness as an attempt to appropriate being, the being of others and
objects, an omnipresent telos seeking to define itself by appropriating objects that it can identify
as itself. He baldly describes “...an appropriative relation between the for-itself and the
world….”103 and later “Let us return to the original project. It is a project of appropriation.”104
Consciousness seeks somehow to recover the in-itself from which it nihilates itself, and it
does so telically, not as a logically necessary consequence of its nothingness and intentionality.
By Sartre’s own assertion we have a telos of consciousness. Thus Sartre’s own most basic
phenomenological description confronts a consciousness that is not an empty nothingness.
Further, consider his claim to provide an “a priori description of the being of the for-itself.”105
Such a goal must be the result of cognized rather than basic phenomenology because, as Desan

102

Sartre, Being, 722.
Sartre, Being, 588.
104
Sartre, Being, 722.
105
Sartre, Being, 722.
103

39

points out, there can be no a priori description that is phenomenological, which would be an
oxymoron.106
Thus, Sartre advances two conceptions of consciousness, one confronted by basic
phenomenology that is telic and one based on cognized phenomenology that is a nothingness
intending objects with which it is synthetically bound. He then privileges cognized rather than
basic phenomenology. He has confronted human consciousness as telic, as seeking to be, which
threatens freedom and knowledge, so he attempts to derive desire, haunting, flight, pursuit,
failure, and solidarity from the mechanics of an intending nothingness consciousness alone. His
“a priori description” has strayed from his most basic phenomenology and led him away from
the thing itself.107 Sartre’s consciousness is not a nothingness.
But Sartre goes further. The for-itself not only seeks to become an in-itself, but does so
while simultaneously desiring to preserve its freedom as a nothingness. Consciousness seeks to
have it both ways, to be both a self-founding being, an in-itself, and a free and autonomous
nothingness, a for-itself.108 In Sartre’s language we seek to be an “in-itself-for-itself,” a selffounding, free and autonomous being, which he notes is God.109 Consider his statements:
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The best way to conceive the fundamental project of human reality is to say that
man is the being whose project is to be God.110
...the project of being God…has appeared to us as the deep-seated structure of
human reality.111
The goal of the reflective scissiparity is, as we have seen, to recover the reflectedon so as to constitute that unrealizable totality ‘In-itself-for-itself,’ which is the
fundamental value posited by the for-itself in the very upsurge of its being.112

Via reduction Sartre’s most basic phenomenology achieves deep insight into the telos of
human reality, the telos of consciousness, and identifies a human essence explicitly rejected by
his cognized phenomenology. As the passages quoted above note, he observes humans have a
“fundamental project,”113a “deep-seated structure,”114a “fundamental value posited by the foritself in the very upsurge of its being.”115 Indeed, by his own definition from the Introduction of
Being and Nothingness, Sartre has identified a human essence; he states, “The appearance does
not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent is no longer a
property sunk in this cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the
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succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.”116 (italicized emphasis added) To
his credit Sartre recognizes and addresses this difficulty.

For freedom is nothing other than a choice which creates for itself its own
possibilities, but it appears here that the initial project of being God, which
“defines” man, comes close to being the same as a human “nature” or an
“essence.” The answer is that while the meaning of the desire is ultimately the
project of being God, the desire is never constituted by this meaning; on the
contrary, it always represents a particular discovery of its ends. These ends in fact
are pursued in terms of a particular empirical situation, and it is this very pursuit
which constitutes the surroundings as a situation. The desire of being is always
realized as the desire of a mode of being.117

Sartre’s argument appears to depend on the distinction between pre-reflective and
positional consciousness; his claim that the “meaning of the desire” does not “constitute the
desire”118 indicates that consciousness’ desire to be God is not a positional, reflected upon
project or goal. We do not move through the world reflectively aware of our goal to be God,
through and by which we then direct our actions. Instead, the desire to be God is a meaning
given to our individual projects when reflectively considered; the meaning is assigned when we
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observe ourselves reflectively, as the “law which presides over the succession of its appearances,
it is the principle of the series” as noted above.119
Further, our desires produce and are enacted in situations of our definition, and
constituted by these situations that we define and construct. In the passage above he notes
“These ends in fact are pursued in terms of a particular empirical situation, and it is this very
pursuit which constitutes the surroundings as a situation.”120 We seek to be in a certain manner
within the situations we create, the meaning of which is the wish to be God.
I concur with Sartre that the meaning of our activities as the desire to be God is a
construction of positional consciousness rather than a “‘nature’” or “‘essence.’”121 But this
meaning of our primordial activity of being does not eliminate that activity; it simply assigns to it
a specific interpretation in positional consciousness. However one interprets the meaning of that
desire, Sartre clearly identifies a nature or essence even seemingly by his own definition “as a
principle of the series,”122 a universal human telos that moves through the world, though
interpretations of it may differ and are not identical to it. Thus, there is a human essence, a being
that is telic, that precedes the existence we create for ourselves through its enactment. Of course
this telos is “pursued in terms of a particular empirical situation”123 and even “constitutes the
surroundings as a situation,”124 but that does not mean that such a telos does not exist, merely
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that its instantiation by the situation it creates and the manner in which it uses and moves through
that situation will differ based on empirical circumstances.
In conclusion, Desan’s observation is well taken, “So once more Sartre…proves not that
existence precedes essence but that essence (logically) precedes existence; that is to say, that
human existence does not create itself in some wild and unlimited freedom but follows a general
scheme which is called human essence or human nature.”125 Sartre’s consciousness is not a
nothingness. Indeed, Sartre identifies additional teloses of consciousness, which are explicated
in the next section.

B. Values, Choices, Projects, Situations and the Ego

The previous section argued that Sartre’s consciousness as depicted by his basic phenomenology
contains telos as structures of its being, a telos seeking to make itself an object and a telos
seeking to retain its autonomy while doing so, an in-itself-for-itself. Commensurate with
Sartre’s reduction that fails to find an ego that has or uses values as entities that might be
deployed by an owner, values are primordially correlative with consciousness’ upsurge from the
in-itself. He states,

Value in its original upsurge is not posited by the for-itself; it is consubstantial
with it - to such a degree that there is no consciousness that is not haunted by its
125
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value and that human-reality in the broad sense includes both the for-itself and
value…Value is merely given with the non-thetic translucency of the for-itself,
which makes itself be as the consciousness of being.126

Later in Being and Nothingness he states “Choice and consciousness are one and the
same thing.”127 According to Sartre, like the desire to be an in-itself-for-itself, consciousness
does not have or own a valuing or choosing telos, consciousness is valuing and choosing telos,
“consubstantial with it,”128 “one and the same thing.”129 He asserts that as a nothingness that
intends the world, consciousness is always surpassing itself toward possibilities. Consciousness
is always the nothingness that is not what it is and is what it is not, such that its surpassings that
manifest values are a necessary corollary of its nothingness in the same manner as its “desire,”
“pursuit” and “flight” noted above.130
But again note Sartre’s use of the word “haunted”131 in the passage above describing
value, which returns to the point argued previously that he is not simply describing the
mechanics of an intentional nothingness consciousness synthetically bound to the world using
anthropomorphic language, but has identified a telos. Basic phenomenology readily encounters
values as primordial to our being, “consubstantial with it.”132 Indeed, Sartre agrees as indicated
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by his own statements, but then abandons the most basic outcome of the reduction that identifies
a telos in favor of a cognized phenomenology that derives values from the mechanics of
intending nothingness consciousness; he strays from basic phenomenology to preserves his
marriage to the nothingness of consciousness required for freedom and knowledge.
As Chapter 2 notes, when basic and cognized phenomenology conflict, basic
phenomenology is usually more persuasive given its closer relationship with the thing itself.
Sartre’s reduction was successful. Valuing and choosing are readily confronted as basic
structures of subjectivity, of “What it is like to be a human,” and should not have been
abandoned in favor of cognized phenomenology deriving values and choices from a nothingness
consciousness that he neither finds, nor describes.
Furthermore, the for-itself does not simply value and choose, it devises projects,133 which
are more complex than singular choices or value assignments to activities or objects. Like
values, projects are consubstantial with the upsurge of the for-itself. Sartre states “…human
reality in and through its very upsurge decides to define its own being by its ends. It is therefore
the positing of my ultimate ends which characterizes my being and which is identical with the
sudden thrust of the freedom which is mine...”134 And what is the goal of our projects? He
continues, “My ultimate and initial project…is, as we shall see, always the outline of a solution
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of the problem of being.”135 The “problem of being” for human beings is that our consciousness
is a nothingness, that which entirely lacks identity with itself.136
To understand Sartre’s projects requires appreciation of his conception of temporality.
As noted earlier being-in-itself is not subject to time. Instead time is introduced by the
nothingness of consciousness, which is diasporatically distributed across the past, present and
future, that is de-totalized as that which is what it is not and is not what it is. This nothingness of
consciousness that gives rise to its possibilities, indeed renders it a possible and nothing more,
introduces time into being. “But temporality is the being of the For-itself in so far as the Foritself has to be it's being ekstatically. Temporality is not, but the For-itself temporalizes itself by
existing.”137
The nothingness of consciousness and the temporality it introduces make possible the
concept of projects. A project is a temporalized manner of being in the world that synthesizes
past, present, and future into a single unit; the present is defined by the future towards which it
projects, and the future is built by the present on the facticity of past from which it emerges, all
unified in a synthetic whole. Sartre states, “Past motives, past causes, present motives and
causes, future ends, all are organized in an indissoluble unity by the very upsurge of a freedom
which is beyond causes, motives, and ends.”138 And continuing Sartre’s previous argument,
projects are designed to fill the lack that we are in our being-for-itself as a nothingness; projects
135
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are consciousness’ appropriative effort to be an in-itself. This is the solution to the “problem of
being.”139
But what exactly is a project? It is a person’s “...totality of his impulse toward being, his
original relation to himself, to the world, to the Other, in the unity of internal relations and of a
fundamental project.”140 In describing our desire to be an in-itself manifested by our projects, he
continues,

There is not first a single desire of being, then a thousand particular feelings, but
the desire to be exists and manifests itself only in and through jealousy, greed,
love, art, cowardice, courage, and a thousand contingent, empirical expressions
which always cause human reality to appear to us as manifested by a particular
man, a particular person.141

Moreover, each of our acts manifests, literally or symbolically, our overall project to become a
self-identical being that persists, an in-itself.142
Further, Sartre indicates that our project, like our desire to be an in-itself-for-itself, is
non-thetic; it is consubstantial with the upsurge of the for-itself and becomes known thetically
only in reflective consciousness. Therefore, when placed into reflective consciousness our
139
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projects disclose our choice of being (who we have chosen to be in the world) to ourselves; their
placement in reflective consciousness reveals to us what we are, and thus give meaning not only
to the future toward which we strive, but also to the past that has become our facticity. The
specific actions that comprise our projects, and of which we are pre-reflectively aware, reveal
what we are to ourselves when confronted in reflective consciousness, and cognized into an ego
and narrative of our lives.
But before considering consciousness’ construction of the ego, there is another dimension
of projects to consider. Our project of solving the “problem of being” by becoming an in-itself
does not take place in a pre-given situation; via our project we actually create the situation
within which we seek by our project to resolve the “problem of being.”143 Not that our projects
create the in-itself, but they move from the background to the foreground the situation as
manifestations of the project itself. Therefore, the situation in which a project is enacted is itself
a creation and expression of that project. Sartre observes, “In fact I am nothing but the project of
myself beyond a determined situation, and this project pre-outlines me in terms of the concrete
situation as in addition it illumines the situation in terms of my choice.”144
This consideration of projects and their situations leads to the conclusion that Sartre again
unduly privileges cognized phenomenology at the expense of basic phenomenology. He again
advances something akin to an essence or nature of consciousness as seeking to solve the
“problem of being;” this was covered in the previous section.145 But in advancing his idea of
projects based on temporality he goes further; he indicates that consciousness creates “situations”

143

Sartre, Being, 596.
Sartre, Being, 706.
145
Sartre, Being, 596.
144

49

that manifest our projects, and within which we instantiate our projects. Indeed, these situations
reveal to ourselves the goals of our projects. Thus, we have a situation creating consciousness.
Again Sartre explains our situation creating consciousness that defines and reveals our projects
and our being, as a necessary corollary of our nothingness, as derivative of consciousness’
temporally diasporatic nothingness.
But for the same reasons previously advanced, Sartre’s cognized phenomenology that
asserts the nothingness of consciousness explains projects and their situations is more akin to an
ontological deduction than basic phenomenology. As such it unnecessarily moves us away from
the “thing itself.” Projects that are consciousness can be more readily apprehended exactly as
Sartre confronts them in basic phenomenology, as a telic process of consciousness. Here can be
seen the danger not of the naiveté of the natural attitude that reduction seeks to avoid, but of the
excessively cognized attitude that dismisses that which the reduction renders apparent.
Of course, to identify a process in the “nothingness” of consciousness destroys its “total
translucency”146 and spontaneity. Sartre makes this point with reference to the ego, but it is no
less forceful with respect to any telos or process.

In fact, however formal, however abstract one may suppose it to be, the I, with its
personality, would be a sort of center of opacity. It would be to the concrete and
psycho-physical me what a point is to three dimensions: it would be an infinitely
contracted me. Thus, if one introduces this opacity into consciousness, one
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thereby destroys the fruitful definition cited earlier. One congeals consciousness,
one darkens it. Consciousness is no longer a spontaneity; it bears within itself the
germ of opaqueness.147

Thus, Sartre must affirm the nothingness of consciousness to preserve its freedom
(“spontaneity”) and unmediated confrontation with existence absent obstruction (“opacity”).148
He maintains the nothingness of consciousness to achieve his epistemic and ontological goals
despite its distance from his basic phenomenology.
But this strategy to achieve his epistemic and ontological goals, to preserve freedom and
unmediated confrontation with existence, fails. Indeed, he betrays these goals by the very
conception of projects that he advances. As he states above, we create situations that reveal our
choice of project; we do not confront objects in themselves absent encroachment by
consciousness that confronts. Consider Sartre’s own example,

Here I am at the foot of this crag which appears to me as "not scalable." This
means that the rock appears to me in the light of a projected scaling-a secondary
project which finds its meaning in terms of an initial project which is my beingin-the-world. Thus the rock is carved out on the ground of the world by the effect
of the initial choice of my freedom…Nevertheless the rock can show its resistance
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to the scaling only if the rock is integrated by freedom in a "situation" of which
the general theme is scaling. For the simple traveler who passes over this road
and whose free project is a pure aesthetic ordering of the landscape, the crag is not
revealed either as scalable or as not-scalable; it is manifested only as beautiful or
ugly.149

He asserts that each of us creates the “situation” in which we find ourselves enacting our
projects150, as manifestations of that project, and in which we then instantiate it. By his
rendering we do not experience a primordial, unmediated confrontation with objects, within our
situation; consciousness is not simply as he says “presence to being”151 as if naked before the
existent. Certainly, consciousness does not create being, but it creates by its projects which
beings, which “thises” exist in relief from the foreground of all being.152 Hence, we create, by
the choice of our project, the objects that populate our situation, the “thises” that constitute that
situation.153
Therefore, consciousness is not a nothingness that confronts objects as they are; it is a
project-choosing and situation-creating consciousness confronting “thises” of its own creation.154
It does not confront the situation as a nothingness; it “confronts” a situation expressing and
manifesting itself. Thus, Sartre’s assertion that we create situations and their “thises”
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undermines the unmediated confrontation he seeks to preserve for his epistemology. He betrays
his basic phenomenology in favor of a cognized phenomenology for a goal that it cannot achieve.
But he identifies other processes of consciousness. Recall that in his phenomenological
reduction Sartre went beyond Husserl by asserting that there is neither a mundane nor a
transcendental ego as a primordial owner or constituent of consciousness. His phenomenological
reduction discerns that the ego is a fictive entity constructed by positional consciousness. He
further claims that consciousness is a unified whole, and that this unity is achieved by the
activity of consciousness itself rather than a transcendental ego like Husserl claimed. He agrees
with Husserl that “Consciousness must be perpetual syntheses of past consciousness and present
consciousness.”155 And as noted above, he asserts that we attach to our fictive ego as if it is our
identity, as if it is what we are as an object. He states, “Everything happens, therefore, as if
consciousness constituted the ego as a false representation of itself, as if consciousness
hypnotized itself before this ego which it has constituted, absorbing itself in the ego as if to make
the ego its guardian and its law.”156
Thus, Sartre identifies additional ontological processes of consciousness, its selforganizing which unifies past, present and future; the systems of ends it enacts in its projects;
and its ego creation in positional consciousness that protects it from full awareness of its
spontaneity and freedom. Importantly, these processes are not post-hoc constructions of
positional consciousness, but primordially discerned in his reduction and indicate that his most
basic phenomenology does not reveal a nothingness consciousness, but one that is content-ed
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with telos and process. Therefore, we again find that despite his cognized phenomenology that
claims consciousness is a nothingness, his basic phenomenology discloses telic processes as the
being of consciousness, as consciousness itself.

C. Conclusions

The purpose of Part II of this chapter has not been to delineate every feature of Sartre’s ontology
whereby he privileges cognized over basic phenomenology or to identify every instance in which
he attributes a telos or process to the supposed nothingness of consciousness.157 Instead the goal
has been to show that Sartre’s basic and cognized phenomenology lead to different ontologies of
consciousness, and that had he followed his basic phenomenology he would have discovered, or
perhaps more accurately acknowledged, that the consciousness he confronts in the reduction is
not empty, but telic. Of course, recognizing a telic consciousness endangers complete freedom
and unmediated confrontation with objects. However, it also exhibits greater fidelity to the
reduction by acknowledging the superior persuasiveness of basic phenomenology over its
cognized cousin. Further, as argued above his situation-producing consciousness precludes the
unmediated confrontation with objects he seeks to preserve to escape a phenomenal-noumenal
dualism. But there are deeper reasons for doubting Sartre’s ontology, which are explained
below.

Depending upon how strictly one defines “telos,” “process,” or even “structure” there could
be other instances. For example do the internal nihilations of consciousness constitute a telos or
process? Does temporality as the “intra-structure of the for-itself” constitute a structure? (Sartre,
Being, 202).
157
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Part III. Language and the Ontology of Consciousness

A. Sartre’s General Ontology Re-Considered

As previously argued, there are reasons to doubt Sartre’s ontology given his basic
phenomenology identifies several teloses as coextensive with consciousness, as being
consciousness, which corrupts the clean bifurcation of being-in-itself and being-for-itself.158
However, there is another reason for doubt.
Consider A. J. Ayer’s criticism of philosophers like Sartre whom he accuses of misusing
language. He states “What is called existentialist philosophy has become very largely an
exercise in the art of misusing the verb ‘to be’.”159 This is a strong claim. Consider a statement
by Sartre that exemplifies the type of writing Ayer criticizes: “We have to deal with human
reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”160 Does Ayer have a point?
Is this statement and others like it a misuse of language absent coherent content, mere gibberish?
For an entity to be a nothingness, like Sartre’s consciousness, is contradictory. The verb “to be”
means to exist, such that asserting consciousness is a nothingness is tantamount to asserting “an
existent is a non-existent” or “an existent non-exists.”

One could reasonably argue that “situation production” is a process that serves the telic
consciousness seeking to be an object (in-itself) or a self-founding object (in-itself-for-itself),
rather than being a telos itself. This might be analogous to debating whether the stomach’s
actions are a process that serves the telos of the person, or are a telos themselves, a question left
for another time. Though unclear how exactly Sartre would describe the ontology of telos, it is
clear that he conceived any content of consciousness to corrupt its confrontation with objects.
159
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Taken literally this is gibberish. Presumably Sartre is speaking figuratively to
communicate something about the phenomenology of consciousness. As Chapter 2 argues,
figurative language using verifiable external referents to describe consciousness is unavoidable,
and understanding such language literally fails to understand it at all. Returning to Kovecses’
distinction161 between the source and target domains of figurative language, it becomes apparent
in Sartre’s statement above and others like it that he is using the word “is,” the singular present
tense of “to be,” figuratively as that which is denied to consciousness. He is saying that
consciousness is like an existent that does not exist. He calls this existence, this being of
consciousness, a nothingness. He understands subjectivity as that which is not objectivity; the
subject is that which is not an object.
However, similar to the mistake of understanding figurative language literally, there is
another closely allied mistake. Zahavi observes that Husserl divides ontology into formal
ontology and regional ontology.162 Formal ontology investigates the properties true of most or
all objects such as “...quality, property, relation, identity, whole, part, and so on.” On the other
hand, regional ontology “examines the essential structures belonging to a given region or kind of
object…”163 For example regions of being might be music, numbers, ideas, emotions,
consciousness, and Sartre’s being-in-itself.164 Thus far in this investigation ontology has been
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used to denote regional ontology to reference the essential structures of consciousness and brute
being, being-for-itself and being-in-itself roughly speaking.
We can now see that there is a cousin to the mistake of understanding figurative language
literally, that of confusing formal and regional ontology. This mistake involves using the
properties and concepts of the regional ontology of the linguistic source domain to understand
the properties and concepts of the regional ontology of the linguistic target domain; metaphors
are not just linguistic, but carry with them an ontology. George Lakoff observes “The
generalizations governing poetic metaphorical expressions are not in language, but in thought:
They are general mappings across conceptual domains…In short the locus of metaphor is not in
language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another.”165
Thus, when employing figurative language it is a mistake to assume that the ontology of the
source domain has the same formal properties as the target domain. There can be a covert
ontological transfer attaching to language as it moves from its literal meaning in the source to its
figurative meaning in the target, which can mislead. Lakoff continues to make this point in
reference to a metaphor about love as a journey.

It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the source domain
of journeys to the target domain of love. The metaphor is not just a matter of
language, but of thought and reason. The language is secondary. The mapping is
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primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language and inference
patterns for target domain concepts.166

For example, the formal ontology of Sartre’s in-itself would be those properties true of
substances such as identity, whole, part, extension, and so on. When using language from this
ontological region as the source to figuratively communicate about a different ontological region
such as consciousness that is the target, it would be a mistake to assume the target domain has
the same formal ontology as the source domain, that both domains have the same properties
organizable by the same concepts. By way of example, consider that Sartre’s brute self-identical
being-in-itself is not subject to time, juxtaposed with being-for-itself that introduces temporality
by existing diasporatically in the past, present, and future. Similarly, the in-itself is always
completely self-identical whereas the for-itself is never self-identical, always other than itself.
Thus, it is not self-evident that consciousness can be described using formal ontological
properties applicable to the in-itself such as whole, part, identity, and the like, or conceptual rules
like Aristotle’s laws of Identity, Noncontradiction, or Excluded Middle. Recall Aristotle’s Law
of Noncontradiction from his Metaphysics:

For the same thing to hold good and not to hold good simultaneously of the same
thing in the same respect is impossible…This, then, is the firmest of all principles,
for it fits the specification stated. For it is impossible for anyone to believe that
166
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the same thing is and is not…But if it is not possible for contraries to hold good of
the same thing simultaneously…and the opinion contrary to an opinion is that of
the contradictory, then obviously it is impossible for the same person to believe
simultaneously that the same thing is and is not…167

Given that consciousness is of a different regional ontology than the in-itself, it
may not be bound by these rules of thought; consciousness likely has a different formal
ontology as well. Nagel makes a similar point in a more general way, “But philosophers
share the general human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms
suited for what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different.”168
This analysis challenges Sartre’s ontology in which he appears to use rules applicable to
the ontology of substances such as identity and non-contradiction to describe and explain
consciousness, which has a different formal ontology. Indeed, by Sartre’s own reckoning the initself and the for-itself have different formal ontologies; subjects are entirely different than
objects, which suggests his figurative language unwittingly smuggles ontology from the source
to the target domain.
For example, concluding that because consciousness is the opposite of the infinitely
dense in-itself that it must be a nothingness borrows from substance ontology where the opposite
of existence (being-in-itself) is non-existence or nothingness (being-for-itself); on this basis
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Sartre asserts that the being of consciousness is nothingness. He employs the language and
formal ontology of the in-itself to explain consciousness such that consciousness is that which
the in-itself is not, the “not-in-itself,” a nothingness. Sartre conceives consciousness by the
ontology of the linguistic source domain used to communicate about the target domain; the being
of the in-itself and the nothingness of consciousness are both conceived from within the ontology
of substance, where the opposite of something is nothing. He uses the language and formal
ontology of the in-itself to describe the for-itself, which by his own statement is of a different
regional and formal ontology.169
Recall that the previous chapter argued that Sartre’s consciousness is multiply telic rather
than being a nothingness. However, following the argument advanced here this does not make
consciousness akin to or draw it closer to the in-itself despite its not being a nothingness; its nonnothingness does not move it in the direction of a concrete thing, a substance. Consciousness has
an entirely different formal ontology than being-in-itself, rather than the two existing as if on a
single continuum with self-identical being (in-itself) on one end and nothingness (for-itself) on
the other. Thus, the being and nothingness that are part of the formal ontology of the in-itself
infected Sartre’s cognized phenomenology of consciousness via the language used to
communicate that phenomenology.
In the formal ontology of substances where extended concrete existence is a property, the
relationship between consciousness as nothingness and being-in-itself as infinitely dense is
antipodal. However, it is not clear that this antipodal relationship holds for the formal ontology
169
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of consciousness, particularly given the gaping ontological difference between consciousness
and the in-itself. Indeed, in the formal ontology of consciousness, being and nothingness are not
necessarily opposites; they could be considered orthogonal or even unrelated. For example,
consider the ontology of consciousness’ teloses identified in the previous chapter, which are
actual existents but of an entirely different kind than an in-itself. A verbal description of a telic
consciousness might be an “occupied nothingness” or a “content-ed nothingness,” which within
the substance ontology of the in-itself would be incoherent, but for the regional ontology of
consciousness accurately descriptive. A telos is an existent, but not of the kind found in
substance ontology, and conceiving it as such misleads.
Thus, Sartre’s desire to retain the synthetic unity of consciousness and the in-itself does
not require that consciousness be interpreted within substance ontology as antipodal to the initself, which renders it a nothingness. Desan drives home this point,

Sartre would have done well to have reread Plato’s Sophist, and understood that
the idea of ‘not being something’ is simply the idea of otherness. It would then
have appeared that what-is-not-a-car is not, therefore, non-being but merely
something else, and that when my own consciousness is not the world, it does not
follow that it is non-being.170
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Said differently, just because consciousness is not the infinitely dense in-itself does not
necessarily mean that it is nothingness; it could just be something other than an infinitely dense
in-itself, simply something else.
To understand the implication of the different formal ontologies associated with different
regional ontologies for this investigation, consider Sartre’s insistence that consciousnesses
between people must be individuated and separable. He states, “Unity with the Other is
therefore in fact unrealizable. It is also unrealizable in theory, for the assimilation of the foritself and the Other in a single transcendence would necessarily involve the disappearance of the
characteristic of otherness in the Other.”171 In the formal ontology of substances the Law of
Identity holds strictly; an object is itself and cannot be something else. If it were to be
assimilated by another object that other object would lose its ontological property of being other.
What were once two objects that could have a relation with one another, are now one selfidentical object absent any internal relation.
But to assert the rules and concepts that have proved useful for understanding the formal
ontology of non-conscious being hold for the regional ontology of consciousness results from
failure to appreciate that the language from a source domain has smuggled with it a formal
ontology incommensurate with that of the target domain it intends to communicate. In this
example, the Other could be assimilated by my consciousness while still remaining Other. The
current point is that to claim this is a priori impossible by failing to appreciate that the language
describing consciousness is sourced by substance ontology that covertly applies its formal
ontology to the target, is akin to a category mistake. The ontology of substances and its rules and
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concepts do not necessarily apply to the ontology of consciousness. Consciousness has its own
formal ontology and will follow its own rules, possibly similar to those of substance ontology,
possibly different.
A similar point is made by Amit Saad who notes that “Ucs. [unconscious] thoughts may
be contradictory.”172 Saad uses “negationless-logic” developed by D. Nelson and P. G. J.
Vredenduin to explain unconscious mental processes observed in psychoanalytic
investigations.173 Importantly for the current investigation, negationless-logic does not affirm
the Law of Excluded Middle, disjunctive statements, negation, or falsity. For example, Saad
summarizes an alternative to the Law of Excluded Middle:

The law of excluded middle - It is impossible to express the law of excluded
middle in negationless-logic. According to this law every proposition is either
true or false; it has two possible truth values. In negationless-logic we cannot
state that a proposition is false, and consequently we cannot state that there are
two possible truth values for a proposition. In a sense, in negationless-logic there
is only one possible truth value for a proposition - every proposition is true.174
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This same point can be observed phenomenologically. Consider the common experience
in which a person is relieved of a responsibility or rescued from a danger he did not appreciate
was burdensome or frightening until after it had passed. We hear the person say, “I did not
realize that was burdening me” or “I did not realize how frightened I was.” The subjective
experience of the emotion is not often experienced consciously, that is in awareness, until after
the situation has passed; this is not uncommon. The person was afraid or burdened without
experiencing the emotion accompanying the fear or burden. But this would seem impossible;
how can a person experience a feeling that he does not experience? How can he be aware
without being aware? In the regional ontology of objects this returns us to Ayer’s criticism and
the claim that “An existent does not exist” or “An existent non-exists.” But the formal ontology
of consciousness is apparently different, and the accepted laws of logic that apply to the in-itself
do not necessarily apply to consciousness. Thus, I can be afraid without being afraid, or said
differently, I can be aware without being aware.
But is it really possible that the concepts and rules that have been successful for
understanding the ontology of objects might be of only limited applicability for understanding
consciousness? Perhaps this question should be turned upside down. Is it likely that the
concepts and rules of thought that have so utterly failed to solve the so-called hard problem of
consciousness are the right ones? Does their failure not point to their inapplicability, or at least
inadequacy, for the ontology to which they are applied? Consider David Chalmers’ description
of the hard problem of consciousness.
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The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following
phenomena:
●

the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli
●

the integration of information by a cognitive system

●

the reportability of mental states

●

the ability of a system to access its own internal states

●

the focus of attention

●

the deliberate control of behavior

●

the difference between wakefulness and sleep

There is no real issue about whether these phenomena can be explained
scientifically. All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to explanation in terms
of computational or neural mechanisms. If these phenomena were all there was to
consciousness, then consciousness would not be much of a problem…The really
hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and
perceive, there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective
aspect.175
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Chalmers’ “really hard problem of consciousness” is “the problem of experience,” the
“subjective aspect” that is the focus of this investigation.176 Possibly the “really hard problem”
of consciousness has been stubbornly recalcitrant to the methods of science and rational thought
because the ontology of objects that undergirds these methods is incommensurate with that of
consciousness. Nearly forty years after Nagel wondered aloud about what it would be like to be
a bat, he asserts a similar view challenging the idea that the concepts and methods used to
understand objects are adequate to understand subjectivity.

Certainly the mind-body problem is difficult enough that we should be suspicious
of attempts to solve it with the concepts and methods developed to account for
very different kinds of things. Instead we should expect theoretical progress in
this area to require a major conceptual revolution at least as radical as relativity
theory…177

Nagel’s suspicion accords with Husserl’s point about looking beyond the natural attitude
by bracketing philosophical presuppositions in the phenomenological reduction. Sartre attempts
to do the same, but appears to have been deceived by figurative language that smuggled an
ontology of objects into his ontology of subjectivity that led him to conclude consciousness as
the opposite of substance that is self-identical must therefore be a nothingness. Indeed, the basic
phenomenology of consciousness that suspends the natural attitude of smuggling substance
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ontology into conceptualization of it readily appreciates that consciousness is of a different
formal ontology. Sartre notes this difference, but does not apply it to his most basic ontology of
consciousness. He states,

Indeed it is impossible for a determined process to act upon a spontaneity, exactly
as it is impossible for objects to act upon consciousness. Thus any synthesis of
two types of existence is impossible; they are not homogenous; they will remain
each one in its incommunicable solitude.178

But if different regional ontologies, “two types of existence,”179 cannot have “any
synthesis,”180 if different types of existence remain in “incommunicable solitude,”181 on what
grounds would we presume a priori that they have the same formal ontologies? How can we
know they have similar ontological properties validly organized according to similar ontological
concepts, understood according to identical rules of thought? As Desan noted earlier there
cannot be an a priori conclusion derived from phenomenology; not only does this violate the
phenomenological method by moving away from the things themselves, it enshrines, rather than
suspends, the natural attitude that contains our ontological, epistemological, and other
philosophical presuppositions.
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Thus, returning to Sartre’s statement above it is not at all clear that “Unity with the other
is in fact unrealizable” or “unrealizable in theory.”182 It is not clear that “assimilation of the foritself and the Other in a single transcendence” would necessarily involve the “disappearance of
the characteristic of otherness in the Other.”183 None of these assertions that are true of
substance ontology are necessarily true for the different ontology of consciousness, and
evaluating their possibility requires phenomenological investigation of subjectivity rather than
application of a priori concepts and rules from a different regional ontology.

B. General Ontological and Methodological Conclusions

The argument of the preceding section can now be summarized. Chapter 2 argued that we use
figurative language borrowed from the physical world to describe consciousness, and that
literalizing this language misunderstands it. The current chapter further argues that using
language from one regional ontology to communicate about another regional ontology also
carries a risk of attributing identical formal ontologies to the language as it traffics from the
source to the target. This is a mistake that Sartre appears to make. In his effort to show that
consciousness is entirely different from the in-itself he conceives it as the opposite of the initself. Instead of being infinitely dense and self-identical, consciousness is conceived as being
what it is not, and not being what it is. Sartre conceives the ontology of consciousness by the
ontology of the language domain used to communicate about it, and thus the for-itself becomes
largely the not-in-itself, its opposite, a nothingness.
182
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But as indicated it is mistaken to expect consciousness to conform to the language,
concepts and rules developed for the in-itself, which has a different formal ontology. Instead,
consciousness can be discerned using a phenomenological method that may yield basic
phenomenology that violates the rules governing the formal ontology of objects, and as such
does not need to be constrained by them. As noted, such constraints constitute a type of category
mistake, and threaten the phenomenological method’s apprehension of consciousness and/or
distort its yield. Indeed, Sartre himself eventually came to appreciate the phenomenology of
Being and Nothingness was unduly influenced by rationality, stating in 1969 “The conception of
‘lived experience’ marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant. My early work was a rationalist
philosophy of consciousness. It was all very well for me to dabble in apparently non-rational
processes in the individual, [but]184 the fact remains that L’Etre et Le Néant is a monument of
rationality.”185
This is not to say that the concepts, rules of thought, and rationality generally associated
with substance ontology are to be entirely rejected as inapplicable to consciousness, but they can
be subordinated to basic phenomenology when they conflict with it. The current investigation
seeks a theory of consciousness based on confrontation with subjectivity, not a “rationalist
philosophy of consciousness” that subordinates subjectivity to the concepts and rules applicable
to objects.186 Though rationality remains useful, it is not likely to prove decisive in
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understanding consciousness, which has a different formal ontology than the in-itself for which
rationality generally proves successful.
But if rationality and consistency as the sine qua non are subordinated to basic
phenomenology, what is the criterion by which philosophizing about consciousness obtains its
force? How can the success of this investigation be judged? Recall Chapter 2 where the success
criterion was identified as phenomenological verisimilitude, for which space has now been
opened by subordinating rationality and consistency in the ontology of consciousness to basic
phenomenology. Further, the usefulness of rational inferences and challenges to this
investigation can be judged by their limiting or augmenting effect upon the phenomenological
verisimilitude of the conclusions they advance For example, the Laws of Identity and
Noncontradiction applied to basic phenomenology may provide a cognized phenomenology that
advances phenomenological verisimilitude in which instance they would be welcomed.
Alternatively they might restrict it in which case they would be considered for rejection.
Therefore, rationality retains a place in the investigation, though one subordinate to basic
phenomenology and the verisimilitude it yields. With these considerations in view, Sartre’s
reduction and the transpersonal consciousness it reveals are considered in the next chapter.

70

IV.

Chapter 4: Transpersonal Consciousness

Based on the aforementioned considerations of language, method, and a success criterion, and
Sartre’s ontology of consciousness and criticism of it from Chapter 3, the groundwork has now
been laid to articulate a content-ed transpersonal ontology of consciousness.
The current chapter examines Sartre’s analysis of the cogito through which he discerns
the ego is constructed by, rather than directing consciousness, and argues that he again starts
with basic phenomenology, only then to privilege cognized phenomenology that leads him
astray. Had he remained faithful to basic phenomenology when discerning the fictive ego, he
would have realized that consciousness is neither individuated, nor a nothingness, but instead
transpersonal and thickly content-ed. This ontology of transpersonal consciousness is elaborated
and then compared with Sartre’s being-for-others. Next the chapter explains how individuation
arises from a transpersonal consciousness, which brings into relief its peculiar ontology that
challenges Aristotelian laws of thought characteristic of substance ontology. Finally, the chapter
is closed by illustrating transpersonal ontology with the phenomenology of grief.

A. Examining Sartre’s Phenomenological Reduction

In The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre argues that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that
discerned a transcendental ego or I187 fails to realize that the I is a product of the natural attitude
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associated with consciousness’ operations; it is superfluous rather than primordial to
consciousness. He states,

...the I never appears except on the occasion of a reflective act. In this case, the
complex structure of consciousness is as follows: there is an unreflected act of
reflection, without an I, which is directed on a reflected consciousness. The latter
becomes the object of the reflecting consciousness without ceasing to affirm its
own object…At the same time, a new object appears which is the occasion for an
affirmation by reflective consciousness, and which is consequently not on the
same level as the unreflected consciousness…nor on the same level as the object
of the reflected consciousness (chair, etc.). This transcendent object of the
reflective act is the I…the transcendent I must fall before the stroke of
phenomenological reduction. The Cogito affirms too much. The certain content
of the pseudo-“Cogito” is not “I have consciousness of this chair,” but “There is
consciousness of this chair.” This content is sufficient to constitute an infinite and
absolute field of investigation.188

He continues with similar statements like “...the ego is an object apprehended, but also
constituted, by reflective consciousness.”189 By identifying the ego’s existence as a mistake of
the natural attitude’s self-reflection, Sartre clears a path for a deeper understanding of
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consciousness. However, his method then appears to take a subtle but important turn. Consider
a later passage from The Transcendence of the Ego,

The Transcendental Field, purified of all egological structures, recovers its
primary transparency. In a sense it is a nothing, since all physical, psychophysical, and psychic objects, all truths, all values are outside it; since my me has
itself ceased to be any part of it. But this nothing is all since it is consciousness of
all these objects.190

He makes a similar point in Being and Nothingness where he describes “the total translucency of
consciousness.”191

In this sense it is necessary to see the denied qualities as a constitutive factor of
the being of the for-itself, for the for-itself must be there outside itself upon them;
it must be they in order to deny that it is they. In short the term-of-origin of the
internal negation is the in-itself, the thing which is there, and outside of it there is
nothing except an emptiness, a nothingness which is distinguished from the thing
only by the pure negation for which this thing furnishes the very content.192
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But is this accurate? Does the elimination of the ego render consciousness empty of all
“physical, psycho-physical, and psychic objects, all truths, all values”?193 Does its elimination
render consciousness “an emptiness, a nothingness?”194 Desan’s earlier point about otherness
failing to indicate non-being, but rather simply something else, again becomes relevant. The
insight that there is no ego within or directing pre-reflective consciousness, no organized or
organizing structure of consciousness, does not entail that there is nothing in consciousness, that
it is a “total translucency,” “an emptiness, a nothingness.”195
Because the landscape I see through the windshield of my car is really a mirage produced
by the sun reflecting off my glasses does not mean that there is no landscape; it simply means
that particular landscape that I see is a mirage. Analogously, to conclude the ego should be
eliminated from primordial consciousness entails that consciousness is a nothingness is an
inference extending the insight that the ego is fictive to the conclusion that consciousness is a
nothingness; it uses basic phenomenology to produce cognized phenomenology. Is this cognized
phenomenology persuasive? Does basic phenomenology indicate that once purged of the ego
consciousness is an “emptiness, a nothingness?”196
By “egological structures” Sartre presumably means persisting mental contents, broadly
conceived to include processes, teloses, ideas, etc. that are organized in some manner, hence the
word “structures;” indeed, the entities he cites “psycho-physical, and psychic objects, all truths,
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all values” usually do have a structure, an internal organization or pattern. However, not every
content, process or telos discerned by reflective consciousness needs to be an “egological
structure.” On the contrary, much of what I view within and constitutive of my consciousness
that I bring to objects, about which I become aware reflectively, is not a structure, is that which
does not have a coherence for which an internal organization could be identified. Most of what I
confront in introspection is basic experience combined with persisting content that I then cognize
to create a structure. These cognized structures are Sartre’s “egological structures…physical,
psycho-physical, and psychic objects, all truths, all values.”
Sartre appears right about this origin of the structures of consciousness; they are fictive
constructions of reflective awareness. But there is a difference between the basic
phenomenology observed by reflective awareness and the structures created by cognized
reflection. This distinction appears inadequately appreciated such that elimination of the
“egological structures” of consciousness mistakenly entails the complete emptying of
consciousness.197
Consider an example. I observe that I usually feel anxious when entering a hospital. The
consistent pairing in space and time of “fear” and “hospital entry” leads me to create in reflective
consciousness a structure I call a “hospital phobia,” which encompasses a history of experiences
and explanatory psychodynamics, all happening to and within me. This would be an “egological
structure” of the type Sartre discerns is fictive. But realizing this structure is fictively created in
reflective consciousness rather than primordial to it, does not eliminate the persisting fear that
hospital entry evokes; its persistence testifies to something occupying consciousness absent
197
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cognizing it to create a fictive structure denominated “hospital phobia.” This is analogous to the
point made earlier where it was noted that a cognized interpretation of consciousness understood
to be fictive does not necessarily indicate that consciousness is empty nothingness.
On the other hand, rather than seeing the persisting hospital fear as an entity occupying
consciousness, Sartre might advance a different explanation. He might account for it in terms of
the project by which I seek to solve the problem of my being, to include the situations I create
and their coefficients of adversity…and he may be right. But if the hospital phobia is not a
persisting content of some kind, but rather a manifestation of my project, the very choosing and
creating that births the project is itself the telos identified in the previous chapter. Thus, there is
either a persisting fear of hospitals analogous to an “object” occupying consciousness or a
project creating telos, either of which indicates consciousness is not a nothingness.
Further, consider again Sartre’s passage above, “The Cogito affirms too much. The
certain content of the pseudo-‘Cogito’ is not ‘I have consciousness of this chair,’ but ‘There is
consciousness of this chair.’”198 This is simply a statement of the empty nothingness of
consciousness that confronts objects. But if we step further away from the natural attitude
Sartre’s reduction seems incomplete. Sartre brackets the natural attitude and discerns that the
ego is fictively constructed. However, as observed above, discerning that “egological structures”
are fictive creations does not necessarily mean that consciousness is empty.199 On the other
hand, nor does it indicate that consciousness is not empty; the mistake is to conclude either that it
is empty or not empty based on inference instead of basic phenomenological investigation.

198
199

Sartre, Transcendence, 53-54.
Sartre, Transcendence, 93.

76

Putting aside for a moment the point above about my own phenomenology that discerns
persisting unstructured contents basic to my consciousness, let us simply stay with Sartre’s
reduction. Once the ego is jettisoned, what does Sartre find? He claims to find an empty
consciousness. Does he?
Consider the whole of Sartre’s phenomenological enterprise in The Transcendence of the
Ego and Being and Nothingness. These works emerge from and in response to works by
Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel, Bergson, Leibniz, Spinoza, and others he cites.
Thus, Sartre’s entire effort, based on his consciousness, is not that of an empty nothingness. The
supposed discernment of the empty nothingness of consciousness is derived from his
consciousness that is full of the ideas of other thinkers; the idea of a reduction that leads him to
conclude consciousness is empty derives from his consciousness that is full. But I need to go a
step further. Sartre’s consciousness neither “contains” nor is influenced by the ideas of these
other thinkers that is only knowledge. For sure their ideas are knowledge, objects for his
consciousness; however, to understand their role in his philosophy as only knowledge is too
simple. Their ideas constitute his consciousness from and through which he philosophizes to
conclude that consciousness is empty; they constitute much of his subjectivity. Sartre’s claim
that consciousness is empty is derived from his consciousness that is full.
But even that statement is not quite right. His consciousness is not full of the
consciousnesses of the other philosophers, it is so constituted by them that they are the basis for
his entire project, that through which his effort and its conclusions become possible. Sartre’s
empty nothingness of the for-itself derives from a consciousness that is anything but empty, and
were it to be so, the claim of its empty nothingness would never arise because the entire

77

architecture of his consciousness that births his effort would not exist. Thus, Sartre’s reduction
does not go far enough in the suspension of his metaphysical and epistemological
presuppositions. On the contrary, the other philosophers constitute the means and content
through which he philosophizes and concludes consciousness is an empty nothingness; his
conclusion is self-defeating, analogous to a skeptic’s assertion that knowledge is impossible.
This same point can be made more from another angle. Recall his statement above about
the cogito that concludes with “‘‘There is consciousness of this chair.’”200 “Chair?” This
statement is too simple. Consider it in the light of Sartre’s description of a “situation.”

We shall use the term situation for the contingency of freedom in the plenum of
being of the world inasmuch as this datum, which is there only in order not to
constrain freedom, is revealed to this freedom only as already illuminated by the
end which freedom chooses. Thus the datum never appears to the for-itself as a
brute existent in-itself; it is discovered always as a cause since it is revealed only
in the light of an end which illuminates it.201

Putting aside the implicit telos this statement contains, consider Sartre’s claim that the
“datum never appears to the for-itself as a brute existent in-itself.” A chair is not in-itself as a
brute existent a chair. Agreed. Sartre’s statement “There is consciousness of this chair” rather
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than “I am conscious of this chair” removes Husserl’s ego, as noted above. However, the very
notion of an object as a chair rather than something else, indeed to recognize it as an object at
all, in Sartre’s language as a “this,” indicates that consciousness confronts it not as empty, but
with some kind of conception that more than confronts it, but actually creates it as a chair rather
than a “brute existent in-itself.”202 Sartre even identifies the “egological structure” with which
consciousness confronts the in-itself from which it fashions a situation; “it is revealed only in
light of an end which illuminates it,” which is to say a project. To affirm the existence of an
object and further assign it an instrumental meaning, Sartre’s “chair” in the passage above,
reveals a non-empty consciousness; my recognition of the object as a chair reveals a situation
creating telos that “illuminates” objects to my consciousness. Thus, Husserl’s and Sartre’s
statements about consciousness above should be revised yet again to be something akin to
“Consciousness creates a chair of which it then becomes aware.” Analogously, Sartre’s entire
philosophical project that discerns an empty nothingness consciousness is created by his
constructed-by-others-telos-content-ed consciousness. His conclusion negates itself.
Consider a different example of how consciousness creates situations and “thises” based
on one’s project. I stand at the top of a steep densely moguled ski slope named Cannonball,
assessing routes to the bottom. The slope is intimidating, and will require skill, concentration,
and courage to navigate. I descend, coordinating the movements of my body in response to the
terrain as it unfolds. I make it to the bottom successful, tired, and exhilarated. I board the ski lift
next to a woman with whom I am acquainted. I ask what trail she had just skied, and she replies,
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This is not to say that consciousness creates the chair as a brute existent; recall the for-itself
does not create the in-itself. What it means is that from a brute background consciousness
“foregrounds” those objects by which to create a situation in which its project can be enacted and
revealed.
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“I was on Cannonball stopped in the middle while you skied by!” Though standing in the middle
of the slope I descended, I had not even seen her. She was not part of the situation, not even a
“this,” in the end that was illuminated by the ski slope for my consciousness. Outside my end
that created the situation, she did not “exist.”203
What does this analysis tell us? First, in addition to the teloses described in Chapter 3,
we find that Sartre’s entire project cannot disclose consciousness as an empty nothingness
because such a conclusion derives from a consciousness that is not an empty nothingness. His
reduction depends upon, indeed is, a situation producing project emanating from his full, richly
content-ed consciousness. Stated crudely, a full consciousness discerns an empty nothingness
consciousness, which of course means that consciousness is not an empty nothingness. Further,
the objects Sartre encounters in the world, in the passage above a chair, indicate that
consciousness creates situations containing “thises” according to its ends, its telos; the very
existence of these “thises” created by consciousness’ ends further indicates that consciousness is
not an empty nothingness. Why does Sartre’s not realize this? To this question I now turn.
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It is important to note that this does not mean she did not exist at all, as an in-itself. Had my
movement through space intersected with her location in space there would have been a
collision. Thus, by creating a situation consciousness does not create the in-itself but it creates a
world and situations from the in-itself via its nihilations/negations according to its ends.
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B. Epistemic Limitations of the Reduction and a Revised Structure of Consciousness

As noted, Sartre’s consciousness as described by his basic phenomenology creates
(“illuminates”204) situations and “thises” according to its ends. For Sartre this realization occurs
through the philosophers that have become his consciousness, not as internalized knowledge
objects, but as his subject, through which he experiences and thereby philosophizes as them as
himself. Unsurprisingly, he failed to see this about himself because consciousness in its
reflecting activity cannot divorce itself from itself when looking at itself; it cannot assume a
spectator perspective entirely outside or apart from itself by which to view itself, a point he
acknowledges.

Reflection is a knowledge; of that there is no doubt. It is provided with a
positional character; it affirms the consciousness reflected-on. But every
affirmation, as we shall soon see, is conditioned by a negation: to affirm this
object is simultaneously to deny that I am this object. To know is to make oneself
other. Now the reflective cannot make itself wholly other than the reflected-on
since it is-in-order-to-be the reflected on. Its affirmation is stopped halfway
because its negation is not entirely realized. It does not then detach itself
completely from the reflected-on, and it can not grasp the reflected-on “from a
point of view.”205
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Said perhaps more simply, the looking activity cannot take itself as an object. Even when
consciousness is looking at itself, there is a looking activity that cannot be reflexive, that it
cannot see. While looking there is always some process that is looking (subject), rather than
being looked at (object). He notes this in The Transcendence of the Ego, “For consciousness is
always turned outward by its own activity, looking at or judging an object or state of affairs
which is not the looking or judging….”206 This inability to be entirely apart from ourselves, that
is outside ourselves to look at the looking when looking at ourselves, the so-called spectator
perspective, places a veil of ignorance over a portion of our most basic awareness of ourselves
considered reflectively. We cannot of our own accord completely know ourselves; a completely
solo phenomenological reduction appears impossible. For these epistemic reasons Sartre
concedes a certain self-ignorance.
However, he also advances an ontological reason for self-ignorance, which he attributes
to the spontaneity of consciousness that “overflows” our fictive constructions that seek to
describe, explain, and contain it.207 But as argued above, the viability of an empty consciousness
needed for complete spontaneity has become untenable, which indicates that Sartre’s basic
structure of consciousness needs revision. Recall that Sartre claims that consciousness as a
nothingness (pre-reflective consciousness) regards itself (reflective consciousness) and its
psychical contents and activities, from which it creates an ego. Recall further that pre-reflective
consciousness is most ontologically fundamental because reflective consciousness and the ego it
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creates presuppose it; absent pre-reflective consciousness neither reflective consciousness, nor its
ego, exist.
Based on the analysis above an initial revision of Sartre's structure of consciousness can
be proposed. Most ontologically fundamental is not an empty pre-reflective consciousness, but a
full constitutively-constructed-by-others pre-reflective consciousnesses. Recall that Sartre’s own
philosophizing creates a situation with “thises” and coefficients of adversity that reveal his
purpose to himself as philosophizing, all performed by his pre-reflective consciousness
constitutively constructed by previous philosophers. Thus, from a first person perspective, prereflective transpersonal consciousness creates “my” situation, its purpose and coefficients of
adversity, through the consciousnesses of “others” that have become “me;” others’ subjectivity
becomes my subjectivity, not only as objects in or for my subjectivity, but as my subjectivity.
Given “my” consciousness is constitutively constructed by “other” consciousnesses, my prereflective consciousness is not simply a nothingness, but a constitutively-constructed-by-others
fullness that provides a rich teleology that directs my pre-reflective intentionality that creates and
confronts a world. Hence, all intentional acts, all engagements with the world, indeed the very
creation of a world are inherently the product of my history of interpersonal contacts that have
and continue to constitutively construct what I am. This transpersonal pre-reflective
consciousness then regards itself reflectively, from which it creates an ego. The task that unfolds
then becomes explaining what is meant by others constitutively constructing my pre-reflective
consciousness, which is explained in the next section.
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C. Overview of Transpersonal Consciousness

A transpersonal ontology of consciousness conceives each “individual” consciousness as
constitutively constructed by others. The constitutive construction by others is not one of
perception and representations that constitute objects for consciousness, which is more akin to
learning. Being advanced is an ontology of subjectivity more basic than the transfer of
knowledge, which suggests objects of and for consciousness transferred from one consciousness
to another. Other consciousnesses are not brought into my consciousness as objects; they
constitutively construct the subjectivity that is “my” consciousness through which I create and
then confront objects. Constitutive construction is the process by which the content and telos of
my consciousness come to be and change over time.
Recall the argument above that Sartre’s reduction does not have solely as objects in and
for his consciousness the ideas of other philosophers; instead they constitute, as content and
telos, his consciousness in so fundamental a manner that he fails to realize that their
consciousnesses have become his through which he philosophizes; they are his consciousness.
In dualistic terms, others’ consciousnesses are that which do the reflecting as Sartre’s
consciousness. They do not do the reflecting as if they are Sartre’s consciousness; the assertion
is not figurative. They do it as, indeed are, “Sartre’s” consciousness.
Chapter 3 notes that Sartre’s cognized consciousness is an empty nothingness exhausted
by the objects it intends, a claim that was challenged by basic phenomenology that found
consciousness content-ed by telos. The claim of transpersonal consciousness goes further by
asserting that “other” consciousnesses become the consciousness content and telos of each
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“individual” by constitutively constructing that “individual.” “My” consciousness is exhausted
by the “Other” consciousnesses contenting and thereby constituting “me,” that “I” am.208
The transpersonal ontology of consciousness in this investigation is largely captured by
Thich Nhat Hanh, who understands consciousness from a Buddhist perspective. He states, “True
self is non-self, the awareness that the self is made only of non-self elements. There’s no
separation between self and other, and everything is interconnected. Once you are aware of that
you are no longer caught in the idea that you are a separate entity.”209 Deconstructed and
interpreted via transpersonal ontology, Nhat Hanh’s statement asserts that “my” consciousness
(“true self”) is entirely constituted by “other” consciousnesses (“non-self elements”) such that
“I” am constituted entirely of “others,” which of course means there is no I or Other (“separate
entity”) as ordinarily conceived.
This claim is analogous to Sartre’s observation that the for-itself is temporally diasporatic
as existing in the past, present, and future. Analogously, transpersonal consciousness is
ontologically diasporatic, existing across multiple “independent” consciousnesses ordinarily
identified with different corporeal bodies. But transpersonal consciousness is also temporally
diasporatic, not as an individuated consciousness with a past, present and future as Sartre
conceives, but as transpersonally diasporatic through generations that have constitutively
constructed it. Nhat Hanh makes this further point, “My spiritual ancestors, blood ancestors,

In later sections we will see that Others’ consciousnesses do not entirely exhaust “my”
consciousness, but that is left aside for now.
209
Thich Nhat Hanh, “‘This is the Buddha’s Love,’” interview with Melvin McLeod. June 2010.
https://www.pbs.org/thebuddha/blog/2010/jun/3/buddhas-love-melvin-mcleod-interviews-thichnhath/#:~:text=Thich%20Nhat%20Hanh%3A%20True%20self,you%20are%20a%20separate%20ent
ity.
208

85

spiritual descendants are all part of me. I am they and they are me. I do not have a separate self.
We all exist as a wonderful stream of life.”210 Indeed, Nhat Hanh extends this insight from past
generations that have constitutively constructed “me,” into the future that extends me by virtue
of my becoming a constructive constituent of others. He continues, “‘I am not an entity separate
from my children, because I am continued by my children. They carry me into the future. My
son, daughter, friend or disciple is me.’”211 Thus, what I think of as my individuated, boundaried
consciousness actually exists diasporatically among others, and across time from the past to the
present, and into the future, rather than being contained within me alone.
A key point is that transpersonal consciousness asserts more than a necessary
interdependence between firmly boundaried consciousnesses in a vastly complex system, a
boundarying like Sartre’s “inter-monad relation.”212 It asserts that boundarying one
consciousness from another, as different corporeal bodies are apparently boundaried, is a
mistaken conception borrowed from substance ontology.213 Consciousnesses are mutually
interpenetrating, that is immanent, such that “portions” of “my” consciousness are identical to,
indeed constitute, “portions” of “your” consciousness; “portions” of consciousness are shared in
a manner that might be loosely visualized like the sharing of bodily structures in conjoined twins.
Said differently and perhaps too simply, two bodies share “segments” of the same consciousness,
which makes the consciousnesses ontologically immanent and interpenetrating, rather than
boundaried.
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A transpersonal ontology of consciousness might be distinguished from ordinary learning
by contrasting the body’s relationship with food on the one hand, and clothing, jewelry, tattoos,
piercings, and hairstyles on the other. When food is consumed it becomes the body; it constitutes
the body. The body is constituted by nothing but the molecules of the food it consumes. It is
neither metaphor, nor exaggeration to assert that the human body is consumed food recombined
according to internal structures, processes and telos; this is analogous to the constitutive
construction of transpersonal ontology. By contrast, the body may be modified by the clothing
we wear or the jewelry that adorns it, the hair we grow, cut, shave or style, and the piercings that
penetrate its exterior. However, these accoutrements do not constitute the body; they are added
to it as superficial modifications, which are akin to knowledge.
Analogously, the ontological assertion of transpersonal consciousness is that each
person’s consciousness is constitutively constructed from “other” consciousnesses like the body
is constitutively constructed by food.214 This is particularly so in the early years of life, perhaps
most profoundly during those prior to verbal cognition. During these years the consciousnesses
of caregivers constitutively construct the child’s consciousness, not by being moved into the
consciousness of the child as an object might exist in a container, but as the consciousness of the
child. The consciousnesses of the caregivers are the ontological “food” of consciousness that
constitutively constructs the child’s subjectivity through which she encounters others, and creates

Given transpersonal consciousness re-conceives what is meant by “person,” in this section
person is understood as defined by the boundary of the body.
214
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the world, projects, and their situations.215 By contrast learning and knowledge are objects for
subjectivity analogous to clothing, jewelry, piercings, and so on.
But what is meant by other people’s consciousness? Any “individual” consciousness
assumes as a constituent any other consciousness of which it becomes aware as a consciousness,
awareness being synonymous with interaction given consciousness’ intentionality. Interactions
with “others” constitutively construct “my” consciousness via direct interpersonal contact, as
well as by indirect contacts like art, writings, tools, vandalism, litter, music and any other
manifestation of “other” consciousnesses discerned as such. These discerned manifestations of
“other” consciousnesses become “my” consciousness as constitutively constructive ingredients,
just as each meal constitutively constructs my body. Following Sartre’s use of “exist” as a
transitive verb, “‘My’ consciousness exists ‘Other’ consciousnesses,” thereby transcending in
some measure the subject-other dualism.216 Or as Nhat Hanh says, “my” self is “made only of
non-self elements,” that is the consciousness of “others,” that “I” am.217
In this rendering, the ontology of transpersonal consciousness is one of mundane
emanation. Each individual consciousness is a combined emanation of every other
consciousness, and/or its manifestations, with which it has interacted in the broadest sense. The
metaphysical origin of consciousness is not addressed in this investigation, which seeks to

By excluding reciprocity, the food metaphor is actually much too simple. The infant’s
consciousness is also constitutively imported “into” the consciousness of the caregiver, though of
course the caregiver’s consciousness has much greater content from prior constituents than the
infant’s. Thus, there is a reciprocal process that merges the two consciousnesses that is not
captured by the one-way constitution of the food as a constituent of the body.
216
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understand its structure and the human condition it births. Nevertheless, it should be noted that
transpersonal consciousness is neither an emanation nor an instantiation of a Supra-Mind of
which each “individual” mind is a moment or manifestation as G. W. F. Hegel conceives in the
Phenomenology of Spirit.218 Nor is “each” consciousness subsumed in a mystical Mind that
unifies the entire universe as articulated by D. T. Suzuki’s Zen Buddhism, captured in statements
such as “He (Hung-jen), of course, being a follower of Bodhi-Dharma, believed in the Mind
from which this universe with all its multiplicities issues…” and “...the Masters who followed
him pointed to the presence of the Mind in each individual mind and also to its absolute
purity…”219
Finally, if not yet apparent, transpersonal consciousness asserts more than intersubjectivity, the very notion of which entails inter subjective experience, experiences shared
between subjects. Consider Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha and Esa Itkonen who
state,

In its simplest terms, intersubjectivity is understood by the authors represented in
this book as the sharing of experiential content (e.g.feelings, perceptions,
thoughts, and linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects….no human
being is entirely devoid of the human intersubjective potential…These
considerations underlie our bold contention that the human mind is
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quintessentially a shared mind and that intersubjectivity is at the heart of what
makes us human.220

They continue,

Human beings are primordially connected in their subjectivity, rather than functioning as
monads that need to “infer” that others are also endowed with experiences and
mentalities that are similar to their own. The sharing of experiences is not only, not even
primarily, on a cognitive level, but also (and more basically) on the level of affect,
perceptual process and conative (action-oriented) engagements.221

Transpersonal consciousness constitutes the ontological foundation that permits the
intersubjectivity that Zlatev et. al. assert is “the heart of what makes us human,” and is the
cognized ontology of the phenomenology of being “primordially connected.”222 “The sharing of
experiential content” can and does occur because the most fundamental ontology of
consciousness is not individuated and separable among people (really bodies).223 Sharing the
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phenomenology of others is achieved not via analogy, but directly via common constitutive
constructants of consciousness comprising a transpersonal consciousness subsuming “individual”
consciousnesses.
To clarify, consider Heidegger’s explanation of empathy. He states “‘Empathy’ does not
first constitute Being-with; only on the basis of Being-with does ‘empathy’ become
possible…”224 Transpersonal ontology extends this insight by articulating an ontology of
consciousness that permits the “sharing of experiences”225 generally in what is commonly
considered intersubjectivity.226 Thus, transpersonal ontology moves beyond notions of empathy,
shared meanings, and shared experiences characterizing intersubjectivity, and articulates the
ontology that undergirds and makes possible these features of what it is like to be human.

D. Sartre’s Being-for-others Re-examined

I can now return to Sartre’s phenomenological analysis of the Other and consider how it might
be re-interpreted by a transpersonal ontology. Recall that Sartre articulates several internal
nihilations whereby consciousness is that which it is not by virtue of its own nothingness, and by
which it “encase[s] with a shell of non-being” entities that are not it.227 Said differently, the
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“shell of non-being” is that which is the “separating” nihilation, the distance the nothingness of
consciousness creates from that which it is not, by being itself a nothingness. Recall further that
consciousness’ most basic internal nihilation is that of the infinitely dense, self-identical, in-itself
that consciousness intends as other than itself.
There is an analogous internal nihilation with respect to the Other. However,
consciousness’ internal nihilation of the in-itself has a different ontological character than its
nihilation of the other, which is another consciousness. Consciousness’ nihilation of the in-itself
entails negating the object world with which it can never be identified, but at most synthetically
bound. But consciousness’ internal nihilation of others is that of their subjectivity, which is of
the same ontology as the nihilating consciousness. Sartre notes this different character of the
nihilation of the Other from the nihilation of the in-itself.

In the upsurge of the Other, however, consciousness is in no way different from
the Other so far as its mode of being is concerned. The Other is what
consciousness is. The Other is For-itself and consciousness…228

In fact, the nihilation of consciousness from another subject entails a “double nihilation”
whereby “my'' consciousness nihilates and thereby disowns the Other as not me, at the same time
that the Other nihilates me as not him; both terms of the relation mutually nihilate one another.
Consider Sartre’s description.
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If in general there is an Other, it is necessary above all that I be the one who is not
the Other, and it is in this very negation affected by me upon myself that I make
myself be and that the Other arises as Other. This negation which constitutes my
being and which, as Hegel said, makes me appear as the Same confronting the
Other, constitutes me on the ground of a non-thetic selfness as “Myself.” We
need not understand by this that a Self comes to dwell in our consciousness, but
that selfness is reinforced as arising as a negation of another selfness and that this
reinforcement is positively apprehended as the continuous choice of selfness by
itself as the same selfness and as this very selfness….Thus, by utilizing the
formulae applied to the knowledge of the Not-me in general, we can say that the
For-itself as itself includes the being of the Other in its being in so far as its being
is in question as not being the Other. In other words, in order for a consciousness
to be able to not-be the Other and therefore in order that there may be an Other
…two things are necessary: consciousness must have to be itself and must
spontaneously have to be non-being; consciousness must freely disengage itself
from the Other and wrench itself away by choosing itself as a nothingness which
is simply Other than the Other and thereby must be reunited with “itself.” This
very detachment, which is the being of the For-itself, causes there to be an
Other.229
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What startles about this passage is that Sartre is not describing basic phenomenology that
confronts, and thereby confirms an other. Instead, he describes the mechanics of what must be
true as a precondition to account for “a primary and perpetual fact” of the existence of the
Other.230 He uses phenomenology to explain the preconditions for experiencing an other as
Other. Consider that he begins the passage with “If” so as to signal he is articulating the
conditions of the Other’s existence; “If in general there is an Other, it is necessary…”231
But the reason he needs to articulate the process by which an other comes to be other is
because our primordial relation with the Other, contrary to consciousness’ “synthetic totality”
with the in-itself, is a relation of unity, which is to say not a relation at all, but an identity.
Sartre’s ontology of being-for-others reveals that he is explicating how consciousness interacts
after becoming individuated from its primordial unity with “other” consciousnesses such that an
“other” and a “myself” come to be phenomenologically. Thus, he is not describing our most
primordial ontology as individuated Others. Instead he describes the route to our individuated
“myself” and an other that is confronted. He is articulating cognized phenomenology to explain
our basic phenomenology of individuation, which emerges from identity with the subjectivity of
the Other. Therefore, by Sartre’s own description our most basic ontology is not individuated,
but in some sense unified or even identified. Consider a later passage from the same chapter of
Being and Nothingness.
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Thus we arrive at this contradictory conclusion: being-for-others can be only if it
is made-to-be by a totality which is lost so that being-for-others may arise, a
position which would lead us to postulate the existence and directing power of the
mind.232 But on the other hand this being-for-others can exist only if it involves an
inapprehensible and external non-being which no totality, not even the mind, can
produce or found. In one sense a plurality of consciousnesses can not be a
primary fact and it refers us to an original fact of a wrenching away from self, a
fact of the mind. Thus the question “Why is there a plurality of
consciousnesses?” could receive an answer. But in another sense the facticity of
this plurality seems to be irreducible; and if the mind is considered from the
standpoint of the fact of the plurality, it vanishes...The ekstatic totality of the mind
is not simply a totality detotalized; it appears to us as a shattered being concerning
which we can neither say that it exists nor that it does not exist. Thus, our
description has enabled us to satisfy the preliminary conditions which we have
posited for any theory about the existence of the Other. The multiplicity of
consciousnesses appears to us as a synthesis and not as a collection, but it is a
synthesis whose totality is inconceivable.233

But perhaps Sartre’s “contradictory conclusion” can be resolved by a transpersonal
ontology. His “totality which is lost” does not need to be a “mind” understood like a Hegelian
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supra-Mind involved in a “wrenching away from itself” to manifest “a plurality of
consciousnesses”. Instead it can be understood as a mundane transpersonal “mind.” Thus,
replacing a supra-Mind with a mundane transpersonal mind does not require a “totality
detotalized” because no totality exists, if by totality one conceives an all- encompassing supraConsciousness that gives rise to plurality.234 As noted in the preceding section, nor does
rejecting a supra-Mind entail an individuated consciousness; there is a hybrid option.
A constitutively constructed mundane transpersonal consciousness is a “totality”235 of all
consciousnesses with which it has interacted, and by which it comes to be constituted. Further,
no supra-mind needs to be “shattered”236 to create the plurality of consciousnesses; “individual”
consciousnesses exist and are endlessly constitutively constructing one another, thereby giving
rise to “individuals” that Sartre identifies within plurality. Therefore, transpersonal
consciousness is an “individualized totality” absent the need of a supra-Mind.
Further, by strictly juxtaposing plurality with totality Sartre risks smuggling the formal
ontology of substances (the in-itself) to the ontology of consciousness (for-itself) via the
figurative language used to communicate about consciousness. It is not at all clear that
consciousness conforms to the conceptual juxtaposition these terms imply. Instead, “each”
consciousness is both part of a plurality, an “individuality,” and a totality. It is an idiosyncratic
totality of the other consciousnesses with which it has interacted and that now constitute it,
which simultaneously “uniques” it as an individuality that gives rise to the plurality of
consciousnesses.
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Moreover, Sartre’s “synthesis whose totality is inconceivable”237 also appears predicated
on the juxtaposition of plurality and totality, such that a totality is “inconceivable,” “vanishes”238
because of the incontrovertible confrontation with a plurality of consciousnesses. Again, using
plurality and totality as antipodal is questionable and renders the problem of their concomitant
existence insoluble. Thus, the entire “contradictory conclusion”239 appears based, at least
implicitly, on a Hegelian like notion of Mind that entails positioning plurality and totality as
mutually exclusive opposites. But a Hegelian supra-Mind is only one type of transpersonal
consciousness, and contrasts with transpersonal consciousness proposed by this investigation
distinct for its mundane transmission and manifestation.
Finally, if consciousness is a nothingness, the matter being considered is that of a
“relation” among two nihilating nothingnesses, which is difficult to conceive as distinct from an
identity; how can we talk intelligibly about the relation of “two” nothingnesses, without at least
considering them to be a single entity? By what conception or method could “two”
nothingnesses distinguish themselves by “encasing with a shell of non-being”240 themselves or
one another, in more nothingness? Perhaps a pause is called for here given distinctions among
extremely abstract notions expressed by language absent verifiable denotations risks violating
Aristotle’s admonition noted in Chapter 2 not to look for more precision than our language and
concepts afford. Accordingly, the question of how nothingnesses might distinguish themselves
from one another is left aside.
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Of course, there remains the question of how the phenomenology of individuality arises
in a transpersonal ontology, how Sartre’s “facticity of this plurality” that “seems to be
irreducible” can be explained.241 If consciousness is constitutively constructed as-others, how do
I come to experience and know myself as an “individual?” How can this universal
phenomenology of what it is like to be human be cognized? To this question I now turn.

E. The Origin of Individuation and the Peculiar Ontology of Consciousness

To explain the origin of our phenomenology of individuation in transpersonal ontology, consider
the peculiar ontology of consciousness that has thus far been introduced. Consciousness has
been described as an entity entirely different from those comprising substance ontology, and as
such may have a completely different formal ontology that requires different concepts and rules
of thought. This peculiar ontology of consciousness can begin to explain the origin of
individuation in transpersonal ontology, and is further revealed by it, as elaborated in the
conclusion of this section.
Recall that Sartre’s ontology conceives two structures of our being, being for-itself and
being-for-others. He states,

This is the fact that being-for-others is not an ontological structure of the Foritself. We cannot think of deriving being-for-others from a being-for-itself as one
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would derive a consequence from a principle, nor conversely can we think of
deriving being for-itself from being-for-others…It would perhaps not be wholly
impossible to conceive of a For-itself which would be wholly free from all Forothers…What the cogito reveals to us here is just factual necessity: it is found and this is indisputable - that our being along with its being-for-itself is also forothers; the being which is revealed to the reflective consciousness is for-itself-forothers…It is as fact - as a primary and perpetual fact - not as an essential
necessity that we shall study being-for-others.242

I previously argued that transpersonal ontology revises Sartre’s locution being-for-others
to being-as-others, in which the central ontological structure of the for-itself is the Other who is
an essential structure of “me;” the “Other” constitutes “me;”; “Others” are what “I” am. By this
rendering the Other is no longer a contingent fact revealed by the look, but a necessary structure
of any “single” consciousness by virtue of its constitutive constructive role. Consciousness does
not just reveal the other “as a factual necessity”243 as Sartre claims. Transpersonal consciousness
entails the Other by being-as-other. Western philosophy’s endemic problem of the Other
becomes transformed into the problem of the Me or the I. Moreover, as argued earlier Sartre’s
basic phenomenology advances a telic, thinly occupied consciousness, whereas transpersonal
ontology advances a thickly content-ed-being-as-others consciousness. Consciousness is neither
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a nothingness, nor a lightly content-ed telic quasi-nothingness, but a transpersonal constitutively
constructed fullness.
But this raises the question: how can the emergence of individuality, that by which the
Other is other, be explained in an ontology of being-as-others? This is the question Sartre
wrestles with in the passage above describing plurality and totality. How does transpersonal
consciousness that merges subject-other account for the phenomenology of ourselves as
individuals?
Recall that transpersonal consciousness is a mundane emanation, by which any “single”
consciousness is constitutively constructed by “other” consciousnesses with which it interacts.
The constructive constituents are then “summed” and “recombined” to comprise any “single”
person’s consciousness. Thus, there are two processes by which consciousness comes to be
individualized. First, it is entirely constituted by the unique constellation of emanations of
“Others” with which one interacts. Second, the unique constellation of emanations are then
idiosyncratically summed and recombined to create an “individual” consciousness.244 This is the

The terms “summed” and “recombined” and the like, to include their variants, are intended
figuratively, and do not carry the formal ontology of their regional ontology into the ontology of
consciousness. For an overview of the Combination Problem addressed from an analytic
perspective see David J. Chalmers, “The Combination Problem for Panpsychism” in
Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by Godehard Buntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 19-47.
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ontological origin of the universal phenomenology of being an “individual” or “me.”245
Consciousness is entirely constituted by “Others,” yet entirely “mine.”246
The ontological process by which other consciousnesses are “added” as constitutive
constructants to my consciousness is called the Combination Problem in panpsychism for which
no satisfactory solution has yet emerged. The manner in which other consciousnesses are
“recombined” within my consciousness is more akin to an ontical empirical question addressed
by psychoanalytic and psychodynamic theories building on Sigmund Freud’s legacy.247 The
specific mechanisms or processes by which consciousnesses are summed or recombined are left
aside in this investigation.
Perhaps our individuality can be illustrated by returning to the analogy of the relationship
between food and the body. People eating the same foods would have the same body; their
corporeal structure would be constituted by the same molecular components. By contrast, unlike
“identical” foods that have identical molecular structures, every consciousness that emanatively
constructs me constitutively and becomes “me,” is itself a unique combination of emanations
idiosyncratically recombined within itself, which is then added to me as-others. Moreover,
subsequent interactions with the “same” consciousness across time are interactions with a

Strictly speaking, a phenomenology of “I” or “me” may not be universal. However, those
that claim to have moved beyond this phenomenology appear unusual, and as such are not
considered in this investigation where the common mundane experience of what it is like to be a
human is considered.
246
Analogously, this is the ontology of each “Other” one “encounters” or “confronts.” However,
the verbs “encounter” and “confront” come from a subject-Other ontology and can mislead, but
are retained for expository purposes.
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McWilliams, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis: understanding personality structure in the clinical
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consciousness differently constituted by the intervening constituents to which it has been
exposed, rendering it a different consciousness that interacts with “me.” Similarly, in these
interactions across time I am also a different consciousness by virtue of the intervening
interactions and recombinations I have experienced. These processes, really interactions, create
the unique consciousness that I am given my being-as-others is constitutively constructed by
others and myself that are both constantly changing.
Related, this emanative process of other consciousnesses that are me also accounts for the
phenomenology of privacy. Given no “other” transpersonal consciousness has the exact same
constituents or recombinations, no other person can phenomenologically share all of my
consciousness. No other person has the same constitutive emanations and as such cannot
experience “me” as I experience myself; no two consciousnesses are alike or can see the whole
viewed reflectively that confers my privileged perspective upon myself. This privileged
perspective, so-called privacy, is founded on my unique constituents, and their recombinations,
that have come to constitute “my” consciousness, the total field of which only I can see and
experience given there is no other consciousness identical to mine.
This unique constitutive construction of experiences (“other” consciousnesses) and their
recombinations is the ontological basis of the privileged “internal” knowledge perspective we
have of ourselves, despite being composed entirely of “Others.” I am a being-as-others-asmyself, and as such can now be understood as both immanent with others that constitutively
construct me and transcendent beyond, or more than, others. Hence, the assertion made earlier
about subject-Other identity in transpersonal ontology is revealed as too simple.
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Consciousnesses have a peculiar ontology by which they are neither entirely identical nor
completely distinct.
Based on the arguments and analysis above, a peculiar ontology of consciousness can
now be elaborated. Consciousness is a paradox. My consciousness is neither entirely identical
with that of others, nor entirely distinct; it is individuated and transpersonal. It is an emanation
of “other” consciousnesses, yet transcendent by virtue of being private and mine; I am myself
and I am the Other. I am both an individualized totality that is me and a diasporatic plurality of
others.
It is unclear at this stage of transpersonal theory if these paradoxes of consciousness
violate Aristotle’s Laws of Noncontradiction, Identity, or Excluded Middle. Possibly
transpersonal consciousness is not immanent and transcendent “in the same respect;” not
individuated and transpersonal “in the same respect;” not comprised entirely of others yet mine
“in the same respect;” not a totality and a plurality “in the same respect.”248 However, it might
be. It might violate Aristotelian laws, which as previously argued would not be grounds alone
for rejection given the focus of this investigation is what it is like to be human from a
phenomenological, rather than a deductive or critical perspective. Indeed, violating Aristotle’s
Laws might actually recommend transpersonal ontology by signaling the beginning of Nagel’s
“major conceptual revolution as radical as relativity theory” required to understand
consciousness.249 However, this matter is left for a separate investigation.
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At this juncture in the investigation transpersonal ontology might become more
understandable by considering our basic phenomenology, to which I now return by considering
grief.

F. Transpersonal Phenomenology of Grief

Someone once asked me if his grief over the death of his father was really sadness for himself.
“Am I really crying for myself rather than my father? Is my grief selfish?” These are important
questions. Why do the living grieve if not for themselves? After all, the decedent is…dead.
But consider the common use of the word “loss” when expressing condolences, “I am
sorry for your loss,” “That is a terrible loss.” Indeed, the death of a loved one is experienced as a
loss. Freud observed this phenomenology of loss in psychoanalytic investigations, stating
“Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person…;” “Profound mourning, the
reaction to the loss of a loved person, contains the same feeling of pain…;” “In grief the world
becomes poor and empty;” “On the one hand, like mourning, melancholia is the reaction to the
loss of a loved object…”250 But who loses what? Am I aggrieved for the deceased that lost his
life, but is now just a corpse?
Judith Butler elaborates on Freud’s view of grief associated with loss. She observes that
according to Freud we mitigate the loss of others to whom we are attached (cathexis) as objects
by internalizing them. We incorporate the lost others into our own ego, as if to retain them in us

Sigmund Freud, (1917) “Mourning and Melancholia,” in Collected Papers, Vol. IV.
(NewYork: Basic Books, 1959), 152-170. 153, 153, 155, 161.
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and as us. This internalization of the lost other into our own psyche is effected as a maneuver to
retain the other despite the other’s absence as an object of cathexis; it is a mechanism to deny
acknowledging the other’s permanent absence and the grief such acknowledgement would
entail.251 She explains, “…those identifications which are formed from unfinished grief are the
modes in which the lost object is incorporated and phantasmatically preserved in and as the
ego.”252 She continues, “What Freud here calls the ‘character of the ego’ appears to be the
sedimentation of those objects loved and lost, the archeological remainder, as it were, of
unresolved grief.”253
However, this psychoanalytic formulation appears to presuppose an ontology of
consciousness different than that advanced in this investigation. To suggest that my
consciousness performs a protective maneuver to mitigate grief by incorporating the lost other
would seem to entail that the other retains the possibility of not being incorporated into my
consciousness, that I could be attached to the other solely as an object without the other being
incorporated into my consciousness as a constructive constituent of my subjectivity. By contrast,
a transpersonal ontology of consciousness asserts not that the other to whom I am attached can
become my subjectivity (the ego in Butler’s statement above), but that the other to whom I am
attached cannot not be a constituent of my subjectivity. To assert that I incorporate the deceased
other into my consciousness as a strategy to avoid the full force of the loss fails to realize that the
other I grieve already constitutively constructs the subjectivity that is me.

Judith Butler, “Melancholy Gender –Refused Identification,” Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 5
(2), 1995.
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Thus, in transpersonal ontology the living “lose” something because the consciousness of
the deceased that constitutively constructed and now comprises that of the living has been
extinguished. The living “lose” something of that which is already themselves, not an object of
attachment, but an existing constitutive constructant of their subjectivity. Indeed, a more
accurate description might be something like “The ‘me’-constituted-by-(as)-the-‘Other’” as a
transpersonal consciousness is no longer whole. Some part of “me” has ceased with the
cessation of the “Other,” which truncates the transpersonal consciousness that is the other-as-me.
Said differently, when the Other dies a part of the transpersonal diasporatically
distributed consciousness that “I” am is extinguished. The loss of the “Other” is the partial loss
of “myself”-as-the-Other. I am now “alone”-as-the-Other rather than transpersonally the-Otheras-me and me-as-the-Other. Of course the Other’s constituents that are “me” remain, but their
continued nourishment no longer occurs, and they can no longer be shared with the “Other”
whose body is deceased. Because of our transpersonal ontology I lose a portion of “me.” Death
of a loved Other is a hole in the diasporatic transpersonal consciousness that “I” am.
Further, the more constitutively constructive the deceased is of my consciousness, the
more of “my” consciousness is comprised of this “Other” consciousness that is no more, or
perhaps one might say the transpersonal consciousness that was the Other-as-me and me-as-theOther, the greater is the truncation of “my” consciousness and “my” loss upon the “Others’”
death. Echoing Nhat Hanh’s earlier statement, the more prominent the “non-self element” that
constitutes “my” self that has become absent, the greater my loss.254 Returning to the question
above about the origin of grief, asking if it is for me or the deceased assumes subject-other
254
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dualism that distorts the ontology of subjectivity. Instead, by bracketing subject-other
presuppositions, grief and loss in response to death reveal consciousness as ontologically
transpersonal.
But attention must be given to the language of loss to describe death. On the one hand,
“loss” can be understood by substance ontology as the absence of an existent that once existed, a
no-longer-existing existent. On the other hand, this is exactly what occurs to transpersonal
consciousness diasporatically distributed among persons. The transpersonal consciousness of
which each person is a constituent is now absent a constituent; a constitutive existent is gone.
Thus, the word “loss” associated with the phenomenology of death is not figurative, and as such
there is no danger of smuggling substance ontology and its formal ontology of concepts and
rules, into consciousness via language used to describe it.
Nevertheless, the consciousness that constituted the Other that is now deceased, is not
entirely non-existent, given it is diasporatically distributed transpersonally as-Others; it is not
extinguished with the body that was its precondition. Perhaps this is one function of funerary
rituals whereby those that knew the deceased gather in remembrance. By coming together and
sharing their experiences of the deceased, really their consciousness as the deceased, they
transpersonally reconstruct him into some semblance of the “whole” that he was, so that each
“individual” person can re-experience approximately, one last time, the deceased via this
communal transpersonal reconstruction.
With these considerations in view, a brief return to Sartre, who asserts that nausea and
anguish disclose the utter contingency of his existence and the unremitting freedom of his
choices, is instructive. His phenomenology reveals his human condition as absurd and
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condemned. Contrast Sartre’s immediate disclosive confrontation with nausea and anguish with
his confrontation with Pierre’s suffering,

For example, if someone tells me of a particular painful event which has just
darkened the life of Pierre, I shall exclaim, ‘How he must have suffered!’ I do not
know this suffering and I do not actually feel it…we direct ourselves towards pain
and shame [of the Other], we strain toward them, consciousness transcends itselfbut emptily…what separates them from real shame…is the absence of the quality
of being lived.255

For Sartre Pierre’s suffering is phenomenologically opaque; he does not “actually feel
it.”256 His experience is absent Pierre’s suffering, which he attempts to reach, but fails. At best
Pierre’s suffering appears to evoke in him some attenuated suffering rooted in analogical
reasoning such as “I have suffered and know what that is like to suffer, and by analogy I
understand what Pierre suffered.” Nevertheless, Sartre’s “consciousness transcends itself-but
emptily” and has no “quality of being lived.”257 Pierre’s suffering is little more than knowledge.
Contrasting Sartre’s immediately disclosive experiences of anguish and nausea with his
anemic reaction to Pierre’s suffering reveals why he does not understand grief as being
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disclosive; it is apparently not “lived,” but experienced “emptily.”258 Indeed, his description of
death in Being and Nothingness is entirely about what happens to the decedent, what will happen
to him when he dies, rather than those left behind. The decedent can no longer choose; his
meanings are gratuitously fixed; he is “...prey for the living. This means therefore that the one
who tries to grasp the meaning of his future death must discover himself as the future prey of
others.”259 It does not seem to occur to Sartre that like nausea and anguish, Pierre’s suffering or
the grief associated with loss of a loved one could be disclosive because they are not intimate
experiences for him; their phenomenology is apparently bland rather than immediate, such that
these events confer knowledge, but disclose little if anything about the ontology of the human
condition. This should not be a surprise. On the contrary, it is inevitable. Sartre’s ontology of
individuated consciousness that isolates each person in “frontal opposition” to the Other
forecloses the intimacy of these experiences.260 Thus, the disclosive power of the Other’s
suffering and death fail to reveal the human condition; they disclose nothing.
With this conception of a transpersonally content-ed consciousness, the investigation can
now evaluate and resolve Sartre’s discontents, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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V.

Chapter 5: Resolving Sartre’s Discontents

The final leg of this journey is now upon us. Part I of this chapter describes Sartre’s
discontented human condition rooted in his ontology of consciousness as an individuated
nothingness. Part II articulates a contrasting human condition based on a transpersonally
content-ed consciousness that either resolves or mitigates these discontents, and opens the
possibility for human happiness. To these final tasks of the investigation I now turn.

Part I: Discontents of Sartre’s Ontology

A. Discontents within Ourselves: Meaninglessness, Nausea, Anguish, Anxiety and Isolation

Recall that Sartre conceives human reality, the being that is human being, as an upsurge from the
in-itself. Like the in-itself we are entirely contingent, thoroughly gratuitous. He states, “It [the
for-itself] has the feeling of its complete gratuity; it apprehends itself as being there for nothing,
as being de trop.”261
For Sartre, this has two consequences. First, there is no intrinsic value or meaning to
existence, either the in-itself or human life.262 Second, because existence has no intrinsic value or
meaning, we must create values and meaning and bring them and the world into existence absent

Sartre, Being, 132. The French expression “de trop” means extra or unnecessary, or most
literally “too much.”
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any guidance while immersed in our absolute freedom, which is disclosed by the experience of
nausea. Sartre ruefully states “But freedom is simply the fact that this choice is always
unconditioned…Such a choice made without base of support and dictating its own causes to
itself, can very well appear absurd, and in fact is absurd.”263 This absurdity is the foundation of
Sartre’s famous assertion that existence precedes essence; first we exist, and then we create an
essence for ourselves composed of the sum of our actions.
Further, our connection to the in-itself, indeed that a dimension of our being, our body, is
an entirely contingent in-itself, is also revealed by nausea. He explains, “This perpetual
apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an insipid taste which I cannot place, which
accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste-this is what we
have described elsewhere under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually
reveals my body to my consciousness.”264
If the absurdity of our lives and gratuity of our existence are revealed by nausea, then our
complete freedom from which we can never escape is revealed by anguish. Our freedom is
characterized in The Transcendence of the Ego as a “monstrous spontaneity” and our existence
as “monstrously free.”265 In Being and Nothingness he asserts, “To be free is to be condemned
to be free”266 and identifies one of the purposes for which consciousness creates an ego and other
psychic structures in reflective awareness is to hide the spontaneity of consciousness from itself
so as to diminish anxiety.
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Given this freedom we are responsible for choices that must be made absent any basis
and repeated in each moment. He forcefully asserts,

It follows that my freedom is the unique foundation of values and that nothing,
absolutely nothing, justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, this or
that particular scale of values. As a being by whom values exist, I am
unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while
itself without foundation.267

As nothingness, consciousness is never what it is, and is always what it is not, such that no past
resolution can bind our freedom.268 We are anguished in the face of having to continually
choose again while being free to choose differently; we cannot depend on ourselves given our
radical freedom re-emerges in every instant of the present, which raises an ever-present
possibility of self-betrayal. Sartre states, “We wished only to show that there exists a specific
consciousness of freedom, and we wished to show that this consciousness is anguish. This
means that we wished to establish anguish in its essential structure as consciousness of
freedom.”269
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Moreover, consciousness of freedom revealed by anguish, the baseless, directionless, and
absurd need to choose, takes place in a context of solitude. Others cannot diminish our anguish
or ultimate isolation. Our absurdity, meaninglessness, anguish and anxiety are solitary burdens.
He states, “I emerge alone and in anguish confronting the unique project which constitutes my
being.”270 The suffering of our anguish remains within us as an unbridgeable reality closed to
others. Others can know that we suffer, but they cannot experience it, as Sartre illustrated with
his example of the suffering of Pierre. We cannot attenuate our suffering by distributing it
among other consciousnesses given consciousnesses are entirely individuated.271

B. Discontents within Ourselves: Bad Faith, Lack and Death Distress

Anguish and anxiety give rise to a dynamic of escape. Consciousness seeks to deny its freedom,
and attendant anguish and anxiety by means of “bad faith;” consciousness deceives itself. Sartre
observes that human reality is a blend of our past, which is a being-in-itself (facticity), and our
present and future that are both entirely free, completely chosen in the manner described above
(transcendence). Bad faith exploits this duality of our existence to deny responsibility for our
actions and thereby eliminate or attenuate our anguish and anxiety. For Sartre, bad faith is a

Sartre, Being, 77. Elsewhere he states, “In this sense the responsibility of the for-itself is
overwhelming since he is the one by whom it happens that there is a world…whatever may be
the situation in which he finds himself, the for-itself must wholly assume this situation with its
peculiar coefficient of adversity. He must assume the situation with the proud consciousness of
being the author of it…” Being, 707-708.
271
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species of self-deception. He states, “We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to
oneself.”272
One dynamic of bad faith involves exclusively privileging our transcendence by denying
that we are a facticity, that we have a past. We deny the significance of the choices we have
made, which constitute our “essence,” by asserting their unimportance because we transcend
them in the present; we assign exclusive significance to our capacity to make different choices
now, irrespective of the past. This strategy of self-deception denies that we are the sum of our
choices by asserting our essence is beyond that which we have been or chosen; we avoid the
responsibility and anguish of past choices by telling ourselves that is no longer what we are.
Instead we are a freedom that completely transcends, and thereby disowns, the past. “I am on a
plane where no reproach can touch me since what I really am is my transcendence.”273
Alternatively, we can deny our transcendence, our complete freedom, by exclusively
privileging our past and assigning pre-eminence to our facticity; we can deny our freedom by
conceiving ourselves as objects without choices. In this strategy of bad faith we tell ourselves
we are not free or that our past somehow defines or compels our current choices. Such
compulsion, the lack of freedom characterizing an object, relieves us of the anguish and anxiety
of freedom.
Given consciousness is a nothingness with respect to every object it intends, it is always
what it is not, and is not what it is; consciousness is a lack, a lack of being of the type
characterizing the in-itself. Sartre states,
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The for-itself in its being is failure because it is the foundation only of itself as
nothingness. In truth this failure is its very being, but has meaning only if the foritself apprehends itself as failure in the presence of the being which it has failed to
be.274

As mentioned earlier consciousness feels “profound solidarity”275 with the in-itself from which it
upsurges, and seeks to remedy its nothingness by becoming an object, a being-in-itself that is
self-identical and can provide its own foundation. However, as a nothingness this effort is
doomed to fail. It is forever separated from the in-itself, and therefore continually experiences
itself as a lack.
Further, while seeking to remedy this lack by becoming its own foundation consciousness
desires to retain its freedom. It seeks to become a self-founding nothingness, an “in-itself-foritself,” which is contradictory and therefore impossible.276 A self-identical object cannot also be
an empty nothingness. Nevertheless, consciousness pursues this impossible goal to retain its
freedom as a nothingness while simultaneously being a self-founding object. “Thus the for-itself
is both a flight and a pursuit; it flees the in-itself and at the same time pursues it…the pursuing
flight is not a given which is added onto the being of the for-itself. The for-itself is this very
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flight.”277 Therefore, the for-itself continually experiences itself as a lack that can never be
ameliorated. It is always seeking an ontological completion or wholeness forever beyond its
reach. Sartre grimly asserts,

The being of human reality is suffering because it rises in being as perpetually
haunted by a totality which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it
cannot attain the in-itself without losing itself as for-itself. Human reality
therefore is by nature an unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing
its unhappy state.278

Given the absurdity of human being, its utter contingency, it is not surprising that Sartre
considers death to be without meaning or significance. He states, “We ought rather compare
ourselves to a man condemned to death who is bravely preparing himself for the ultimate
penalty, who is doing everything possible to make a good showing on the scaffold, and who
meanwhile is carried off by a flu epidemic.”279
However, the “absurd character of death” has another dimension.280 Sartre conceives the
for-itself as temporally diasporatic, as a de-totalized totality spread across the past, present and
future by virtue of always being what it is not, and not being what it is. Therefore, the meaning
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of our lives, to include our past, is continuously re-created and re-defined by our current actions,
which revise the meaning of our past by the future toward which they project. Similarly, the
future toward which we project is given meaning and context by the past from which it
temporally emanates. This disaporatic temporalization of the for-itself leads to the constant
revision of the meaning of our lives by the choices we make in the present.
But we cannot choose the moment of our death, and therefore the meaning of the projects
in which we are engaged, and which define the meaning of our past and future, become fixed by
a random force outside our freedom. Thus, death not only ends our lives in a gratuitous manner,
which renders it absurd, it steals from us the freedom necessary to give meaning to our past and
future; death gratuitously fixes all of these meanings absent our consent. “Since death does not
appear on the foundation of our freedom, it can only remove all meaning from life.”281 He
continues,

Conversely, if it [death] is the closing of the account which gives our life meaning
and its value, then it is of little importance that all the acts of which the web of
our life is made have been free; the very meaning of them escapes us if we do not
ourselves choose the moment at which the account will be closed…If death is not
the free determination of our being, it can not complete our life. If one minute
more or less may perhaps change everything and if this minute is added to or
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removed from my account, then even admitting that I am free to use my life, the
meaning of my life escapes me.282

Added to these absurdities, death also has an interpersonal dimension. As noted above,
while alive, we continually revise the meaning of our past and future by the free choices we
make in the present. Further, any meanings others might fix to our lives are subject to our assent
or rejection by the choices we make in our freedom; we continually assert our nothingness that
gives the lie to the fixed assignments others might confer upon us. Others might attempt to
define us in ways at variance with our own projects, but these efforts fail to contain us and can
always be proved mistaken by our free choices. Sartre states,

So long as I live I can escape what I am for the Other by revealing to myself by
my freely posited ends that I am nothing and that I make myself be what I am; so
long as I live, I can give the lie to what others discover in me, by projecting
myself already toward other ends and in every instance by revealing that my
dimension of being-for-myself is incommensurable with my dimension of beingfor-others. 283
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However, once deceased the Other’s power to define us becomes complete and exclusive
of our freedom that has been terminated. Hence, not only is the meaning of our lives
gratuitously fixed within our own perspective by our death given it is no longer subject to
revision by our free choices, the meaning of our lives transfers to the power of the Other’s
definition. “Thus the very existence of death alienates us wholly in our own life to the advantage
of the Other. To be dead is to be a prey for the living.”284

C. Discontents with Others: Shame, Alienation, Exploitation and Guilt

Sartre’s ontology also necessarily leads to discontent with others; we are chronically exploited
by or in conflict with others, made known to us by basic phenomenological apprehension.
He indicates that we become aware of the existence of the Other and our relationship
with the Other via the look. Contrary to my primordial experience of myself as a subject, when
the Other looks at me, I become pre-reflectively aware that I am an object for the Other, an
object for a subjectivity that is not mine. This look that reveals me to myself as an object for the
Other, also reveals me as an object for myself; the Other’s look shifts my consciousness from prereflective to reflective. This dynamic of the Other’s subjectivity, which makes me an object for
him and an object for myself, is pre-reflectively revealed to me by shame in a manner similar to
that by which anguish reveals to me my freedom. Sartre states, “Now, shame, as we noted at the
beginning of this chapter is shame of self; it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that
object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes
284
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me in order to become a given object.”285 Thus, shame emerges in response to the look of the
Other. Paralleling Sartre’s earlier statement about anguish, it could be said that shame is the
“essential structure”286 of consciousness of being an object for the Other and for ourselves.
The key feature of this dynamic is that by shifting awareness of myself from prereflective subjectivity engaged in projects to reflective objectivity, that is as an object, the
Other’s look destroys me as a subjectivity with possibilities by inducing in me a positional
consciousness whereby I am an object for myself. My transcendent possibilities are alienated
from me. Sartre describes the dynamic, “The Other as a look is only that-my transcendence
transcended. Of course I still am my possibilities in the mode of non-thetic consciousness (of)
these possibilities. But at the same time the look alienates them from me.”287 This stealing of
my possibilities, really of my subjectivity, constitutes the alienating effect the Other has upon
me. By making me an object, he alienates me from myself as a subjectivity enacting my
possibilities in the world: “I grasp the Other’s look at the very center of my act as the
solidification and alienation of my own possibilities.”288
Further, the Other incorporates me into his projects as an object in his world; I become an
instrument by which he achieves his project; my subjectivity becomes an object for his
subjectivity. Thus, what was my transcendence, that which I was as a possibility, is now
transformed into an object by the Other, for the Other; the Other makes me and my world an
object for him. The only avenue by which I can recover my subjectivity and again assert myself
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as a transcendence is to reverse this process. I must transform the Other from a subjectivity that
makes me an object, into an object for my subjectivity, to shift the Other from a subject to an
object in my world, for my project, which of course shifts his consciousness from pre-reflective
to positional in the same manner that occurred for me by his look. I then make the Other a
“transcendence-transcended.”289 Hence, in Sartre’s rendering two subjectivities cannot
simultaneously pursue their projects without each attempting to make of the Other an object for
his own project.
Concretely, this relationship with the Other, in which he incorporates me as an object for
his projects, leads the Other to obstruct my projects should they conflict with his or use me as an
instrument by which to further his projects. I become an obstructive object to be eliminated or a
tool to be used. Therefore, relationships are inherently conflictual and exploitative. Sartre states,
“Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others,”290 and the possibility of interacting with
the Other not as a “transcendence-transcended,”291 but as a “transcendence-transcending” is
foreclosed.292
An outcome of the look and its dynamics is existential guilt. In contrast to shame that
characterizes one’s being before the Other, guilt characterizes the relationship with oneself. On
the one hand, I am guilty if I permit the Other to deny my transcendence and make me an object
for his projects, for his transcendence, which denies my own. On the other hand, absolving
myself of this guilt by reclaiming my subjectivity, my transcendence, can only be achieved by
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making the Other an object, that is by inflicting upon him that which he induced in me, and
which led to my guilt in the first place. Therefore, every person in every relationship must either
betray the Other by making him an object, or betray himself by permitting the Other to make him
an object. Every person in every relationship becomes either a perpetrator or victim in what
Andrea Nye aptly calls “...the Sartrean theory of separate warring consciousnesses.”293 Hence,
existential guilt derives from our ontology as human beings.
Of course, on Sartre’s rendering of the relationship with the Other described above there
is little possibility for love conceived as care, concern, and affection for another beyond what the
Other might offer for oneself. Others are obstacles to be cleared or resources to be used for my
projects; they are not transcendences to be preserved or expanded beyond my own.
But to fully consider love requires returning to consciousness as a nothingness, as lacking
the self-identical being of the in-itself, yet dependent upon the in-itself for its existence. On this
rendering, consciousness’ relationship to others, even in love, becomes part of its project to
become an in-itself or an in-itself-for-itself that thereby eliminates the problem of the
contingency of existence. Catalano summarizes,

The for-itself is relational, and the ideal of love is another attempt by the for-itself
to found its being and remove the absolute contingency of its existence…In love,
I desire the beloved freely to return to me my very objectification that came-to-be
by my relation to the other. The beloved will redeem me from my original fall,

Andrea Nye, “Preparing the Way for a Feminist Praxis,” Hypatia Volume 1, no 1 (Spring
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which is my exteriorization before the other; and the beloved, as the other, will
unite me with my alienated self, freely returning to me the free and hidden
evaluation of my exteriorized being. Because of the beloved, I am not a tool. The
beloved’s look makes me into that unique center and origin from which all things
have their meaning and value.294

In love we seek to appropriate others as “freedom-objects”295 to incorporate into
ourselves as ourselves, in an effort to be a self-founding freedom, an in-itself-for-itself. Sartre
states, “Thus my project of recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other”
and “My project of recovering my being can be realized only if I get hold of this freedom [the
other person] and reduce it to being a freedom subject to my freedom.”296 But given the
individuation of consciousness a merging with the Other can never be achieved, and this
appropriative desire fails. Therefore, the most fundamental relation with the Other even in love
is appropriative, and because the Other pursues the same aim inevitably conflictual. Sartre states
“Such then is the real goal of the lover in so far as his love is an enterprise-i.e., a project of
himself. This project is going to provoke a conflict.”297
Moreover, the very desire to incorporate the lover as a freedom-object is in principle
contradictory, in that rendering the lover an object, even a freedom-object prevents the lover
from being an unlimited freedom that can then love the lover. As Sartre notes, “Thus the lover

294

Catalano, Commentary, 181.
A term I coined.
296
Sartre, Being, 475 & 477.
297
Sartre, Being, 484.
295

123

demands a pledge, yet is irritated by a pledge. He wants to be loved by a freedom but demands
that this freedom as freedom should no longer be free.”298 On the other hand, we also long for the
beloved to make us an object for the beloved. As Sartre indicates, we long to be the “‘whole
world for the lover;’”299 we seek to be an idealized object for which the lover longs, the lover’s
ultimate object of desire, of transcendence, but not transcended. We wish to be “...the object
limit of transcendence, that toward which the Other’s transcendence transcends all other objects
but which it can in no way transcend.”300
Thus, in Sartre’s vision love becomes a dynamic of exploitation of the Other and/or bad
faith with myself. Either I seek to appropriate the beloved as a freedom-object and thereby
truncate the beloved’s freedom or induce the beloved to make me a “freedom-object,” and
thereby agree to truncate my own freedom. Moreover, these rather unpleasant outcomes
ultimately fail because as Sartre notes union with the beloved “is in fact unrealizable.”301

D. Conclusions Regarding Sartre’s Ontology and Its Discontents

This exposition of Sartre’s discontents reveals their origin in two features of his ontology:
consciousness is a gratuitous nothingness and consciousness is an isolated individuality. In the
gratuitous upsurge from the in-itself consciousness’ nothingness leaves us bereft of guidance or
resources by which to make moral choices or create a world or meaning. Rather than a resource
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content-ed consciousness from which to draw, we must choose how to fulfill these tasks exnihilo in complete freedom, which leaves us anxious, anguished, nauseated, and lying to
ourselves in bad faith. Despite this predicament, or perhaps because of it, consciousness seeks to
solve its “problem of being” a nothingness, which is experienced as lack.302 However, its
nothingness provides no basis for the resolution of its nothingness. The structure of the problem
prevents its solution.
Moreover, though others might offer guidance or succor, there is no escaping our
complete freedom originating ontologically in the nothingness of an individuated consciousness.
But even if others could in some manner attenuate these burdens, by virtue of its ontological
individuation consciousness is alone; others cannot share the burdens. On the contrary, the
radical individuation of consciousness leads others to exploit and appropriate us as objects to
remedy their own nothingness. This leads to the dynamics of the look where we deny the
subjectivity of others to exploit them as objects and thereby alienate others from themselves,
which they experience as shame. As Sartre starkly observes, this ontology entails conflict. Nye
similarly locates these conflictual dynamics in ontology stating, “Acting for others or with others
would always be problematic given an existentialist metaphysics of separate consciousnesses
who must see each other as threats.”303 Moreover, this dynamic creates existential guilt as we
deny the transcendence of others or ourselves; we either exploit others for our projects or permit
them to exploit us for theirs.
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With this ontology love becomes simply another manifestation of an individuated
nothingness consciousness seeking to resolve its “failure” to be an in-itself, via appropriation of
the Other.304 Finally, given the upsurge of consciousness as an individuated gratuitous
nothingness, death becomes a catastrophe gratuitously terminating our existence, contingently
fixing the meaning of our projects, and subjecting us to the judgements and interpretations of
others who make of us an object for their own transcendences for which we have no recourse.
The aforementioned features of Sartre’s human condition clearly contradict his claim that “no
doctrine is more optimistic.”305
However, Chapters 3 and 4 critiqued this ontology and found it to be untenable, which
led to its replacement with a transpersonally content-ed consciousness. This revised ontology
promises to give rise to a more optimistic human condition that addresses Sartre’s discontents.
This final task of the investigation occupies the remainder of this chapter.

Part II: The Resolution of Sartre’s Discontents

A. Freedom in Transpersonal Ontology

Chapter 3 argued that by Sartre’s own phenomenology, consciousness is not a nothingness, but
telically content-ed. Chapter 4 went further by arguing that consciousness is more than thinly
content-ed by telos, but transpersonal and thickly content-ed as-others. But this raises an
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important question that can now be addressed: can a thickly content-ed being-as-others
consciousness be free? Recall Sartre’s claim that consciousness must be a nothingness to retain
its freedom. Does he have a point that any content of consciousness restricts “spontaneity” and
freedom, such that a transpersonal thickly content-ed as-others consciousness cannot be free?306
A response based on transpersonal ontology can be proposed. Like Sartre’s nothingness
consciousness, transpersonal consciousness retains its freedom to act. Indeed, that “choice is
always unconditioned”307 in any given situation is so immediate for basic phenomenology that it
constitutes a problem only in a strictly deterministic worldview advanced by a metaphysical
interpretation of the natural sciences; the insistence by determinists that freedom is illusory is so
belied by subjectivity that it is difficult to take seriously. To suggest that forces within
consciousness, or anywhere else, compel me to continue typing this essay rather than text my
child violates my most basic phenomenology. For this meaning of freedom, transpersonal
content-ed consciousness’ choices remain “always unconditioned.”308
However, suspending the natural attitude in favor of a deeper consideration of choices
reveals a more complex picture. Though every choice before me remains unconditioned
irrespective of what might be occupying my consciousness at any given moment, the possible
choices are actually created by my consciousness; my consciousness creates and then lays out
before me in my phenomenological field the choices I confront. I create a situation composed of
choices analogous to Sartre’s situation that he created and then confronted in the performance of
his philosophical enterprise described in the previous chapter. Recall that I argued Sartre’s
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discernment of a nothingness consciousness was predicated upon his full consciousness that
created the situation he confronted and revealed his choices, absent which no reduction could
have been conceivable in the first place. Similarly, the simple choice above of whether to type
or text is not created or discerned ex nihilo. Instead, it comprises part of a “situation” I create,
ensconced in and birthed by a fundamental project, whereby I have chosen how to relate myself
to others and the world to achieve some overarching goal; this goal is manifested by every choice
I make, which “illumines”309 my project to myself. Sartre’s insights here are invaluable.
But Chapter 4 argued this all emerges not from an individuated nothingness
consciousness, but from a transpersonally content-ed consciousness. The “other”
consciousnesses that are “me,” those that transpersonally content and direct “my” consciousness
as a being-as-others, are that from which I create the world, my projects, my values, their
situations, choices, and so on. Within this world constituted by others-as-me, and the choices
others-as-me disclose to me, I am free to choose; my choices are unconditioned.
Returning to the example above, I am entirely free to type or text; however, the very
concepts of typing and texting that constitute my possibilities, and thus reveal my choices to
myself, emerge as activities created by “other” consciousnesses that are “mine,” my
consciousness as being-as-others. Consider that if Plato were suddenly transported to the present
he would not be free to make such a choice, not because he is unable to exert volitional control
over which device on which to move his fingers, but because for him no devices would even
exist from which to choose. His consciousness, as constitutively constructed by those of his
time, does not create a world, situation, or project where electronic devices exist as possibilities
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to reveal his choices to him. In this respect he is not free to choose the device over which to
move his fingers, despite unconditioned freedom to move his fingers.
Thus, there are two types of freedom: the capacity to make unconditioned choices from
among possibilities I confront, and the capacity to create possibilities to confront from which to
choose. Like Sartre’s freedom, a transpersonal content-ed ontology leaves me free to make
unconditioned choices within the worlds and situations “I” create; however, the possibilities I
create and confront from which to choose are not freely created ex nihilo, but constructed by my
being-as-others-as-myself, my being-as-others that I am. Sartre’s conception of freedom as total
or non-existent is therefore moderated in favor of a nuanced ontology that retains unconditioned
choices within worlds and situations created by others-as-myself. I am free to choose, but
others-as-myself create the possibilities from which I choose and thereby limit my freedom.
However, freedom reveals itself to be still more complex. There are two additional
dimensions to freedom resulting from a thickly content-ed transpersonal consciousness to
consider, that of the ego and the role of others, which are addressed in the next two sections.

B. The Ego in Transpersonal Ontology

Sartre insightfully observes that a phenomenological reduction reveals that many of our daily
actions are choices that we fail to see as such. He states,
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…there exist concretely alarm clocks, sign-boards, tax forms, policemen, so many
guardrails against anguish. But as soon as the enterprise is held at a distance from
me, as soon as I am referred to myself because I must await myself in the future,
then I discover myself suddenly as the one who gives its meaning to the alarm
clock, the one who by a signboard forbids himself to walk on a flower bed or on
the lawn, the one for whom the boss's order borrows its urgency, the one who
decides the interest of the book he is writing, the one who finally makes the
values exist in order to determine his actions by their demands.310

According to Sartre a nothingness consciousness freely “gives its meaning”311 to all these
“demands,”312 to which it then responds as if they are externally imposed. We refuse to
acknowledge that the meanings of these objects and events are chosen by us in an effort to avoid
freedom and anguish. Sartre argues the reduction reveals the external meanings and their
demands to be illusory, the product of the natural attitude that fails to appreciate they are chosen.
However, a transpersonally content-ed ontology cognizes the phenomenology of these
demands differently. Instead of discerning that I originate these meanings and their demands to
avoid freedom and anguish, I realize that they originate in “others” that have constitutively
constructed “me” given my consciousness is a content-ed being-as-others. I do not choose to
originate these demands to avoid my freedom; I discover these demands as originating in othersas-me, which limit my freedom.
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Once I realize these demands are my being-as-others-as-myself that I do not originate, I
can make them objects for my consciousness reflectively observable by my subjectconsciousness. Rather than being my subject-consciousness that performs the observing, the
demands become objects for my subject consciousness that observes. This re-positioning of my
being-as-others-as-myself within consciousness from subject that looks to object that is looked
at, permits my freedom to embrace or repudiate them, not because they are now understood as
external “guardrails”313 that I have chosen, but via realization that they are my being-as-othersas-myself that I have not chosen. Said differently, reflectively regarding my consciousness as an
object permits me to realize the demands I experience are others-as-myself, which then positions
me to repudiate them as a “portion” of my being-as-others should they be inimical to my
purposes, a process that can be understood as transitioning from being-as-others-as-myself that I
am to being-as-others-for-myself that I seek to become.
Further, if freedom is not an all or nothing ontology, I can develop my freedom via
insight into “my” consciousness that is being-as-others-as-myself. But what is meant by “insight
into ‘my’ consciousness?” Recall that “my consciousness,” really my subjectivity, rather than
being individuated nothingness is transpersonally content-ed, and as such can be known and
“conceptualized,” at least in principle. Of course, care must be taken to avoid the mistake of
conceptualizing consciousness as if it were an object; inevitably, the language of extended
objects will be used to describe transpersonally content-ed consciousness, and the mistake of
using the formal ontology associated with that language should be avoided. Possibly the most
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accurate rendering of transpersonal consciousness may be hermeneutic or some other as yet
undeveloped method, though this question is left aside.
The critical point for this investigation is that given a transpersonally content-ed
consciousness, the ego is no longer an entirely fictive obscuring construction of consciousness.
Though “cognizations” of my consciousness are likely forever incomplete, they are not fictively
created owners, occupants or organizers of consciousness, but cognizations of its peculiar
transpersonally content-ed ontology. Primordial subjectivity has content and telos that are beingas-others that can be described with more or less persuasiveness depending on the
phenomenological verisimilitude of the description.
Moreover, the ego can help me understand and master my being-as-others-as-myself by
facilitating its placement into reflective consciousness as an “object” where I can repudiate it if
needed. Thus, the ego is not a fictive entity constructed to limit my freedom, but an articulation
of my subjectivity as-others that promises to expand my freedom by facilitating my disidentification with portions of my being-as-others-as-myself contrary to my aims. Sartre’s ego
that limited the freedom of a spontaneous individuated nothingness consciousness, now promises
to expand the freedom of a thickly content-ed being-as-others consciousness via the insight it
confers.
Certainly, cognizations of my consciousness are neither synonymous with my
consciousness nor its occupier as Sartre notes. Instead any proffered cognization stands in
relation to consciousness in a similar manner that an interpretation of a poem articulates the
poem, but is not synonymous with it. Consequently, the ego properly understood as a
cognization of the content-ed transpersonal consciousness that is “me” is resurrected as a useful
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concept, and different cognizations can be judged by their phenomenological verisimilitude.
Therefore, the locution above “insight into ‘my’ consciousness” becomes intelligible in the same
manner that insight into a poem becomes intelligible: there is a being (consciousness) and an
interpretation of that being (insight), and the interpretation can be judged by its
phenomenological verisimilitude.
This has relevance for freedom, which recall occurs within the context of possibilities I
create from my being-as-others-as-myself that restrict my freedom. Thus, an essential feature of
freedom is knowledge of my consciousness, that is knowledge of my being-as-others-as-myself
that constitutes “my” consciousness and which creates the possibilities I confront. Given the
resurrection of the ego as an articulation of primordial consciousness, I can now discover myself
and the choices my being-as-others creates, rather than simply create myself ex nihilo. Absent
such discovery, I cannot know the choices “I” create that limit my freedom; I simply operate
within the field of those possibilities as if they are intrinsic to existence, as described by Sartre in
the passage above, rather than created by my being-as-others.
Therefore, knowledge of my being-as-others-as-myself, understood as
phenomenologically verisimilar cognization, develops my freedom by conferring awareness of
the choices I create for myself, which is the foundation of creating different choices that expand
my freedom beyond unconditioned choices. Said differently, this insight into my own
consciousness transforms me from being-as-others-as-myself with its attendant possibilities into
being-as-others-for-myself in the reflective process noted above, which permits the creation of
new possibilities. Absent such knowledge I cannot choose to retain or reject the choices I create
for myself because I do not realize I am creating them. The world, and its projects and situations
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where I create and reveal “my” possibilities to myself remains opaque to my awareness as a selfcreation of my being-as-others, and thus the creation of different choices that expand my
freedom is foreclosed.
Perhaps an example might make this clearer. Consider someone that was chronically
mistreated as a child. These experiences created his being-as-others-as-himself that he now
“exists” as an adult confronting others as deceitful and predatory.314 Absent awareness of how
these early experiences have constitutively constructed him, he experiences his consciousness as
translucent, failing to realize that he encounters the world, indeed creates the world, through
these early experiences; they comprise the subjectivity through which he confronts others.
Accordingly, he is guarded and hostile, and the possibility of loving interpersonal relations is not
a part of any “situation” that he constructs. He does not realize that the hostility he sees in others
as objects of his consciousness, is really the hostility that he brings to relationships as his
paranoid subject-consciousness. What he confronts in others is not the Other, but himself, his
being-as-others-as-himself that constructs his subjectivity and through which he confronts others
as hostile. If he could move this feature of his subjectivity from the subject that performs the
looking to the object that is looked at, it would no longer be a feature of the world, but a feature
of his consciousness to which he is subject as a being-as-others, and could cognize as a
“paranoid disorder.” Upon observing this feature of his consciousness as an object, he can then
decide to repudiate it should it work against his goal of establishing constructive interpersonal
relationships. In this capacity to decide to accept or repudiate this feature of his consciousness
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he moves from being as-others-as-himself to being-as-others-for-himself, which enhances his
freedom. By contrast, the failure to appreciate that he encounters the world as a being-as-othersas-himself that constitutes his subjectivity leaves him trapped by his being-as-others, rather than
free of it to create new possibilities as for-himself.
However, there are challenges to the notion of verisimilar cognizations of my being-asothers-as-myself that promise to expand my freedom. First, Nagel and Chalmers point out in
Chapter 3 that the ontology of subjectivity, to include any particular consciousness such as mine,
does not admit of ready cognization. Absent Nagel’s “major conceptual revolution”315 it is
difficult to conceive how the infinite constructive constituents of transpersonal consciousness, to
include their summations and recombinations, can be more than cautiously cognized. Therefore,
knowledge of my consciousness that promises to reveal to me new possible choices is limited by
the ontology of my transpersonal consciousness. This might be called the ontological challenge
to the knowledge conferring insight that reveals to me the world that I create and then confront in
my possibilities.
Second, recall from Chapter 4 Sartre’s epistemic problem that haunts this investigation:
consciousness cannot look at itself when it is doing the looking; it cannot spectate itself
independent of itself. I cannot remove myself from the transpersonal content-ed consciousness
that I am, in order to look at the transpersonal content-ed consciousness that I am. Thus, when I
perform the phenomenological reduction seeking knowledge of my consciousness as-others-asmyself, which creates the possibilities from which I choose, the reducing necessarily includes
that which I seek to discern and evaluate apart from my consciousness. The reduction is
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doomed to be at best incomplete. Sartre recognizes this limitation near the end of The
Transcendence of the Ego.

In a word the Cogito is impure. It is a spontaneous consciousness, no doubt, but it
remains synthetically tied to consciousness of states and actions. The proof is that
the Cogito is given at once as the logical result of doubt and as that which puts an
end to doubt. A reflective apprehension of spontaneous consciousness as nonpersonal spontaneity would have to be accomplished without any antecedent
motivation. This is always possible in principle, but remains very improbable or,
at least, extremely rare in our human condition.316

Recall from Chapter 2 Fink’s solution to this epistemic problem entailed assuming a
“non-worldly position of the spirit.”317 However, the current investigation privileges mundane
phenomenology to the exclusion of non-ordinary experiences like Fink’s proposal. Though such
a perspective may not be impossible to achieve, it is too removed from common experience to be
useful here; it sounds like mysticism. But if no such perspective becomes available in the
reduction, how can this epistemic obstacle to knowledge of my consciousness as a being-asothers-as-myself and the freedom it confers be overcome? How can I reposition my being-asothers-as-myself into an object of reflection that renders it being-as-others-for-myself needed to
devise new possibilities that expand my freedom? This question is addressed in the next section.
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C. The Other and Freedom in Transpersonal Ontology

Consciousness’ inability to look at its looking activity when looking at itself restricts its
knowledge of itself, which limits its freedom. The strategy to overcome this limitation is for my
consciousness to gain a perspective on itself apart from itself, which is impossible for my
consciousness. But here the solution emerges. Though I cannot spectate myself while
spectating, others can spectate me and my spectating. The verisimilar cognization I need of my
being-as-others-as-myself to articulate my possibilities to myself, which I cannot fully know due
to the epistemic obstacles noted above, has a dimension that can only be revealed by others.
Absent others my “autonomy of choice”318 is restricted by the possibilities that “my” autonomy
as a being-as-others creates and confronts. Thus, contrary to Sartre the Other is found not to
threaten my freedom, but to be essential for it. To illustrate this point, consider the cartoon
below.319
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The painter does not realize that the fly he perceives is part of himself; in the context of
this investigation it is analogous to his being-as-others-as-himself to which he remains subject
given it constitutes his looking, his subjectivity through which he confronts the world. Absent
insight into this feature of his consciousness he cannot move into being-as-others-for-himself by
examining it reflectively as-himself. And the epistemic obstacle to this re-positioning of his
consciousness from subject that looks to object that is looked at, often can only be remedied by
others who confer insight into the being-as-others that is his consciousness. In the cartoon others
would inform the painter that his perception of the world and its attendant possibilities is limited
by his consciousness that creates the world and its possibilities; his possibilities are
contaminated, and thereby restricted by the fly. Analogously, the paranoid person described in
the example above requires others to confer insight into his being-as-other-as-himself that
projects hostility in the world, to which he is then subject as if it is a feature of others, and which
restricts his freedom to establish interpersonal relationships.
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Moreover, others enhance my freedom beyond providing knowledge conferring insight
into my being-as-others-as-myself. I can also reflectively choose to interact with other
consciousnesses that promise to re-construct “my” consciousness with constituents consonant
with interests independent of those that initially constructed “me,” and thereby further enact my
being-as-others-for-myself. Said differently, I can choose the constructive constituents of my
consciousness by choosing those Others with whom I interact. In this respect, I am free to
deliberately re-construct my consciousness and the worlds, projects, situations, and choices I
create, which augment my freedom. I can re-construct the consciousness that is my being-asothers-as-myself that I discover by my own reflection and the insights conferred by others.
This type of effort is commonly observed in those that choose to live in intentional
communities such as monasteries, where practitioners surround themselves with others with
whom they wish to live and interact, and thereby re-construct themselves via the other
consciousnesses that become their being-as-others. Similarly addicts and criminals seeking
rehabilitation often choose to immerse themselves in communities that eschew thinking patterns
that lead to destructive choices, so-called therapeutic communities. Immersion in therapeutic
communities pro-socially re-constructs the consciousnesses of the members, apart from the
insight or knowledge into their being-as-others-as-themselves they might acquire through their
interactions with others.
For example, consider a maximum security prisoner whose rehabilitation I had been
attempting to develop in my role as a psychologist. He had been seeing me regularly for over a
year, and had been taught problem-solving strategies, interpersonal skills, and how to identify
and modify criminal thinking, all standard features of criminal rehabilitation. But the therapy
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had an additional and rather unusual dimension: at the close of every session he asked for a hug,
which I provided. I cannot say that this request was a conscious desire to constitutively reconstruct his consciousness with mine, but it probably facilitated that process by adding a tactile
embodied dimension to our interactions.
One day he entered my office with a look of pained contempt, and exclaimed, “This
whole prison is disgusting!” This statement was not born from the skills I had taught him or the
insight I had disclosed to him about his being-as-others-as-himself, really the criminal
socialization to which he had been subject, but through some mysterious process by which my
“citizen” values had re-constructed his being-as-others with my consciousness. I never
expressed contempt for prison culture the way that he did, but my values could easily give rise to
such a sentiment, values that were now his being-as-himself that permitted him to move into
reflective consciousness his prior values as objects for examination and repudiation. The
constitutive re-construction of his consciousness with my consciousness permitted him to move
from being as-others-as-himself to being-as-others-for-himself. He did not just learn a new way
of looking at himself and the world, he was converted to a new way of being himself in the world
via constitutive re-construction with my consciousness.
Thus, in relationships with others, there are two avenues by which they can increase my
freedom. First, they can provide me with insight that is knowledge about my being-as-others-asmyself that permits me to expand my possible choices. Such insight can be relatively superficial
as might occur when reading a self-help book or deep as when a psychoanalytic interpretation
liberates a patient from neurosis. Second, others can provide their consciousness as a reconstructive constituent for “my” consciousness, which also expands my possible choices. This
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latter mechanism of constitutive re-construction of my consciousness by others’ consciousnesses
is the ontological foundation of beneficial role-modeling effects exhibited by mentoring and
psychotherapeutic relationships, and accounts for the more profound effects these relationships
usually confer relative to knowledge or insight alone, as exhibited by the prisoner above.
It is important to emphasize that both avenues through which others can expand my
freedom depend on an ontology different from that advanced by Sartre’s consciousness as an
individuated nothingness. The freedom expanding effect of insight provided by others that I
cannot accomplish myself is predicated upon a content-ed consciousness amenable to verisimilar
cognization that is more than purely fictive. Similarly, the re-construction of my consciousness
by others chosen by my being-as-others-for-myself is predicated upon consciousness being
transpersonal. This ontology gives rise to an entirely different relationship with others, who no
longer restrict my freedom, but are required to potentiate it.
The description of an alternative human condition that resolves Sartre’s discontents can
now be advanced in the subsequent sections of this chapter. This alternative emanates from an
ontology of consciousness as a transpersonally content-ed being-as-others, the resurrected ego it
entails, and the freedom conferred by others. To this description I now turn.

D. Sartre’s Lack Re-interpreted

Sartre’s basic phenomenology of incompleteness or absence of internal unity that he cognizes as
the lack of a nothingness consciousness can be re-cognized by a thickly content-ed transpersonal
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consciousness. For ease of exposition first person language characteristic of subject-other
ontology is employed.
To the extent that I fail to discern my being-as-others I “degenerate”320 the being that I
am as-others, and experience myself as a lack. I retain a “profound solidarity”321 not with the initself from which I originally upsurge and on which I depend, but from the constitutively
constructive others from which my consciousness as a unique transpersonal combination that
assumes being-as-others-for-myself depends and upsurges. This failure to realize my being-asothers that results in the phenomenology of lack emanates from mistaking my uniqueness and
being-for-myself, both derived from my being-as-others, for my essence; I fail to appreciate that
my most basic ontology is being-as-others-as-myself who have constitutively constructed me.
Using Sartre’s language, the internal nihilation of my consciousness from other
consciousnesses permitted by its unique combination of other consciousnesses idiosyncratically
summed and recombined and employed for-myself tricks me into experiencing others as
ontologically separate from me, rather than constitutively constructing me. The natural attitude
mistakes the unique consciousness that I am and assume as a being-as-others-for-myself for my
most basic ontology. This mistake is discernible in Sartre’s own phenomenological reduction
where he states, “This negation [of the Other] which constitutes my being…makes me appear as
the Same confronting the Other, constitutes me on the ground of a non-thetic selfness as
‘Myself’.”322
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The “non-thetic selfness” Sartre experiences as his “Myself” is a cognization of the
natural attitude,323 that of pre-reflective consciousness that privileges its unique constitution
positioned for-itself, rather than insight obtained in a reduction performed by reflective
consciousness that discerns its most basic essence as-others. Indeed, Sartre concedes “The Other
exists for consciousness only as a refused self.”324 Said differently, I discern the Other, actually
create an Other, by refusing my being-as-others in favor of exclusively privileging my
idiosyncratically summed and recombined uniqueness positioned for-myself.
However, even this movement by which I separate and individuate from my being-asothers-as-myself by reflecting upon it as an object does not entirely supersede my most
fundamental ontology as being-as-others. Consider that as I effect this re-positioning of my
consciousness into reflective awareness as an object my thickly constituted by-others
consciousness that does the reflecting remains predicated on my being-as-others; my reflecting
subjectivity is as-others. This is the epistemic limitation to solo efforts to achieve self-insight
noted earlier. The natural attitude’s failure to appreciate this epistemic limitation can lead to the
mistaken conclusion that my most basic ontology is an autonomous individuated observing
consciousness independent of and absent the being-as-others, which is me, that performs the
observing.
These two mistakes of the natural attitude, privileging my uniqueness and failing to
realize my being-as-others-as-myself does the reflecting in my being-as-others-for-myself, lead
to the false view that I am an individuated consciousness. These mistakes separate me not from
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the in-itself from which I upsurge as a nothingness that I then experience as lack, but from others
from whom I derive my thickly constituted being and from whom I upsurge as a unique
consciousness that assumes being-as-others-for-myself. These mistakes that separate me from
others result in the phenomenology of lack. Thus, consciousness’ desire to be reunited with the
in-itself from which it upsurges can be re-interpreted as a desire to be reunited with others that
constitute its subjectivity. This is the lack Sartre experiences and mistakenly cognizes as
degeneracy of the in-itself.
Recall Sartre’s claim that unity with others is unrealizable and would eliminate the
otherness of others. However, basic phenomenology transpersonally cognized concludes just the
opposite; unity with others that resolves my lack is not unachievable. On the contrary, unity with
others characterizes my most fundamental ontology and requires only my awareness of such to
be realized. Rather than being impossible to achieve, such unity is impossible to avoid. The
“profound solidarity”325 I seek is entirely present and available if I can only become aware of it
by avoiding the mistakes noted above by which I conclude my individuality is my most basic
ontology, rather than a derivative of it.
Thus, contrary to Sartre’s claim that existence precedes essence, I have a transpersonally
content-ed “essence” constitutively constructed by others-as-myself that I then choose how to
exist as others-for-myself, the first step of which is viewing my “essence” as-others-as-myself
reflectively. Note that like Sartre, my “essence” is not intrinsic, but constructed; however, unlike
Sartre the construction of my “essence” is not primordially performed by myself, but by others,

325

Sartre, Being, 198.

144

which I can then accept or repudiate as I become aware of it and assume my being-as-others-formyself.
Moreover, Sartre’s claim that consciousness cannot be self-founding accords with
transpersonal ontology, but is also reinterpreted. Rather than being dependent on the in-itself
from which it derives via its nothingness, my consciousness is disclosed as dependent upon other
consciousnesses that have constitutively constructed me, and from which I derive my being asothers-for-myself. My unique subjectivity assumed for-myself is not self-founding, but
primordially founded by others that have constitutively constructed me. From within a
transpersonally cognized phenomenology, Sartre’s desire to be an in-itself-for-itself can also be
re-interpreted as the “contradictory” desire to be both transpersonally as-others-as-myself and
individually as-others-for-myself. As noted in Chapter 4, though perhaps impossible for the foritself and the in-itself to be identified given their different regional ontologies, no such obstacle
necessarily exists for consciousnesses that are “mine” and “others;” I am a unique consciousness
constructed by consciousnesses that are not me. Nor do Aristotelian laws of thought necessarily
apply to consciousness should a strict contradiction emerge between being simultaneously asothers-as-myself and as-others-for-myself.
Indeed, the process by which this possible contradiction is overcome was described
earlier in which I become as-others-for-myself by becoming aware of my being-as-others-asmyself. By repositioning myself-as-others from within my basic subjectivity that does the
looking to the field of objects at which I direct the looking, I become both being as-others-asmyself that is observed and being-as-others-for-myself that does the observing, though as noted
earlier the observing is never completely free of that which it observes. In Sartre’s lexicon, my
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being-as-others-as-myself is analogous to the in-itself and my being-as-others-for-myself is
analogous to the for-itself, both of which I am. Thus, the desire to be as-others-as-myself and asothers-for-myself, or perhaps more colloquially to be dependent upon others yet autonomous, is
achievable in a transpersonally cognized ontology of consciousness. I am a being-as-others-asmyself-for-myself.

E. Sartre’s Shame, Alienation, Exploitation, and Guilt Reinterpreted

Given a transpersonally content-ed consciousness and its reinterpretation of freedom and lack,
the basic phenomenology of shame, alienation, exploitation and guilt can also be re-cognized to
improve their phenomenological verisimilitude.326 First, consider Sartre’s claim that I am an
object for the Other in the look in which he observes that I experience the Other primordially as
a subjectivity. He states, “In view of this presence of the Other-as-subject to me in and through
my assumed object-ness, we can see that my making an object out of the Other must be the
second moment in my relation to him.”327 But must I assume this “second moment” and make
the Other an object?328 Could I not look at the Other as a subject rather than an object that leads
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to alienation, exploitation, shame and guilt? In fact, this investigation has argued that an
ontology exists for interpersonal relations absent these discontents.
As a thickly content-ed consciousness as-others, I am not lack motivated to solve my
“problem of being” by making others objects to appropriate or exploit.329 On the contrary,
because of my content-edness, I need others to expand my freedom, by conferring insight into my
being-as-others and the possibilities it creates. For others to do this requires that I encounter and
maintain them as subjects standing outside my projects as their own transcendence, so that they
can communicate to me insight about my transcendence. If I confront others as objects their
ability to provide such insight for me is destroyed by the denial of their subjectivity that is the
source of the insight. An object cannot reveal to me what I am as a being-as-others, by which I
create my possibilities. Therefore, I need to confront and maintain others in their subjectivity.
Only as subjects outside my projects, as transcendent to me, can others confer to me insight into
my being-as-others that I cannot discern myself given my inability to look at my looking, and
which I need to create for myself new possibilities that are the core of my freedom expansion.
Further, only if I show-up as a subject, that is exhibit my subjectivity to others’ subjectivity for
confrontation, can they achieve this purpose for me. Only by showing them who I am in my
subjectivity can they gain the knowledge they need to confer insight into my being-as-others-asmyself that I need from them to expand my freedom.
Thus, if I confront others as less than a complete subjectivity or I show-up as less than a
complete subjectivity, the promise others hold for expanding my freedom to create new
possibilities is truncated. For identical reasons others seek to encounter me as a subject, and
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show up as subjects for me. Rather than a struggle in which each person seeks to turn others into
objects to advance their freedom for unconditioned choices, both parties are motivated to show
up as subjects and maintain Others as subjects to discern new possibilities that expand freedom.
Moreover, the Other’s look that repositions my consciousness from pre-reflective to
reflective does not render me an object that induces shame and alienates me from my
possibilities. Instead the Other’s look that repositions my consciousness of myself permits me
the reflective awareness of my being-as-others-as-myself that I need to develop my freedom as a
being-as-others-for-myself, and to which I am partially blind in my looking. The Other’s look
reveals my being-as-others-as-myself to me by moving my being-as-others-as-myself into
reflective consciousness.
Thus, the Other’s look does not alienate me from my possibilities, but reveals to me my
possibilities; the Other’s look does not induce me to see myself as a shamed object, but as a
human subject with a constitutively constructed human essence as-others. Said differently, the
Other’s look is the mechanism by which my being-as-others-as-myself can be transformed into
my being-as-others-for-myself that I need to potentiate my freedom. The other’s look does not
shame, alienate and exploit me, but promises to affirm my humanity as a being-as-others while
liberating me to be a being-as-others-for-myself.
Further, recall the second avenue by which others promise to expand my freedom by
constitutively re-constructing my consciousness so that it might more closely conform with my
desired being-as-others-for-myself. Also recall that for Others to assume this constitutively reconstructive role they must be encountered as consciousness, that is as subjects rather than
objects. Hence, I again find that based on my desire to expand my freedom via disclosure of new
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possibilities, I am motivated to maximally preserve others’ subjectivity rather than deny or
diminish it by confronting them as objects. Reciprocally, others are maximally motivated to
preserve me as a subject so that I might assume the same constitutively re-constructive role for
their freedom expansion. By this additional mechanism of freedom expansion, I am motivated to
preserve the subjectivity of others, rather than confront them as objects to exploit, shame, or
alienate, which might expand my capacity for unconditioned choices, but forecloses their
promise to reveal to me new possibilities.
This alternative cognization of the phenomenology of the Other indicates that
exploitation, alienation, shame, and guilt characterizing human interactions at all levels of
sociality are not the inevitable product of ontology, but mere ontical possibilities in the sense
observed by Heidegger when he states, “Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over
against the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences.”330 Thus, these discontents arise not from our
ontology. They arise from ignorance of our ontology as being-as-others, in which my freedom
is expanded by others whom I need to move me from being-as-others-as-myself to a being-asothers-for-myself. But is this not simply a re-statement of Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist
ethics? This question is addressed in the next section.

F. Simone de Beauvoir and Transpersonal Ontology

Despite her many similarities with Sartre, Beauvoir articulates a more optimistic and
interpersonally constructive existentialist vision of the human condition. In The Ethics of
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Ambiguity she affirms an ethic with freedom as its highest goal, stating “In setting up its ends,
freedom must put them in parentheses, confront them at each moment with that absolute end
which it itself constitutes, and contest, in its own name, the means it uses to win itself.”331
Specifically, the means used to secure my freedom must not restrict the freedom of others. In
this context she explicitly lauds Christian and Kantian ethics, “which treats each man as an
end.”332 She summarizes her ethic “To put it positively, the precept will be to treat the other…as
a freedom so that his end may be freedom…”333
However, this more sanguine vision of the human condition is based on a different
interpretation of Sartre’s ontology. Consider her statement “Man, Sartre tells us is ‘a being who
makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.’”334 The interpretation of
Sartre’s ontology in this investigation is not that consciousness makes itself lack of being, but
that consciousness is lack of being. Indeed, consciousness is continually seeking to remedy its
lack of being by becoming an in-itself, a project Sartre explicitly states it cannot achieve; its lack
of being is not a choice but an inherent and inescapable “structure” of its nothingness. It cannot
be other than a lack of being.
Beauvoir asserts that consciousness chooses to make itself a lack of being so that it can
be separated from being, which is required to bring the world into existence. Further, our
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fundamental project is not to become a being, an in-itself, but to disclose being, which requires
becoming a lack of being separate from being, which is achievable. Thus, consciousness is not
intrinsically unhappy. She states, “There is an original type of attachment to being which is not
the relationship of ‘wanting to be’ but rather ‘wanting to disclose being.’ Now here there is not
failure, but rather success.”335
Accordingly, because consciousness’ lack of being is not a problem to solve, but a
solution that permits its freedom, it does not advance a fundamental project of appropriation of
being or others. Instead, its fundamental project is disclosure of being, specifically the meanings
and significations created by others within which we choose to engage our projects. Beauvoir
states “My freedom must not seek to trap being but to disclose it.”336 Moreover, the meanings
consciousness, which has chosen itself as lack, discloses in the world that become part of my
individual project are created by others. These meanings are the material from which I fashion
my projects. She continues,

Thus, every man has to do with other men. The world in which he engages
himself is a human world in which each object is penetrated with human
meanings. It is a speaking world from which solicitations and appeals rise up.
This means that, through this world, each individual can give his freedom a
concrete content. He must disclose the world with the purpose of further
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disclosure and by the same movement try to free men, by means of whom the
world takes on meaning.337

This ontology provides the basis for more cooperative interpersonal relationships
than those Sartre characterizes by shame, alienation, exploitation and guilt. However,
Beauvoir’s cognized phenomenology differs from that advanced in transpersonal
ontology. First, transpersonal consciousness is neither a lack, nor capable of becoming a
lack. This point returns us to Sartre’s failed reduction; recall from Chapter 4 that Sartre
used his full consciousness-as-others to claim that primordial consciousness is a
nothingness. In the same vein Beauvoir re-conceives Sartre’s ontology and claims that
consciousness can choose to become a lack, an idea clearly derived from her
consciousness that is Sartre-as-herself. The lack she claims consciousness must choose
in order to achieve freedom and found the world is predicated on non-lack, on her
content-ed consciousness that is Sartre-as-herself; the assertion is self-negating. Thus,
when I deliberately engage the meanings of others to incorporate into my own project, I
do so not as an achieved lack, but as a transpersonally content-ed being-as-others-formyself that relies in some measure on the others that have constitutively constructed me,
my being-as-others-as-myself. Beauvoir’s achieved lack suffers the same pitfalls as
Sartre’s nothingness consciousness.
Beauvoir’s ontology also differs from transpersonal ontology by locating the
meanings created by others incorporated into my projects as existing in the world such
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that they require disclosure, which is the primordial teleology of consciousness as it seeks
to enact its freedom. As noted earlier, transpersonal ontology agrees that disclosure of
novel possibilities is the key feature of freedom expansion. However, the possibilities to
be disclosed are not created by others that I encounter in the world to incorporate into my
projects as Beauvoir asserts; instead they are encountered in my being-as-as-others-asmyself that I then project into the world and discover in my choices, like the painter with
a fly on his glasses. Thus, I need others to be free so that they can expand my freedom
not so that they can create new meanings that I can disclose, but to help me see the
possibilities I create as-others-as-myself. Perhaps said differently, contrary to Beauvoir,
others do not populate the world with meanings derived from their lack for my projects;
they help me to see how I populate the world with meanings derived from my being-asothers-as-myself that limit the possibilities of my projects so that I can devise new
possibilities and thereby expand my freedom.
A transpersonally content-ed ontology also provides the basis for a different
cognization of bad faith and authenticity, to which I now turn.

G. Sartre’s Bad Faith and Authenticity Reinterpreted

Sartre’s bad faith and authenticity rely on an individuated nothingness consciousness and the
conception of freedom it entails. By contrast a thickly content-ed transpersonal ontology recognizes the phenomenology of bad faith and authenticity. Recall the two types of freedom, that
of creating possibilities from which to choose and then making unconditioned choices within
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those possibilities. Denying the freedom of our unconditioned choices in either the past or the
present is a freedom rejecting self-deception of bad faith consistent with transpersonal ontology.
However, the deeper freedom by which consciousness creates new possibilities to confront
becomes particularly relevant to re-interpreting bad faith and authenticity.
As conceived by transpersonal ontology, bad faith involves denying my primordial
ontology of being-as-others-as-myself in favor of exclusively privileging my derived unique
consciousness positioned as being-as-others-for-myself. In bad faith I conceive myself as a selffounding autonomous consciousness for-myself rather than a constitutively constructed being-asothers. This self-deception denies that the situations and their possibilities that I create manifest
my essence as a being-as-others, rather than being a spontaneous ex nihilo choice independent of
others.

Denying my possibilities are created by my content-ed others-as-myself consciousness

in favor of an autonomous spontaneous nothingness consciousness denies my essence as a beingas-others and the necessary role others play in my freedom expansion.
Thus, bad faith is ontological self-deception involving enrapturement by my unique
consciousness positioned as being-as-others-for-myself, which denies my being-as-others-asmyself or my epistemic need for others’ insight to create new possibilities. Further, in bad faith
where I believe I exist and create situations ex nihilo absent others, I assume a posture
exclusively for-myself that confronts others as obstacles to overcome or resources to be
exploited, as if the advancement of my unconditioned choices is the core of freedom rather than
its superficial expression. By denying my being-as-others I avoid confronting what I am, the
possibilities I create as-others, and the responsibility for changing my possibilities with the
assistance of others, all of which are the conditions for the expansion of my freedom to create
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new possibilities beyond the unconditioned choices I currently confront. Like Sartre’s bad faith,
transpersonally re-cognized bad faith is self-deception that restricts my freedom, though through
a different process associated with a different ontology.
Further, in bad faith the primary focus on unconditioned choices leads to the dynamics of
the look, in which the need to show up as a subject and confront the Other as a subject are
denied. I deceive myself into believing I no longer need the Other to expand my freedom for
new possibilities, and resist showing up as a subject or confronting the Other as a subject
because it risks curtailing my unconditioned choices that I mistakenly believe are the core of my
freedom, rather than acknowledging that possibility creation is the core, which requires others as
complete subjects for its potentiation.
By contrast authenticity acknowledges the deeper dimension of my freedom, which
entails recognizing that I create my possibilities as-others rather than ex nihilo, and therefore
need others for my freedom as re-constructive constituents and insight into the others-as-myself
that I am. This need of others for my freedom entails that they are confronted as full subjects,
whom I confront as a full subject myself, all of which is predicated on acknowledging my basic
ontology of others-as-myself. The core of my freedom and authenticity then becomes not the
enactment of my unconditioned choices emanating from an autonomous nothingness
consciousness, but recognition of my most basic ontology as being-as-others that creates my
possibilities, and requires others for the freedom expansion they promise.
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H. Sartre’s Anguish, Anxiety, and Isolation Reinterpreted

Much of the analysis so far depends on freedom experienced as desirable such that we are
motivated to show up as subjects encountering others as subjects, which is another way of saying
we are motivated to affirm rather than deny our transpersonal ontology. By contrast, recall that
Sartre indicates we are condemned by our freedom that creates anxiety from which we flee,
awareness of which is anguish that must be endured alone.
However, the phenomenology of freedom is cognized differently by a thickly content-ed
transpersonal ontology. First, as argued above the ego is not entirely fictive. Instead it is an
attempted articulation of content-ed transpersonal consciousness that can be evaluated by its
phenomenological verisimilitude. Second, recall the two meanings of freedom that have been
advanced: unconditioned choices within possibilities created by consciousness and the capacity
of consciousness to create novel possibilities. The latter has been considered the deeper meaning
of freedom by which projects, and their situations and accompanying possibilities are revised.
Thus, a phenomenologically verisimilar ego can develop the creation of new possibilities by
revealing to me my being-as-others-as-myself as an object for my reflecting, which permits me
to assume my being-as-others-for-myself that expands my freedom. Rather than limiting my
freedom, a phenomenologically verisimilar ego promises to enhance it.
While agreement with Sartre has been noted that my capacity for unconditioned choice
within possibilities my consciousness creates are unrestricted, they do not occur absent any basis.
As argued throughout this investigation, possibilities do not emerge from a nothingness
consciousness, but from a thickly content-ed transpersonal being-as-others. Though my being-
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as-others does not compel any specific choice, it does provide contextual grounds from which
the choice emerges, and resources by which to consider the choice. The choice is not made in a
vacuum of nothingness consciousness, but within the human world that transpersonally
constitutes me. I must choose, but to assert I make the choice spontaneously and entirely alone
would seem to be an over-simplification.
Indeed, the challenge within transpersonal ontology is not some unrestricted spontaneity
that risks violating my moral prohibitions or fundamental project, the possibility of which
manifests anguish. On the contrary, the risk is being stifled by my being-as-others-as-myself
from which I struggle to emerge as a being-as-others-for-myself. Said differently, the anxiety
and anguish I experience derive not from unbridled spontaneity, but from the experience of being
trapped among painful or frightening possibilities I can neither abide nor escape. I am not
victimized by a spontaneous unbounded consciousness; I am trapped by an inability to conceive
choices beyond those I find in my being-as-others-as-myself. The risk is less my individual
spontaneity, which is relevant to the interpretation of freedom as unconditioned choice, and more
my oppression as a transpersonally constructed being-as-others that cannot escape into beingfor-myself needed for the freedom of new possibilities. Further, the truly revolutionary choices I
might make, such as abandoning or significantly revising my fundamental project, are almost
certainly going to be made in an interpersonal context, given others are required to identify novel
possibilities that constitute such fundamental changes.
Thus, both unconditioned choices within known possibilities conferred by my being-asothers-as-myself and novel possibilities deriving from my being-as-others-for-myself occur from
within an interpersonal context that is my transpersonal ontology. I do not decide entirely alone.
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This cognization does not resolve all of the anguish and anxiety associated with freedom that
Sartre describes, as any weighty decision reveals in mundane experience. However, it does
attenuate anguish, anxiety, and isolation by placing my choices in the interpersonal context that
is my transpersonal ontology.

I. Sartre’s Meaninglessness and Nausea Reinterpreted

In contrast to Sartre’s gratuitous absurd human condition manifested as nausea, the human
condition arising from a transpersonal ontology is entirely different. First, transpersonal
consciousness is a continuously constructed by-others fullness that confronts and creates objects
through its being-as-others, and which seeks to enhance its freedom by reflecting on itself or recreating itself so that it can become a being-as-others-for-itself. Therefore, the meaning I
experience, Sartre’s “fixed movement of transcendence,”338 is at least partially, if not primarily,
discovered in my being-as-others-as-myself, which is the “Other” that is “me.” My
transpersonal consciousness created by others not only deliberately re-creates itself in
relationship with others as explained above, it also discovers itself and its meaning in
relationship with others who confer insight into what I am as-others, which is possible because
my subjectivity is thickly content-ed rather than a nothingness.
Hence, as noted earlier contrary to Sartre’s claim essence precedes existence, and is
discoverable as a source of meaning, a “fixed movement of transcendence”339 that is others-as-

338
339

Sartre, Being, 452.
Sartre, Being, 452.

158

myself, rather than exclusively, or even primarily, created by me ex nihilo. The world I create
and then confront, to include its meanings, is not generated by my unbounded choices as a
nothingness consciousness, but by my being-as-others-as-myself. Thus, I do not create the
world from nothing; I discover the world and its meaning as created by me-as-others. The next
step in which I create meaning as-others-for-myself also emerges inevitably from an
interpersonal context given my need of others for its full realization. Nevertheless, there remains
some moment of choice independent of others that conduces to anxiety like Sartre notes.
However, my autonomy from others in my being-as-others-for-myself is not the ex nihilo act
Sartre conceives, but always in some measure founded on others-as-myself that provides
grounds and resources for decisions.
Still, a transpersonal cognization of consciousness remains in one sense gratuitous; it fails
to articulate a metaphysical or divine significance to human life. Kitaro Nishida observes, “A
world of pure meaning and value is thought of only in so far as the being which has its place in
consciousness mirrors the content of something trans-conscious.”340 No transcendental
consciousness (“trans-conscious”) is advanced. This is not to deny necessarily metaphysical
significance to human life, but arguing for it would move beyond mundane consciousness that is
the subject of this investigation’s effort to discern what it is like to be a human. On the other
hand, a transpersonal consciousness is anything but gratuitous given it is constructed by and
diasporatically exists among others; it is thus entirely and inescapably of and within the human
world where I reside.
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Further, although I did not construct the consciousness that I am as a being-as-others-asmyself, it would be misleading to assert that this consciousness that I am is entirely contingent.
On the contrary, my consciousness did not spontaneously upsurge from the in-itself by its own
nothingness, but was constructed by others, often deliberately in their rearing efforts that are
most fundamentally constitutive of the consciousness that I am. The deliberate actions of others’
content-ed consciousnesses constitutively constructed my consciousness by purposefully guiding
me into the human world, and thereby imparting meanings to my being-as-others-as-myself.
Even when I move into being-as-others-for-myself, I do so in relationship with others that
necessarily entails meanings given I must show-up as a transcendence and preserve the other as a
transcendence.
Consequently, from a metaphysical or divine perspective my consciousness may remain
gratuitous and without meaning. In a different, but perhaps no less important sense I remain
firmly ensconced in the human world where my being and the world I confront is constitutively
constructed by others who confer meaning to my being-as-others-as-myself that I discover asmyself, and my being-as-others-for-myself that I create through my relationship with others.
Of course, the being-as-others-as-myself that I discover may be worthily revealed as
nausea. For example, I recall a New York mobster’s disgust that he had been “socialized” into
the mafia, which led to 18 years in prison. “A waste!” he exclaimed. He discovered his beingas-others-as-himself to be contemptible. Similarly, a drug dealer expressed his fondest wish that
he be bound and beaten for the choices he had made at variance with the values with which he
had been reared by his family. His being-as-others-for-himself was revealed by an experience
worse than nausea, one worthy of expiation via torture. But as noted in the section on guilt,

160

nausea that reveals my being-as-others is ontical rather than ontological, which of course creates
a very different human condition. And this different human condition makes love possible, as
described in the next section.

J. Sartre’s Love Reinterpreted

As richly argued, a thickly content-ed by others transpersonal consciousness is no longer a lack
of being, but experiences lack by denying its essence as-others in favor of privileging its
uniqueness and being-as-others-for-itself as primordial. Accordingly, its project to solve the
“problem of being”341 is that of realizing phenomenologically its being as-others rather than
remedying its lack; therefore, appropriation no longer occupies transpersonal consciousness as a
primordial telos, and has been revealed as contrary to its freedom expansion conceived as
identifying new possibilities. Therefore, the appropriative dynamics found in love relationships
founded by an individuated nothingness consciousness ignorant of our being-as-others no longer
need monopolize our attention, and can be substituted by other dynamics more
phenomenologically verisimilar and congruent with transpersonal ontology.
Consider that love has impressed humans for as long as recorded history for its beauty,
pleasure, and profundity. Plato’s Phaedrus concludes his remarks in the Symposium by affirming
“Thus, then I claim that Eros is eldest and most honored of gods and most authoritative in respect
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of possession of virtue and happiness for men both living and dead.”342 Recall that this
investigation conceives fraternal, familial, and romantic love as affection and concern for an
other greater than for oneself. This entails that love at its core is not enlightened self-interest or
contractual negotiation. The concern for the other greater than oneself distinguishes love from
other relationships by its desire to give without return, or at least give more than it expects in
return, which incurs uncompensated hardship, pain, loss and the like upon the giver.
Hence, self-sacrifice for the Other becomes one of love’s most revealing manifestations
and distinguishes it from other relationships based on self-interest.343 This view of love is
canonized by Jesus in the Gospel of John where he states “Greater love has no one than this, that
he lay down his life for his friends.”344 Love conjoins affection and sacrifice, and thus pleasure
and pain. Virtually every human activity can be understood along an antipodal continuum of
pleasure on one end and pain on the other, except for love where the two often merge.345 For
example, consider a favor performed on behalf of a loved one that incurs an uncompensated cost.
How often do we say “I am happy to do it?” Though often stated in a perfunctory manner to
facilitate future cooperation, it also reveals the deeper truth that in loving an other we commonly
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sacrifice ourselves willingly, even happily. My sacrifice for the Other makes me happy; by
virtue of my love for the Other, my pain becomes my pleasure.
For example, consider a mother’s love for her child that leads to a life-sacrificing act on
behalf of the child. Of course, a mother’s love for her child is only one example of such a love
relationship, as illustrated by Jesus’ statement about friends and Plato’s about lovers in the
Symposium. However, maternal love may be the most powerfully revealing. Viewed from a
spectator perspective, a mother’s life-sacrificing act appears to trade her life for that of her child,
which she values more than her own. This is the common interpretation of the natural attitude
that tacitly affirms subject-other dualism. But the spectator perspective fails to adequately
capture the mother’s phenomenology, which is that the performance of this act is not experienced
only as a sacrifice, an interpretation that would exclusively privilege subject-other ontology that
this investigation challenges. A feature of her phenomenology of the life-sacrificing act is her
awareness of her ontological unity with her child. Specifically, her consciousness is so fully
constituted by, so thoroughly identified and interpenetrating with the child’s consciousness, that
ontologically it is as if there is only one transpersonal consciousness. As noted in the previous
chapter, the peculiar ontology of consciousness is such that she is both individuated and unified
with her child, and to fully understand her phenomenology during such an act requires that both
dimensions be considered, the sacrifice for her child who is other than herself and the unity of
the child and herself.
Thus, the mother does not save her child entirely at the expense of herself because in
some primordial ontological sense there is no “child” and “herself.” Instead, she and the child
comprise a peculiar transpersonal consciousness on whose behalf she acts to further the child’s
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consciousness, which might be best characterized as the child-as-the-mother. Of course the
mother’s freedom and individuation as a being-as-others-for-herself is sacrificed upon her bodily
death, and as such the sacrifice identified by the spectator is accurate. However, there is also her
consciousness-as-the-child that persists as the child, and will develop as-the-child as the child’s
consciousness is constitutively constructed by-others and as-others-for-herself through time after
the mother’s death.
But perhaps a mother’s life-sacrificing choice on behalf of her child moves us too far
from the mundane experience on which this investigation is founded. Consider instead the
second portion of the definition of love “concern for an other.” To deeply love someone
commonly reveals a phenomenology of concern beyond duty or other abstract dicta. The
concern I experience with respect to the Other rises and falls as I become aware of his pain or
pleasure. The Other’s pain and pleasure, as I become aware of it, is not just known by me, or
vicariously experienced by me, but somehow directly experienced by me-as-the-other that I love,
as-myself. The Other’s pain or pleasure is mine to the extent that the mutual constructive
constituents of consciousness that transpersonally constitute “me” and the “other” are activated.
Said differently “I” experience the “other’s” pain given I am being-as-the-other rather than
separated from the other. At the same time, the pain between us is never entirely identical given
the idiosyncratic constellation of constituents and their recombinations that individuates each of
our consciousnesses.
This phenomenology of love in which my experience mirrors that of the other occurs
because I am the other, a being-as-the-other. Thus, the ontology love discloses is analogous to
the ontology of freedom that anguish discloses for Sartre. Recall his statement that the “essential
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structure” of “our consciousness of freedom” is anguish.346 Transpersonal ontology holds that
there is a specific consciousness of my being-as-others, which is love, and that love is the
“essential structure” of my consciousness of being-as-others. Said differently love most
distinctly manifests our primordial ontology as-others.
Further, consider the transpersonal ontology revealed by my suffering contemporaneous
and identical with that of the Other whom I love contrasted with Sartre’s phenomenology of
Pierre’s suffering. Sartre’s inability to share Pierre’s pain, or alternatively stated, the absence of
his intersubjective experience synonymous with Pierre’s, is inevitable in light of his ontology.
His cognized phenomenology in Being and Nothingness and The Transcendence of the Ego
conceives an isolated individuated consciousness that would seem to permit little alternative
given the “incommunicability and inwardness of consciousness.”347 At best such an isolated
consciousness can only reach the Other via analogical knowledge, which is how Sartre describes
Pierre. The pain of the Other cannot be “lived;” it is only known.348 This is the ontological
foundation for Sartre’s human relationships as “frontal opposition” and the dynamics that appear
to exclude the possibility of love as defined in this investigation.

K. Sartre’s Death Distress Reinterpreted

Like Sartre’s other discontents, a transpersonally constituted being-as-others consciousness
reinterprets his three dimensions of death distress. Consider the revised ontology of human
346
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identity this investigation advances. Each consciousness is not an individuated boundaried entity
interacting with, or even interdependent among other such entities. Instead, the person is
conceived as a consciousness diasporatically distributed among other persons. “Each''
consciousness is transpersonal, that is as-others, rather than an enclosed subjectivity. Of course,
as argued above, there is a dimension of consciousness that individuates itself by its unique
combination of constituents and by becoming a being-as-others-for-itself. But these autonomous
dimensions of consciousness are derived from its most fundamental ontology that is being-asothers. A transpersonal ontology that reconceives human identity diasporatically distributed
among others then leads to a different meaning of death.
Returning to Sartre’s first source of death distress, transpersonal ontology does not alter
the absurdity of death, its often perplexing and unpredictable timing, and lack of apparent
meaning. In this sense, death remains astonishingly gratuitous, the force of which can hardly be
overstated given COVID19, which shocks us by its very existence that starkly illustrates what
Butler aptly deems “the precariousness of life.”349 She observes “One would need to hear the
face as it speaks in something other than language to know the precariousness of life that is at
stake.”350 But life is more than simply precarious. It can also be undeniably absurd by its
apparently gratuitous termination exemplified by the capricious mortality of COVID19. Some
healthy and vigorous people succumb and some frail elderly people survive. Adding to the
absurdity of COVID19, in what we like to consider a rational universe, is the presence of long
terms ill effects that are not strongly associated with the severity of disease. But perhaps most
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absurd is the very existence of pathogens like Covid19 that are invisible in their existence and
transmission, and phenomenologically arise ex nihilo independent of human aims or
explanations. Indeed, contrary to many dangers the phenomenology of most pathogens is little
more than an abstraction until millions die, which testifies to the absurd quality of death that
Sartre describes and which is not altered by a transpersonal ontology.
However, Sartre’s second source of death distress, that of projects, can be revised.
Certainly upon my death I can no longer make choices that revise the meanings of my past and
future for me; my being-as-others-for-myself is terminated. Nevertheless, my consciousness as a
constructive constituent of others continues as-them, and the meaning I had for them as-them
continues to be revised by them as incorporated by their unfolding projects as a constituent.
Beauvoir expresses a similar point stating “...the death of an individual is not a failure if it is
integrated into a project which surpasses the limits of life, the substance of this life being outside
of the individual himself, in the class, in the socialist State…”351 But I can make a statement
stronger than Beauvoir’s. The diasporatic transpersonal subject that I am as-others and is othersas-me cannot be other than “integrated into a project which surpasses the limits of life.”352
Further, the constituents that are me as-others never were and never will be just objects for others
as Sartre claims. Recall that transpersonal consciousness is only constructed by other
consciousnesses confronted as consciousness, that is as a subjectivity, which is what I am asothers. Therefore, the constituent that I am as-them is always my subjectivity and remains my
subjectivity-as-them after my death, just as it was during my life.
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Said differently, in death the transpersonal diasporatic consciousness that I was, and
continue to be as-others escapes my grasp as my being-as-others-for-myself, but remains asothers who continue to re-interpret the consciousness that I was, and which constitutes them, as
they move forward with their projects as-others, part of which is “me” as a subject. Thus, by my
being-as-others, my consciousness in some literal sense continues to exist and participate in their
projects after my death. Indeed, “my” consciousness as a diasporatic entity is not limited or
fixed by incorporation into their projects during my life or after my death, but enlarged
transpersonally by being-as-them, which encompasses me as a constituent of their
consciousness. By being a constituent of their consciousness, my ontology is expanded and
extended beyond my being-as-others-for-myself and persists upon my death.
Thus, the living with whom I once interacted do not prey on me, they are me, in my life
and death. Upon death I am not “prey for the living”353 who confer upon me a meaning that
fixes my past and future any more than I was a prey for the living in life when I showed-up as a
subject and was confronted as a subject to potentiate my freedom. Instead, I remain a
constructive constituent that continues to exist most prominently in those with whom I was
closest in life, and as such was a pre-eminent constructional constituent that they carry into their
projects as-themselves.
Of course, in death some might prey upon me as Sartre describes, just as some might prey
upon me in life as a resource to overcome their self-created coefficients of adversity that limit the
enactment of their unconditioned choices, rather than engaging my subjectivity that promises to
expand their freedom by helping them identify new possibilities. However, such an outcome
353
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would be ontical rather than ontological; what appears most ontologically fundamental is the
continued existence of “my” consciousness as-others that persists and instantiates “me” in their
projects in different ways over time. To illustrate this point, consider the continued and changing
influence one experiences from an other, with whom one had a strong relationship, long after the
other’s death. The other persists as-me, and rather than being a fixed object used in my projects
is a continuously changing subjectivity that is me as my subjectivity as it continues to interact
and unfold with others and the world. Given the transpersonal ontology of consciousness it
could not be otherwise.
On the other hand, the unique combination of constructive constituents that are “me” and
that can become my being-as-others-for-myself comes to an end upon my death. This is an
unpleasant reality, but is mitigated by awareness that my most basic being does not end given its
diasporatic distribution among others, as-others; indeed, the catastrophe of death emanates from
misunderstanding my ontological essence as individuated based on the natural attitude. To assert
that my consciousness is entirely extinguished upon the death of my body again mistakes my
being-as-others-for-myself, or the private perspective I have upon my uniquely constructed
consciousness, for my primordial ontology, which is being-as-others that persists as me-asothers.
Those seeking a divine after-life or other transcendental meaning for death may argue
that this simply relocates the absurdity of my death to the absurdity of the transpersonal
consciousness of which I am a constructive constituent, and which will presumably end with the
extinction of humans. The absurdity of death has not been eliminated; life has simply been
extended by which the final reckoning is delayed. This point is acknowledged. However, as
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noted above this investigation seeks to articulate what it is like to be a human from a mundane
perspective, and as such does not address metaphysical or religious possibilities. But conceding
that no after-life or divine purpose exists, the resolution of death distress proposed here relies
upon the ultimate value of the human world, and the relationships we have with others as the
source of at least adequate, if not ultimate, meaning.
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VI.

Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Afterthoughts

A. Summary of Discontents and Ontology

The effort to resolve Sartre’s discontents and articulate a sanguine human condition that carries
phenomenological verisimilitude has been long and involved. Perhaps the most important
conclusion has been that discontent is not intrinsic to our ontology as human beings, but only one
ontical possibility among many; our discontent is largely gratuitous and chosen rather than
necessary.
The ontical possibility of discontent emanates from the misconceived individuated
nothingness consciousness Sartre articulates. This consciousness gives rise to intra-personal
discontents of meaninglessness, nausea, anguish, anxiety, isolation, bad faith, death distress and
lack by leaving us bereft of internal resources. We are adrift in absolute freedom without purpose
or guidance; this is the freedom that condemns. By contrast, a transpersonally content-ed
consciousness grounds us in our being-as-others, which either resolves or mitigates our
discontents by placing them within an intersubjective ontology that provides resources and
guidance, and can diasporatically distribute our fear and pain among others, rather than existing
them alone. Furthermore, our consciousness content-ed by our being-as-others re-conceives
inter-personal discontents of shame, alienation, exploitation, and guilt, and renders love possible.
Others are no longer objects to be used or overcome, but subjects essential to conceive new
possibilities that expand our freedom.
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Sadly, Sartre’s roster of discontents, particularly the intra-personal ones, could hardly be
a more accurate description of the current American moment where they are almost universally
conceived and/or experienced as endemic mental health problems. This should not be a surprise
in a culture excessively weighted in favor of our being-as-others-for-ourselves where our most
fundamental ontology as being-as-others is considered either an obstacle or afterthought to our
freedom. Moreover, the prescription often proffered for our distress is more individuation or
individuation absent forethought of the consequences for our basic ontology as-others. But
perhaps these remarks are better left for a slightly different investigation.
By contrast transpersonal ontology births a human condition in which we are not
condemned to be free and alone, but exist diasporatically as-others who can potentiate our
freedom. Contrary to Sartre’s claim in No Exit, the other is not hell; the other frees me, expands
me, and is me.354 Conforming my actions with the realization that I am the Other, and the Other
is me, and that both need to present themselves and interact with one another as a subjectivity is
the basis for living an authentically human life that conduces to my freedom and that of others.
On this rendering, Sartre’s discontents largely derive from ignorance of our ontology and the
choices consequent to that ignorance. Sartrean discontents that we commonly recognize are not
the result of malice, but mistaking our uniqueness and being-as-others-for-ourselves as our most
basic ontology; this is our fall from grace or what Beauvoir calls our “flaw within the
manthing.”355 Of course, this mistaken ontology characteristic of the natural attitude is not easy
to dislodge, and might offer a social purpose for philosophers able to articulate it more clearly
and persuasively than done here.
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Certainly, resolving Sartre’s discontents with transpersonal ontology does not eliminate
all suffering, but only those discontents resulting from ignorance of our ontology as-others.
Echoing Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud’s statement that psychoanalysis promises to turn
“neurotic misery into ordinary unhappiness,” transpersonal ontology fails to resolve much fear
and pain.356 However, the “ordinary unhappiness” we inevitably confront is neither shouldered
alone, nor simply known by others analogically.357 Instead it is diasporatically distributed
among others whose consciousnesses I am and are me; the fear and pain are distributed among
us, and thereby attenuated. Indeed, this is readily experienced by the emotion regulating effect
talking with others about our fear and pain commonly achieves. Simply telling others about our
“ordinary unhappiness” appreciably diminishes it, as witnessed in the success of supportive and
non-directive psychotherapies.358
But where does a transpersonal ontology leave Sartre’s project? Recall his twin goals: an
ontology of absolute freedom and an epistemology of pure confrontation with objects, both of
which he sought to preserve by advancing an individuated nothingness consciousness. As noted,
Sartre’s freedom as unconditioned choices is preserved; however, the deeper freedom identified
in this investigation as the creation of new possibilities assisted by others is not without limits.
Others may help me to conceive new possibilities, but they can only do so, whether by
conferring insight or providing themselves as re-constructive constituents, within the limits of
their consciousness as-others. Thus, we are not completely free to devise every possibility that
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exists within the possible arrangements of the in-itself, and as such there are limits to our
freedom at any given moment despite the best efforts or ourselves and others.
Similarly, because consciousness is not a nothingness, but a content-ed being as-others
that confronts objects, pure apprehension of objects absent encroachments by consciousness
becomes impossible, and complete knowledge unattainable. We are again in Kant’s
phenomenal-noumenal dualism that would appear to foreclose metaphysical knowledge. Said
differently, we confront being as and through human consciousness that is our being-as-others;
we can only know and live in a universe humanized by our being-as-others consciousness that
confronts the world.
Moreover, Sartre’s contingent gratuitous vision of existence, to include human being is
not entirely redeemed. Transpersonal ontology neither posits, nor rests on some ultimate
meaning or purpose to our lives. Certainly as Chapter 5 argues, it is not likely that our
consciousness, either as-others-as-myself or as-others-for-myself is entirely gratuitous given
both are deeply contexted by our being-as-others. Indeed, though I can create meaning as beingas-others-for-myself with the assistance of others, the majority of meaning I encounter will likely
be discovered as being-as-others-as-myself. Nevertheless, this meaning as-others, whether
created or discovered remains in some ultimate sense gratuitous; it is still a purely human
creation. The meaning of our lives then becomes less absurd by being embedded among and
created by others with whom we are ontologically connected and share the world. But this
simply re-locates the gratuity of our existence from the level of the individual to the species. For
many of us this may suffice, for others perhaps not. Finally this investigation closes with some
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reflections on the broader philosophical implications of transpersonal ontology, to which I now
turn.

B. Other Philosophical Implications of Transpersonal Ontology

Echoing Zlatev et. al.’s empirical claim that consciousness is intersubjectively shared and
fundamental to our humanity, transpersonal ontology challenges subject-other dualism that
characterizes Western philosophy. Indeed, the near ubiquity of subject-other dualism is what led
Zlatev et. al. to characterize their challenge as “bold.”359 But at this juncture in Western
philosophy, is it so bold?
Nearly 100 years ago Heidegger characterized subject-object dualism as “‘superficial,
formal” where there “lurks as much ‘truth’ as vacuity.”360 Consider the passage below
expressing these complaints reinterpreted, such that substituting his italicized key terms with
bracketed bolded terms expresses the problem of subject-other dualism.

It would be unintelligible for Being-in-the-world [others’ subjectivity] to remain
totally veiled from view, especially since Dasein has at its disposal an
understanding of its own Being [subjectivity], no matter how indefinitely this
understanding may function. But no sooner was the ‘phenomenon of knowing the
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world’ [phenomenon of knowing the Other] grasped than it got interpreted in a
‘superficial’, formal manner. The evidence for this is the procedure (still
customary today) of setting up knowing as a ‘relation between subject and
Object’ [relation between subject and other] - a procedure in which there lurks
as much ‘truth’ as vacuity. But subject and Object [Other] do not coincide with
Dasein and the world [Other].361

The next step in challenging subject-object dualism would appear to be challenging
subject-other dualism using an ontology of being-as-others. On this rendering,
transpersonal ontology transforms the problem of the Other into the problem of the Me.
Consider Sartre’s claims with respect to the problem of the Other,
…ontology is powerless to overcome it…But even if we could succeed in making
the Other’s existence share in the apodictic certainty of the cogito - i.e., of my
own existence - we should not thereby “surpass” the Other toward any intermonad totality. So long as consciousnesses exist, the separation and conflict of
consciousnesses will remain; we shall simply have discovered their foundation
and their true terrain.362
The present investigation turns this problem upside down. Ontology is not
“powerless to overcome”363 the problem of the Other, but finds the Other intrinsic to our
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ontology and therefore impossible to avoid; the “separation” of consciousnesses are not
the result of ontology, but of misapprehending ontology by the hypnotization of our
natural attitude by our unique consciousness regarded positionally as being-as-others-forourselves; and the “conflict of consciousnesses” that limits our freedom is replaced by a
transpersonal consciousness that requires the Other to expand our freedom.364
Finally, the “apodictic certainty”365 of Descartes cogito becomes “I think;
therefore an Other exists.” The other is not confronted after I discover myself existing,
but is the precondition for the most basic activity of my consciousness from which my I
emerges to confront the Other; to say that I exist presupposes the existence of other
consciousnesses that have constitutively constructed mine. Thus Beauvoir’s claim “It is
rather well known that the fact of being a subject is a universal fact and that the Cartesian
cogito expresses both the most individual experience and the most objective truth”
appears to conflate two disparate assertions.366 To affirm “the fact of being a subject”
does not entail an “individual experience” as Beauvoir claims, but rather confirms a
transpersonal experience. To what extent this truth becomes apodictic would appear to
depend on the extent to which the natural attitude that assumes subject-other ontology
can be replaced with a more basic phenomenology absent this assumption.
Therefore, Sartre’s “inter-monad totality” that merges me with the Other becomes
not impossible to achieve, but impossible to avoid.367 The puzzle that emerges from this
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transformed cogito is not the existence of the Other, but the existence of myself apart
from the Other, the derivation of my being-as-others-for-myself from my being-asothers-as-myself and the manner in which other consciousnesses constitutively construct
mine. Chapter 4 attempts to address this question and the success of that effort can be
determined by the reader. The core point is that the investigation of our ontology is given
a new direction, the results of which will unfold over time.
Furthermore, transpersonal consciousness advances a paradoxical and exceedingly
peculiar formal ontology at complete variance with that of substances. This ontology was noted
in Chapter 4 where consciousness was articulated as transpersonal, yet individuated; emanating
from and immanent with others, yet transcending others; both private and as-others; and an
individualized totality that is me and a diasporatic plurality as-others. Some of these paradoxes
may be only apparent and thereby escape Aristotle’s Law of Noncontradiction. However, some
may be irreconcilable contradictions that should not unduly trouble us given consciousness’
peculiar formal ontology, particularly if they articulate a high level of phenomenological
verisimilitude. In fact, such contradictions might be understood not as problems with the theory
but as clues to revealing the “hard problem” of consciousness that has been recalcitrant to
resolution.368
Indeed, a different formal ontology absent Aristotelian laws of thought might be entirely
necessary to effect Nagel’s revolution “as radical as relativity theory…”369 Such a re-thinking of
consciousness again raises questions of language, in particular the extent to which language
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derived from perception of substances has molded our primordial consciousness to conform
conceptually to the formal ontology of substances from which we struggle to escape. Language
derived from substance ontology may do more than simply impede communication about
consciousness, it may warp our thinking about consciousness based on an ontology
incommensurate with it. Thus, the method by which we seek to solve the mystery may preclude
its resolution. If this were so, then presumably novel concepts based on non-verbal language
might be required to approach the problem and communicate the findings. What such a method
and its concepts might be is beyond this investigation, but may be analogized with branches of
physics that could not be understood until new mathematical tools were devised. Hopefully, this
investigation that has sought to articulate an ontology that does not entail Sartre’s discontent has
advanced Nagel’s aspiration in some small way.
Lastly, recall that this investigation sought to advance a description of the human
condition by examining our subjective experience; specifically it advanced an ontology of
consciousness different from Sartre’s in an attempt to make space for human happiness. The
success criterion for the investigation was identified as phenomenological verisimilitude defined
as articulation of our subjective being that is some primordial manner known, but not previously
named or described. Each reader will have to evaluate if the ontology of consciousness proposed
by this investigation satisfies this criterion.
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